Propaganda against Propaganda: Deconstructing the Dominant Narrative of the Committee on Public Information by Howard, Christopher Eric & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROPAGANDA AGAINST PROPAGANDA: DECONSTRUCTING THE 
DOMINANT NARRATIVE OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis  
by 
CHRISTOPHER ERIC HOWARD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School 
 at Appalachian State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2014 
Department of History 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
PROPAGANDA AGAINST PROPAGANDA: DECONSTRUCTING THE 
DOMINANT NARRATIVE OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis  
by 
CHRISTOPHER ERIC HOWARD 
May 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED BY:  
  
 
        
Judkin J. Browning 
Chairperson, Thesis Committee 
 
 
        
Michael L. Krenn 
Member, Thesis Committee 
 
 
        
Lynne M. Getz 
Member, Thesis Committee 
 
 
        
Lucinda M. McCray 
Chairperson, Department of History 
 
 
        
Edelma D. Huntley, Ph.D. 
Dean, Cratis Williams Graduate School 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by Christopher Eric Howard 2014 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
PROPAGANDA AGAINST PROPAGANDA: DECONSTRUCTING THE 
DOMINANT NARRATIVE OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION 
 
Christopher Eric Howard 
B.S., Appalachian State University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson: Judkin Browning 
 
 
 This thesis examines how the World War I-era Committee on Public 
Information, created by President Woodrow Wilson and chaired by George Creel, has 
been presented as a case study in the dangers of government propaganda.  A thorough 
examination of the secondary literature on World War I propaganda, an extensive 
survey of United States History textbooks, and a gleaning of relevant websites 
confirms that a dominant narrative of the Committee exist.  This narrative relies on 
common persuasive techniques to cast the Committee, and by extension propaganda, 
in a negative light.  The dominant narrative’s claims are substantially disproven 
through a careful study of the wartime correspondence between Wilson and Creel and 
through the application of current Department of Defense methodology for 
determining the effectiveness of Psychological Operations.  By deconstructing this 
dominant narrative, this thesis argues in favor of a value-neutral interpretation of the 
Committee on Public Information. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We did not call it propaganda, for that word, in German hands, had come to be 
associated with deceit and corruption.  Our effort was educational and informative 
throughout, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that no other argument 
was needed than the simple, straightforward presentation of facts. 
 
George Creel 
How We Advertised America, 1920 
 
 
Anyone consulting the Wikipedia article on the “Committee on Public Information” 
will find, as the article’s foremost image, a striking example of World War I propaganda.  
This image is a World War I-era propaganda poster portraying a mustachioed gorilla, mouth 
agape, fangs exposed, bearing a club labeled “Kultur” in one hand and a helpless, bare-
breasted damsel in the other.  The gorilla, crowned with a spiked helmet (pickelhaube) 
bearing the word “militarism,” is standing on a shore that is labeled “America.”  Above the 
gorilla are the words “Destroy This Mad Brute.”  Below this image, the poster reads “Enlist,” 
with “U.S. Army” superimposed over it.  It is a stunningly vivid example of propaganda.  It 
seems likely that this particular poster has proven to be such an enduring symbol of World 
War I propaganda because it is so overt.  Its symbols are as clear as they are offensive to 
most modern eyes.  Its message is so clear that it does not need interpretation—and yet there 
is so much going on.  It takes some time to process all of the elements intellectually and yet 
its meaning is conveyed instantaneously.  It is an image that has become synonymous with 
propaganda and, through a variety of both scholarly and non-scholarly sources, with the 
Committee on Public Information (CPI), America’s “propaganda ministry” during World 
War I.
1
  The problem is that “Destroy This Mad Brute” was not the work of the CPI. 
                                                 
1. “Committee on Public Information,” Wikipedia, last modified November 23, 2013, accessed November 
23, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_on_Public_Information.  
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Errors such as the misattribution of “Destroy This Mad Brute” to the CPI are not 
uncommon.  In the century since the CPI’s brief existence (1917-1919), it has been the 
subject of misinterpretation as much as interpretation.  Successive generations of 
schoolchildren have learned about the CPI through textbooks that use “Destroy This Mad 
Brute,” among other evidence, to convey the excessiveness of the CPI.  Scholars seeking to 
prove the charge that the CPI resorted increasingly to appeals to hate and fear as the war 
progressed produce “Destroy This Mad Brute” as evidence.  They also present the CPI 
Chairman George Creel as a one-man show, a tactless bumbler, a petty tyrant or, worse yet, a 
villain who almost single-handedly suspended civil liberties in the name of wartime 
necessity.  Generations of scholars have also highlighted the CPI’s alleged excessiveness to 
make a broader point about the dangers of propaganda in a democratic society.  Over time, a 
dominant narrative of the CPI coalesced around these key tenets.  It feeds off of negative 
impressions of propaganda, exemplified by the CPI, and embraces the cautionary message 
that the CPI must be studied lest it, or something worse, be inflicted on the American people 
in the name of patriotism.   
This thesis argues that a dominant narrative of the CPI, as described above, exists and 
that it is not substantiated by the available evidence.  The cautionary aspect of the dominant 
narrative hinges on assumptions of the CPI’s effectiveness that wither under scrutiny.  
Additionally, the singular focus on George Creel overlooks the working relationship between 
Creel and President Woodrow Wilson, meanwhile ignoring the role of the thousands of 
Americans who volunteered their often considerable talents to the work of the CPI.  Finally, 
the dominant narrative excludes evidence of the CPI’s moderation because such evidence 
would undermine the cautionary message.  Scholars should reject this narrative in favor of a 
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historical interpretation of the CPI that recognizes that it was a vast cooperative, progressive, 
and largely voluntary enterprise that was relatively moderate when compared with many of 
the other forces vying for the American mind during World War I. 
Methodology 
Chapter one traces the development of the three competing historiographical 
interpretations of the CPI that emerged during the 1920s and 1930s as part of a broader 
struggle over the usefulness, meaning, and moral implications of propaganda.  The 
celebratory interpretation of the CPI was furthered mainly by those who had been directly 
involved in the work of the committee and is exemplified by the works of George Creel and 
Edward Bernays.  The instructive interpretation emerged out of a desire to study propaganda, 
and later the CPI, from a value-neutral perspective.  It is most thoroughly articulated in the 
works of James Mock and Cedric Larson, Stephen Vaughn, and David Kennedy.  Finally, the 
cautionary interpretation resulted from the nascent revisionist movement of the 1920s and 
can be observed in the work of Charles H. Hamlin and Harry Elmer Barnes.  More recently, 
this interpretation has been furthered by Stewart Halsey Ross and Thomas Fleming.  
Although the cautionary interpretation provides the cornerstone of the dominant narrative of 
the CPI, it is but one aspect of this narrative.  Chapter one provides evidence of the dominant 
narrative’s other components, drawing heavily from the recent secondary literature. 
After establishing the characteristics of the dominant narrative in chapter one, chapter 
two examines how this narrative has been perpetuated through standardized public school 
United States History curricula, through commonly adopted United States History textbooks, 
through several popular U.S. histories, and through several common web-based reference 
sites.  These sources are evaluated in order to determine compliance with the dominant 
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narrative of the CPI, as defined in chapter one. This evaluation involves both a broad survey 
of U.S. History textbooks, with a focus on more recent titles, and a longitudinal study of one 
representative title: Thomas Bailey’s The American Pageant, which spans from 1956 to the 
present.  Chapter two then examines two particular aspects of the dominant narrative that are 
commonly found in textbooks and reference materials and addresses the significance of each. 
Chapter three considers the question of whether the dominant narrative is accurate in 
portraying George Creel as the solitary leader, both mastermind and dictator, of the CPI and 
in portraying President Woodrow Wilson as a watchmaker who created the CPI and then left 
it in the hands of Creel.  This is done by examining Creel’s relationship with President 
Wilson, as seen through their wartime correspondence.  Chapter three also connects the CPI 
to the broader themes of the progressivism embraced by Wilson, Creel, and many of the 
CPI’s foot soldiers.  
Chapter four tests the dominant narrative’s claim that the CPI created a climate of 
fear, intolerance, and xenophobia during the war and that it was responsible for postwar 
disillusionment.  This is done by utilizing current Department of Defense doctrine for 
Psychological Operations (aka PSYOP or “Military Information Support Operations”).  
Chapter four also presents the operations of the CPI’s Division of Four-Minute Men within 
the construct of the doctrinal process for conducting PSYOP.  The case of the Four-Minute 
Men demonstrates that, despite the improvisational nature of the CPI, progressive 
inclinations toward bureaucratic efficiency resulted in strikingly modern operating 
procedures.  Finally, chapter four explores the CPI’s foreign operations and the role which 
the U.S. military played in supporting these operations.  This collaboration presaged the 
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development of U.S. public diplomacy and, subsequently, the PSYOP mission of “Defense 
Support to Public Diplomacy.”   
The Committee on Public Information: A Primer 
This thesis does not present a comprehensive narrative of the CPI.  James Mock and 
Cedric Larson’s Words that Won the War (1939) and Stephen Vaughn’s Holding Fast the 
Inner Lines (1980) are recommended reading for those desiring a complete overview of CPI 
operations.  The following is merely a brief primer intended to familiarize the reader with 
some basic information on the CPI. 
On April 14, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson issued Executive Order 2594 
establishing the CPI for the purpose of handling the sensitive issue of censorship and, more 
generally, of building popular support for the American war effort.
2
  The CPI consisted of 
Secretary of War Newton Baker, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, and Secretary of the 
Navy Josephus Daniels.  George Creel, a progressive journalist from Denver and longtime 
Wilson supporter, was appointed as the CPI’s civilian chairman.  Creel’s loyalty to Wilson 
was beyond question and Wilson responded in kind, particularly when Creel came under fire 
from enemies in Congress and elsewhere.   
Although it quickly became known as the “Creel Committee,” many men and women 
who were leaders in their respective fields eagerly joined Creel’s organization, most on a 
volunteer basis.  Many of the nation’s leading historians, led by Guy Stanton Ford of the 
University of Minnesota, volunteered their services writing pamphlets for the CPI that 
described, among other topics, the reasons for U.S. entry into the war and the true nature of 
the German enemy.  Many of these pamphlets were printed by the million.  Many of the 
                                                 
2. Executive Order 2594, April 14, 1917, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur Link, vol. 42, 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 59.  
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nation’s most famous artists, led by Charles Dana Gibson (perhaps the most famous of all), 
contributed over a thousand poster designs as part of the Division of Pictorial Publicity.  
Some of America’s leading journalists and authors lent their services to the CPI’s Bureau of 
Syndicate Features.  Leaders in America’s nascent film industry joined the ranks of the CPI, 
producing several feature-length films, along with many shorter featurettes and newsreels.  
The advertising industry signed on as well, securing millions in free advertising space for 
CPI products.  Other CPI divisions sprang up, as the need or opportunity dictated, until the 
total reached nineteen domestic divisions.
3
 
The CPI also enlisted thousands of faceless volunteers, perhaps as many as 150,000, 
into the fight for what Wilson himself referred to as “the verdict of mankind.”
4
  Half of this 
number, nearly 75,000 men, volunteered their services as “Four-Minute Men” who gave 
four-minute long speeches at movie theaters and in other public settings that encouraged their 
fellow citizens to support the war effort, among other ways, by purchasing liberty bonds, 
conserving food, donating blood, and registering for the draft.  Countless other volunteers 
served as translators, social workers, artists, writers, and clerical staff.  
Creel rejected strict censorship of the European mold and instead established 
guidelines for “voluntary censorship” on the part of the press.  In keeping with his notion of 
                                                 
3. James Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public 
Information: 1917-1919 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), 66-73.  Mock and Larson’s account 
remains, some seventy-five years after its publication, the best starting point for those seeking to learn about the 
CPI.  It is more comprehensive than the accounts by either Stephen Vaughn (Holding Fast the Inner Lines) or 
Alan Axelrod (Selling the Great War) and, while there is a mild but discernable pro-CPI bias, it is widely 
considered to be factually accurate. Vaughn’s is the second best source but does not address the CPI’s foreign 
operations.  Axelrod’s provides the most detailed biography of Creel of the three but draws heavily on Creel’s 
own writing and those of Mock and Larson. 
4. George Creel, Rebel at Large: Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1947), 158.  Written nearly thirty years after the war, Creel’s autobiography contains five somewhat brief 
chapters of his experiences as CPI Chairman.  His How We Advertised America (1920) provides a much fuller 
account of the CPI. 
 
7 
 
“expression, not suppression,” Creel believed that, by providing the press with war news, the 
CPI could simultaneously provide a valuable service and control the flow of sensitive 
information.
5
  Not all journalists agreed and, despite his intentions to avoid censorship, Creel 
came to be known as the “Chief Censor.”  Nevertheless, other government officials, such as 
Postmaster General Albert Sydney Burleson, were much more aggressive censors than 
Creel.
6
 
True to his muckraking past, Creel brought to his job the progressive’s faith in human 
rationality and the power of facts to persuade.  Many other progressives enlisted in his battle 
for the American mind, although not all shared Creel’s belief in the power of facts alone.  
Some, such as Gibson, openly rejected the appeal to reason and actively used appeals to 
emotion.  Such was the paradox of progressivism.  The progressive faith in rationality 
encouraged appeals to fact and reason while the progressive drive for efficiency encouraged 
appeals to fear, hatred, and other negative emotions.  It is the latter appeals for which the CPI 
is better known due to the fact that, unlike so much of its other work, its posters have 
survived. 
The CPI engaged in America’s first large-scale experiment in what would become 
known as “public diplomacy” by promoting the justness of America’s cause, as well as 
President Wilson’s peace plan (the “Fourteen Points”) around the world.  The CPI conducted 
operations in over thirty nations but its reach extended even farther than that.  President 
Wilson’s speeches were widely disseminated by the CPI and citizens in places such as Spain 
and Italy came to view Woodrow Wilson as a heroic figure who was perhaps the only man 
                                                 
5. Ibid., 157. 
6. David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), 75-77. 
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on the world stage who could bring about a just and lasting peace.  The success of the CPI’s 
foreign outreach has led to accusations that it had oversold the Fourteen Points and that this 
led to postwar disillusionment.  
On the domestic front, the CPI has been accused of promoting intolerance of all 
things German. Ironically, wartime opponents of the CPI often argued that the CPI did not go 
far enough to promote such feelings.  There is no objective way of determining how much 
the CPI contributed to vigilantism or anti-immigrant sentiment because many other 
organizations, such as the American Protective League and National Security League, 
aggressively promoted such behaviors and ideas through their own unsanctioned propaganda, 
as well as through direct action. 
Assessing the legacy of the CPI has proven challenging.  Both its domestic and 
foreign operations were clearly unprecedented in American history but the extent to which 
they were effective cannot be known.  What is known is that subsequent propaganda efforts 
by the U.S. government have been comparably less overt than the CPI because of the 
backlash against propaganda that followed World War I.  Even today, government efforts to 
rally public support in favor of military action are likely to draw comparisons with the CPI. 
The total cost of the CPI, by Creel’s accounting, was $6,850,000 ($5,600,000 from 
President’s War Fund and $1,250,000 from Congress).
7
  For sake of comparison, this would 
equal $105,946,364 in 2013 dollars.
8
  Creel accounts for $2,825,670 in receipts, which were 
                                                 
7. George Creel, How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on 
Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (1920; repr., 
London: Forgotten Books, 2012), 13. 
8. United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, “CPI Inflation Calculator” bls.gov, 
accessed November 23, 2013, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.  
 
9 
 
returned to the government, for a net operating cost of $4,912,553.  True to his effusive 
nature, Creel proclaimed: 
These figures might well be put in bronze to stand as an enduring monument 
to the sacrifice and devotion of the one hundred and fifty thousand men and 
women who were responsible for the results.  A world-fight for the verdict of 
mankind—a fight that was won against terrific odds—and all for less than five 
millions [sic]—less than half what Germany spent in Spain alone!
9
 
 
While indispensable as a primary source, Creel’s account has been used by both those 
seeking to praise and those seeking to bury Creel and his organization.  The sheer volume of 
the numbers provided by Creel—150,000 workers, 75,000 Four-Minute Men, 75,000,000 
pamphlets, 6,000 news releases—are often used as evidence of the CPI’s overreach.  Each 
number comes with its own caveat and yet critics of the CPI have found little need for 
investigation, let alone equivocation.  There is little need to dig deeper when the raw 
numbers prove the point that the CPI was a propaganda machine of Orwellian proportions.  
In this way, the dominant narrative is more polemical than it is historical.   
The dominant narrative is not entirely inaccurate but it is highly selective in its 
presentation of the CPI.  It is, quite simply, propaganda against propaganda—a clarion call 
for greater awareness of government attempts at deception.  Many of the propagandist’s 
tricks and techniques enumerated in the 1930s by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, most 
notably name-calling, transfer, and card-stacking, have been used for nearly a century, along 
with other persuasive techniques, to portray the CPI as a dark and regrettable episode in 
American history and George Creel as an irredeemable villain.  Deconstructing this biased 
and value-laden narrative of the CPI is an essential first step to restoring a sense of 
objectivity to the subject.  Examining the CPI for what it was, and was not, without imposing 
                                                 
9. Creel, How We Advertised America, 13. 
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moral judgments on its actions, its leaders, or on the broader issue of propaganda is the only 
way to arrive at an accurate assessment of its historical significance.
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CHAPTER ONE 
We Won’t Get Fooled Again: Defining a Dominant Narrative of the 
Committee on Public Instruction 
With a warning before them, the common people may be more on their guard when the 
war cloud next appears on the horizon and less disposed to accept as truth the rumours, 
explanations, and pronouncements issued for their consumption.   
 
Arthur Ponsonby  
Falsehood in War-time, 1928 
 
In his 1941 doctoral dissertation “George Creel and His Critics,” Walton Bean argued 
that “historians should reject the idea that the Committee on Public Information (CPI) was 
largely responsible for the war-time excesses of patriotic emotion.  Relative to general public 
opinion, it was actually a moderating influence.”
1
  Bean’s name appears in the bibliographies of 
only three subsequent accounts of the CPI and his conclusions have been largely ignored.  Rather 
than viewing the CPI as a moderating influence, most historians and commentators have drifted 
hard in the opposite direction, preferring to view it as a cautionary tale of the dangers of 
propaganda and overly-aroused patriotism.  This interpretation provides the cornerstone of the 
dominant narrative of the CPI. 
This chapter provides a detailed historiographical overview of the CPI in order to 
demonstrate that a dominant narrative of the CPI has emerged over the course of the past 
century.  It then investigates some of the key components of this narrative.  In brief, the 
dominant narrative disregards Walton Bean’s research and focuses instead on the perceived 
excesses of the CPI—the very ones that Bean endeavored to debunk—often with the stated goal 
of making the American public less susceptible to future propaganda campaigns.  Thus, the tone 
                                                 
1. Walton Bean, “George Creel and His Critics: A Study of the Attacks on the Committee on Public 
Information, 1917-1919,” abstract, (PhD diss., University of California, 1941). 
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of the dominant narrative is one of caution. This narrative also includes: the misattribution of 
non-CPI propaganda to that organization, ad hominem and teleological attacks on CPI Chairman 
George Creel and CPI Foreign Bureau deputy Edward Bernays, an emphasis on the role of the 
CPI in promoting intolerance and suppressing dissent, and the inclusion of the CPI in a broader 
narrative of deceit on the part of the United States government.  
Preconceived notions about the morality of propaganda have clouded attempts to 
understand the CPI from the beginning.  To those holding a negative perception of propaganda, 
the CPI is presumed guilty—no further investigation is needed.  If propaganda is bad then the 
CPI was bad because the CPI was America’s first “propaganda ministry.”  The dominant 
narrative of the CPI hinges on this tautology.   
Separating the CPI from the issue of propaganda, though essential to attaining a sense of 
objectivity, was difficult in the postwar years.  The Great War had initiated a battle for the 
meaning of the word itself that lasted until the outbreak of another even greater war.  Out of this 
battle emerged three distinct interpretations of the CPI.  The celebratory interpretation, promoted 
mainly by CPI alumni, recognized great potential in the positive application of propaganda.  The 
instructive interpretation viewed propaganda from a neutral perspective as a thing to be studied.  
The cautionary interpretation, rooted in wartime criticisms of the CPI by the press, disaffected 
progressives, and Republican legislators, presented the CPI as evidence of the dangers of 
propaganda.   
The Battle for the Word “Propaganda” 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, the word “propaganda” dates to the year 1622, when 
Pope Gregory XV founded a committee of cardinals responsible for foreign mission.  The actual 
term comes from the Latin congregatio de propaganda fide or “congregation for propagation of 
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the faith.”
2
  This remained the dominant definition until World War I, although it had already 
taken on a secular meaning in the context sense of spreading ideas.  In his 1928 book 
Propaganda, CPI alumnus Edward Bernays quotes the following definition of propaganda from 
Funk and Wagnall’s Dictionary: “effort directed systematically toward the gaining of public 
support for an opinion or a course of action.”
3
 Bernays speaks to how the connotation of 
propaganda had changed as a result of the war.  To make his point, he quotes at length from an 
article from Scientific American, in which the unidentified author states: “there is no word in the 
English language whose meaning has been so sadly distorted as the word ‘propaganda.’  The 
change took place during the late war when the term took on a decidedly sinister complexion.”
4
   
Bernays wrote with the intention of redeeming the word, which he found to be essentially 
neutral.  In 1923’s Crystallizing Public Opinion, Bernays argued that “the only difference 
between ‘propaganda’ and ‘education,’ really, is in the point of view.  The advocacy of what we 
believe in is education.  The advocacy of what we don’t believe in is propaganda.”
5
  Five years 
later, in Propaganda, he picked up on the same theme, stating, “I am aware that the word 
propaganda carries to many minds an unpleasant connotation.  Yet whether, in any instance, 
propaganda is good or bad depends upon the merit of the cause urged, and the correctness of the 
information published.”
6
  George Creel was more cautious in his approach to the word 
propaganda, owing to its negative connotation: “We did not call [the CPI’s work] propaganda, 
                                                 
2. Oxford Dictionaries, s.v. “propaganda,” accessed November 22, 2013, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/propaganda. 
3. Edward Bernays, Propaganda (New York: Ig Publishing, 1928). 48. The exact version of Funk and 
Wagnall’s Dictionary is unknown, as Bernays’s failed to provide a note for this definition.  In this dictionary entry, 
the initial definition provided is the religious one (“A society of cardinals, the overseers of foreign mission…”).  
4. Ibid. 
5. Edward Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion (New York: Ig Publishing, 1923). 200. 
6. Bernays, Propaganda, 48. 
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for that word, in German hands, has come to be associated with deceit and corruption.”
7
  
Nevertheless, Creel, like Bernays, believed in the usefulness, even morality, of propaganda.  The 
belief that propaganda could be employed to positive ends, and that the CPI had done so, is 
characteristic of the celebratory interpretation. 
Harold Lasswell, perhaps the first to study World War I propaganda from a scholarly 
perspective, attempted to explain this new connotation of propaganda in his landmark study 
Propaganda Technique in the Great War (1927).  Lasswell asserts that propaganda had “an 
ominous clang in many minds” which he traces to the feeling, among many Americans, that they 
had been fooled by wartime propaganda.
8
  He observes, “We live among more people than ever, 
who are puzzled, uneasy, or vexed at the unknown cunning which seems to have duped and 
degraded them.”
9
  This feeling of having been tricked, Lasswell argues, leads to a desire to know 
how it was done.  He notes, “These people probe the mysteries of propaganda with that 
compound of admiration and chagrin with which the victims of a new gambling trick demand to 
have the thing explained.”
10
   
During the 1930s, as propaganda aided the rise of totalitarian regimes abroad and 
demagogues at home, Bernays’s fight to restore respectability was all but lost.  In 1933, the 
President’s Research Committee on Recent Social Trends noted that both “interest in 
                                                 
7. George Creel, How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on 
Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (1920; repr., London: 
Forgotten Books, 2012), 4. 
8. Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in World War I (1927; repr., Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
M.I.T. Press, 1971), 2. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid., 2-3. 
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Americanization” and “anti-alien propaganda” peaked during the period from 1918 to 1924.
11
  In 
a more general sense, the committee’s report expressed growing anxieties about the power of 
propaganda and its compatibility with democracy, noting that “the expensive control of masses 
of people through the arts of organized publicity and propaganda presents its dubious aspects to 
the observer of democratic trends.”
12
  The committee’s report expressed the fear that this 
tendency could lead to the “emergence of some recognized and avowed form of plutocratic 
dictatorship.”
13
 
It was into such a climate that the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) was born in 
1937.  Its founder, Columbia University professor Clyde R. Miller, had been a reporter during 
World War I and felt as if he, like so many others, had been “hoodwinked” by the propaganda 
effort.
14
    It concerned itself with propaganda of all sorts, defining it as “the expression of 
opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions 
of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends.”
15
  The Fine Art of 
Propaganda: A Study of Father Coughlin’s Speeches (1939), their most famous work, outlined 
the seven basic propaganda techniques.  By September 1939, the IPA’s materials were being 
used in 550 high schools and colleges.
16
  It disbanded in 1941 believing that, with war on the 
horizon, it would be unpatriotic to analyze, and to thus risk undermining, government 
                                                 
11. President’s Research Committee on Social Trends, Recent Social Trends in the United States (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933), 557. 
12. Ibid., lxviii. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
Publications, 2006), 163. 
15. Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee, The Fine Art of Propaganda (1939; repr., San Francisco: 
International Society for General Semantics, 1979), 15. 
16. Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 228. 
 
16 
 
propaganda during wartime.
17
  Nevertheless, it left as its legacy a desire, as Lasswell termed it, to 
have “the thing explained.”   
Modern definitions of propaganda reveal how the word has taken on a decidedly different 
connotation during the century since World War I began.  The Oxford Dictionary now has, as its 
primary definition of propaganda: “chiefly derogatory information, especially of a biased or 
misleading nature, used to promote or publicize a particular political cause or point of view” and 
traces the origin of this sense of the word “from the early 20
th
 century.”
 18  
Similarly, Merriam-
Webster currently defines propaganda as “ideas or statements that are often false or exaggerated 
and that are spread in order to help a cause, a political leader, a government, etc.”
19
  The U.S. 
military, which, in cooperation with the CPI pioneered tactical propaganda techniques during 
World War I, currently uses the term propaganda to refer exclusively to enemy communications, 
defining propaganda as: “Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or 
misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any 
group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly.”
20
 
Some recent propaganda scholars have attempted to restore neutrality to the term 
propaganda.  In Propaganda and Persuasion, communications experts Garth Jowett and Victoria 
O’Donnell express their intention to evaluate propaganda “in a contemporary context free from 
                                                 
17. Lee and Lee, The Fine Art of Propaganda, xii. 
18. Oxford Dictionaries, s.v. “propaganda.” 
19. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “propaganda,” accessed November 22, 2013, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/propaganda. 
20. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-53: Military Information Support Operations 
(January 2013), Glossary-10. 
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value-laden definitions.”
21
  Just as was the case with Bernays eighty years earlier, those 
attempting to follow Jowett and O’Donnell’s value-neutral approach face an uphill battle, as 
propaganda has accumulated even more of a negative connotation in the century since World 
War I due to its frequent employment and the subsequent feeling, on the part of its victims, of 
having been duped. 
The Celebratory Interpretation: History or Gloating?  
Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell trace popular disdain for the CPI to the perceived 
gloating of George Creel and his fellow wartime propagandists, saying, “The reaction against 
government propaganda was particularly virulent, as those responsible for creating the successful 
campaigns during the war seemed only too eager to explain how it was all done.”
22
  George 
Creel, Edward Bernays, and Guy Stanton Ford were among those who contributed to the 
celebratory interpretation of the CPI in the decade following the war.  In fact, their perceived 
gloating started almost immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. 
Guy Stanton Ford, Professor of History and Dean of Graduate Studies at the University 
of Minnesota, wasted no time in boasting of the CPI’s accomplishments.  Ford had been the head 
of the CPI’s division of Civic and Educational Cooperation and assisted the CPI in other 
capacities, such as editing the Four Minute Men Bulletin.  In an address to the Minnesota 
Historical Society on January 20, 1919, Ford boasted of the CPI’s importance: “I think that as 
time goes on and as the history of this committee’s work is written and its accomplishments are 
better understood, the executive order of April 14 [which formed the CPI] will be seen as one of 
                                                 
21. Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 2.  They define propaganda as “the deliberate, 
systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that 
furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (7).  
22. Ibid., 221. 
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the most perspicacious things that was done in preparation for the struggle.”
23
  He also defends 
the CPI against charges of censorship, describes its organization and rapid expansion, and 
explains the functions of its various divisions.  His speech was published in the February 1919 
edition of the Minnesota History Bulletin, making it the earliest published overview of the CPI. 
Drawing heavily from the Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public 
Information 1917: 1918: 1919, George Creel published an exhaustive retelling of the CPI in 
How We Advertised America (1920).  Its subtitle gives evidence to Creel’s enthusiasm: The First 
Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information That Carried the Gospel of 
Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe.  Critics of Creel and, more generally, of the CPI, 
were rankled by his exuberant treatment of the organization that he led from 1917 to 1919.  
Beyond simply describing the structure and functions of the CPI, Creel attempted to vindicate 
himself and his organization from its wartime critics, an undertaking that he had yet to complete 
to his own satisfaction in 1947 when he published his autobiography Rebel at Large: 
Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years. 
During the decade following the war, CPI alumnus Edward Bernays published two 
influential books on the emerging field of public relations: Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923) 
and Propaganda (1928). While neither book dealt specifically with the CPI, the fact that Bernays 
openly and unapologetically touted the value of the “public relations counsel” led to ex post facto 
suspicion of the CPI.  The way Bernays spoke of persuasion—coolly and scientifically—
unnerved those who were already suspicious of propaganda.   
One non-CPI writer who made a noteworthy contribution to the celebratory tradition was 
journalist Mark Sullivan.  A contemporary observer of the CPI, Sullivan devotes two chapters of 
                                                 
23. Guy Stanton Ford, “America’s Fight for Public Opinion,” Minnesota History Bulletin 3, no. 1 (Feb., 1919): 
7-8. 
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his multivolume series on the early twentieth century (Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925) 
to a discussion of Creel and the CPI.  These chapters, entitled “A New Device in War” and 
“Wilson Makes War With Ideas,” span over thirty pages and cover the controversial personality 
of George Creel, the organization and scope of the CPI, Creel’s run-ins with Congress, his 
relation to Woodrow Wilson, and the CPI’s legacy and aftermath.  Though not as unequivocally 
positive as Creel’s own account, Sullivan is sympathetic and, at times, expansive in his 
descriptions of the CPI—particularly when describing the success of the CPI’s foreign work.  
Sullivan presents the CPI as being synonymous with Creel, saying that “like most institutions, 
the Committee on Public Information was the shadow of a man; and the man was not Wilson, it 
was George Creel.”
24
  Sullivan creates the impression that Creel was the mastermind of the CPI, 
seven times mentioning that Creel “mobilized” a specific group of people for the CPI’s 
purposes.
25
   
Walton Bean’s 1941 dissertation, “George Creel and His Critics: A Study of the Attacks 
on the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919” is a rare scholarly work that falls within 
the parameters of the celebratory interpretation.  Bean makes no attempt to describe the CPI’s 
organization or operations.  Instead, his goal is to address, and then rebut, the major criticisms of 
George Creel.  CPI historian Stephen Vaughn comments on Bean’s lack of objectivity by calling 
it a “ringing defense of the CPI’s chairman and his committee” and by saying “one is sometimes 
left with the impression that this study is an expansion of Creel’s How We Advertised America.
26
   
                                                 
24. Mark Sullivan, Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925, vol. 4, Over Here, 1914-1918 (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1933), 424. 
25. Ibid., 428-433. 
26. Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public 
Information (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 351. 
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Bean is convincing in parrying the charges of Creel’s lack of qualifications to be CPI 
chairman and charges of Creel’s partisanship.  He provides evidence that most of Creel’s 
enemies were Congressional Republicans who attacked Creel as an indirect way of criticizing 
Woodrow Wilson or Democrats with a personal vendetta against Creel.  He also defends the CPI 
against the most publicized accusations of false reporting by tracing each of the four known 
instances of erroneous CPI reports to their source.  Of the four, Bean found a CPI employee to be 
responsible for only one of the errors.
27
  Finally, he notes the irony that critics had cast the CPI 
as a promoter of excessive patriotism and “100 percent Americanism” when, during the war, it 
was just as often criticized for not going far enough.  For example, the CPI made only limited 
use of stories of German atrocities that would later be used as evidence, by adherents to the 
cautionary interpretation (most notably Stewart Halsey Ross and Thomas Fleming), as examples 
of the CPI’s irresponsibility.  That Bean’s work has been overlooked by so many historians is 
unfortunate because his arguments in favor of the CPI’s moderation are particularly compelling.   
The Instructive Interpretation: Learning from the CPI 
In early 1939, National Archives historian James R. Mock and historian Cedric Larson’s 
article “The Lost Files of the Creel Committee of 1917-1919” appeared in Public Opinion 
Quarterly.  They were the first historians to locate and study the CPI files that had been 
misplaced during the Committee’s chaotic liquidation in 1919.
28
  In the fall of 1939, Mock and 
Larson published the first full-length study of the Committee on Public Information: Words that 
Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919.  As their title 
indicates, Mock and Larson cast the CPI in a positive light.  The book is more descriptive than 
                                                 
27.  Bean, “George Creel and His Critics,” 166-167. 
28. Cedric Larson and James R. Mock, “The Lost Files of the Creel Committee of 1917-1919,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 3, no. 1 (January 1939): 5. 
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argumentative but it was clear that Mock and Larson took no issue with the CPI’s work and 
viewed the CPI as a suitable template on which to build the government’s next propaganda 
agency.  In fact, Mock and Larson’s work would fall under the celebratory interpretation if not 
for the facts that they did not allow George Creel to escape his role in wartime censorship and 
that they avoided the sort of overtly congratulatory language that characterized the celebratory 
accounts.  Since 1939, Words that Won the War has provided a starting point, along with Creel’s 
How We Advertised America, for nearly all subsequent studies of the CPI.  It remains the most 
comprehensive source for information about the CPI. 
The instructive approach to the CPI continued after World War II but, after Words that 
Won the War, no full length study of the CPI appeared until 1980 when communications 
historian Stephen Vaughn published Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and 
the Committee on Public Information.
29
  Vaughn does what few historians of the CPI have 
                                                 
29. In 1948, Paul M.A. Linbarger published Psychological Warfare, which included the following brief but 
perceptive summary of the CPI’s legacy: “The war propaganda left a rather bad taste in the mouth of many 
Americans, and the boisterous joviality of the arousers probably produced negative attitudes which encouraged 
pacifism and isolationism in the postwar years” [Paul Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (1948; repr., Landisville, 
Pennsylvania: Coachwhip Publications, 2010), 101]. 
In 1953, Ph.D. candidate Wayne Nicholas’s dissertation “Crossroads Oratory: A Study of the Four Minute 
Men of World War I” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1953) provided the first detailed study of the CPI’s Four-
Minute Men: “Crusading Oratory: A Study of the Four-Minute Men in World War I.”  Nicholas studies the topics 
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CPI but he found it to be generally effective.  He complimented Creel, calling him “a man of great resourcefulness, 
determined, hard-working, and full of verve and energy” [Charles Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare, 1914-
1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 1974), 42].  
Several articles were consulted for this study that fit within the instructive tradition.  These include: Daniel 
Pope, “The Advertising Industry in World War I,” The Public Historian 2, no. 3 (Summer 1980): 4-25; Eric Van 
Schaak, “The Division of Pictorial Publicity in World War I,” Design Issues 22, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 32-45; James 
R. Mock, “The Creel Committee in Latin America,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 22, no. 2 (May 
1942): 262-279; Gregg Wolper, “Wilsonian Public Diplomacy: The Committee on Public Information in Spain,” 
Diplomatic History 17, no. 1 (January 1993): 17-34. 
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bothered doing, which is to shift the focus off of the person of George Creel.  Instead, Vaughn 
profiles other key members of the CPI apparatus, many of whom acted largely independently 
from Creel (including Guy Stanton Ford, Charles Dana Gibson, Edgar Sisson, Arthur Bullard, 
Carl Byoir).  By breaking Creel’s monopoly on the CPI, Vaughn discredits the view (which 
persists to this day) that the CPI was Creel’s one man show.  Vaughn also makes the link 
between the CPI and progressivism more clearly than any other CPI historian.  Vaughn’s account 
largely vindicates the CPI and Creel but he deftly avoids excessive praise, caution, or 
condemnation.  Vaughn also provides a forty-two page bibliographic essay that thoroughly 
addresses the historiography of the CPI up to the time of his writing.  Vaughn does not seek to 
acquit the CPI but he does present it as less ominous and more moderate than it is sometimes 
portrayed, noting in his conclusion, “Much of the Committee on Public Information’s work was 
well intentioned, and much was worthwhile.  For the most part the committee stressed 
antimilitarism, antiauthoritarianism, and the defense of democratic government.”
30
 
Appearing in the same year (1980) as Holding Fast the Inner Lines was historian David 
Kennedy’s Over Here: The First World War and American Society.  This has become the 
standard work for those studying the American home front during World War I.  Kennedy 
devotes one lengthy chapter to the “The War for the American Mind,” in which he provides a 
rather even-handed account of the CPI that recognizes that the CPI was not the sole enemy, or 
even the greatest enemy, to civil liberties during the war.  He describes Creel “as both the agent 
and the symbol of the usually benign democratic impulse sometimes run amok under the strain 
of war.”
31
  For Kennedy, the American Protective League, Postmaster General Albert Sidney 
                                                 
30. Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines, 238.   
31. David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), 75. 
 
23 
 
Burleson, and Attorney General Thomas Gregory were all more menacing to individual freedom 
than Creel or his Committee.  This does not, however, get Creel and the CPI entirely off the 
hook.  Kennedy makes it clear that, while the CPI was not the bogeyman that some make it out 
to be, it was complicit in the suppression of civil liberties during the war.  Over Here straddles 
the boundary between the instructive and cautionary interpretations. While Kennedy echoes 
certain themes that are characteristic of the cautionary interpretation, his focus is more on 
explaining the CPI within the broader propaganda war than on persuading the reader of the 
dangers of propaganda.
32
 
In 1991, historian Gregg Wolper provided the most complete scholarly study to date of 
the CPI’s foreign operations in his dissertation “The Origins of Public Diplomacy: Woodrow 
Wilson, George Creel and the Committee on Public Information.”  He presents the CPI as the 
first case of what would come to be known as “public diplomacy,” which may be defined as the 
selling of U.S. policy goals, culture, and ideas to foreign audiences.  He notes in his introduction 
that “the CPI used news articles, feature stories, lectures, movies and more in an effort to 
publicize the American military contribution, spread the words of Woodrow Wilson, and, in 
general, create a more positive image of the United States.”
33
  Wolper focuses his research 
primarily on CPI operations in Spain, Russia, Italy, and Switzerland—all countries in which the 
CPI was quite active.  His work is original and important to understanding the full scope of the 
CPI’s operations but it has been largely overlooked. 
The most recent book-length treatment of the CPI appeared in 2009, in the form of 
popular historian Alan Axelrod’s Selling the Great War: The Making of American Propaganda.  
                                                 
32. Kennedy notes the similarities between the World War I propaganda effort and George Orwell’s Oceania 
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Axelrod presents the CPI, if not as Walton Bean’s “moderating force,” then certainly as one 
undeserving of its sullied reputation.  Axelrod provides the most thorough, and most favorable, 
account of the life of George Creel available outside of Creel’s own writings.
34
  It should come 
as no surprise that Creel’s own autobiography (Rebel at Large) provided the vast majority of 
Axelrod’s material, particularly in the early biographical chapters of the book.  For details on the 
formation and operation of the CPI, Axelrod consults Creel’s How We Advertised America 
frequently.  Of the standard historiography of the CPI, only Creel’s works and Mock and 
Larson’s Words that Won the War appear in Axelrod’s notes.  That he relies so heavily on these 
older, less critical accounts helps to explain why Axelrod’s treatment of Creel and the CPI is 
more sympathetic than other recent accounts tend to be.
35
 
Despite Axelrod’s generally positive presentation of the CPI, there is also an inescapable 
presentism in his writing.  He begins and ends his book by making references to the attempts of 
President George W. Bush’s use of propaganda and deception to sell the Iraq War to America.  
This is the essence of the cautionary interpretation of the CPI. 
The Cautionary Interpretation 
While the cautionary interpretation began to take shape during the war with the criticism 
of Creel and the CPI coming from both the right and the left, it solidified during the interwar 
period.  In Historians on the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War (1970), 
                                                 
34. No full-length biography of George Creel exists. 
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historian George Blakey provides an account of how historians were mobilized in the World War 
I propaganda effort by focusing on the activities of three organizations: the CPI, the National 
Board for Historical Service, and the National Security League.  Blakey offers two explanations 
for why opinion turned against the CPI so quickly after the end of the war.  The first was 
political in nature.  Republicans identified the CPI with their mortal enemy, President Woodrow 
Wilson.  More specifically, they targeted George Creel as a way of getting to Wilson.  The 
historians who worked for the CPI (and other organizations) got caught in the postwar 
recriminations. Blakey observed: “The irony of much of the Republican criticism is that it was 
intended for Wilson, aimed at Creel, and hit the historians.”
36
  This left many of these historians 
on the defensive and somewhat discredited professionally.  While few among them ever refuted 
their wartime work as propagandists, and some (such as Guy Stanton Ford) defended it 
vigorously, most simply “kept silent or made their assessment (of their wartime work) so 
circumspect as to be uninformative.”
37
   
The second explanation of hostility towards the CPI resulted from the rejection of 
Wilsonian idealism by revisionist thinkers and historians.  This started during the war, as Blakey 
noted: “Even before the war ended the crippled and bitter pacifist of Greenwich Village, 
Randolph Bourne, had pointed out that ‘there is work to be done to prevent this war of ours from 
passing into popular mythology as a holy crusade.’”
38
  Blakey continued, “This invitation to 
rebuke Wilsonian idealism became the keynote of many American historians during the 1920s 
                                                 
36. George Blakey, Historians of the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War (Lexington: The 
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37. Ibid., 146. 
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and 1930s and revisionism grew into an academic and publishing industry itself.”
39
  This 
scholarship provided the foundation for the cautionary interpretation of the CPI. 
Of these revisionists, none was more hostile toward the wartime propaganda work of 
historians, or the perpetuation of its themes in postwar historical texts, than the disenchanted 
National Security League alumnus Harry Elmer Barnes.  Starting in the early 1920s, Barnes 
engaged in a vigorous crusade to bring what Herbert Croly of the New Republic termed 
“historical integrity” to the study of the late war.
40
  Barnes took particular exception to the notion 
of Germany’s sole war guilt, which had been a theme of multiple CPI pamphlets and speeches. 
His most enduring work on this front was The Genesis of the World War (1926).  Barnes stirred a 
passionate debate within the historical community and his campaign to dispel the myths of 
Wilsonian idealism continued until his death in 1968.
41
 
Harry Barnes’s fellow revisionist, Charles Hunter Hamlin, was shocked by the 
revelations of fellow historians regarding the extent of propaganda in the recent World War.
42
  In 
1927, Hamlin published The War Myth in United States History, which would become the first 
work of history that placed the First World War within the context of a greater tradition of 
wartime deception.
43
  Hamlin’s assessment of the CPI was unequivocally negative.  He asserts 
                                                 
39. Ibid., 131-132. 
40. Ibid., 133. 
41. Ibid., 134-136. 
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that “no effort was made to present the truth” and the CPI “was the greatest fraud ever sold to the 
public in the name of patriotism and religion.”
44
 
In 1928, the same year that Edward Bernays published Propaganda with the hope of 
redeeming that word, a British Member of Parliament by the name of Arthur Ponsonby published 
a critique of World War I propaganda entitled, tellingly, Falsehood in War-time: Containing an 
Assortment of Lies Circulated throughout the Nations during the Great War. Ponsonby was clear 
on the cautionary purpose of his study: “With a warning before them, the common people may 
be more on their guard when the war cloud next appears on the horizon and less disposed to 
accept as truth the rumours, explanations, and pronouncements issued for their consumption.”
 45
 
Ponsonby’s refutation of the wartime Bryce Report on German atrocities in Belgium 
served as an indictment of the CPI, which had utilized some of the Bryce Report’s claims. 
Ponsonby’s cautionary message has been embraced by many historians of the CPI.  This 
cautionary interpretation is demonstrated in the forward to the 1971 reprint of Ponsonby’s book, 
in which Blanche Wiesen Cook of John Jay College, City University of New York, opens: “With 
the publication of the Pentagon Papers, Americans have been brutally reminded that war always 
subverts truth.”
46
  
The cautionary interpretation is sometimes found in unlikely places.  In a review of 
James Mock and Cedric Larson’s Words that Won the War for the Winter 1939 issue of The 
North American Review, the anonymous reviewer notes: “the history of that period [World War 
I] is repeating itself” and recommends Words that Won the War be listed as “required reading” 
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lest the CPI be reactivated in the coming conflict.
47
  Taking a source that was neutral, if not 
positive, towards the CPI and turning it into a cautionary tale about the menace of propaganda 
was to become characteristic of the cautionary interpretation.  In this case, the reviewer barely 
addressed the contents of the book, let alone the authors’ pro-CPI bias.  The CPI had become a 
thing to be molded to serve his or her purposes. 
Writing in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, historian Stewart Halsey Ross invokes 
the cautionary tradition in the most unequivocal language in Propaganda for War (1996), 
stating: “This book is about how the United States was conditioned to fight the Great War of 
1914-1918.  Its focus is on the hypocrisies and deceptions of propaganda, and how the war was 
packaged, promoted, and sold to a gullible nation as a holy crusade against evil.”
48
  Ross notes 
the similarities between America’s first great crusade of the twentieth century and its last, 
saying: “Seventy-five years after Americans were assigned an alliterative “Beast of Berlin” 
(Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II), they were given a “Butcher of Baghdad” (Iraq’s president, 
Saddam Hussein) as the hated-enemy symbol for the 1992 Persian Gulf war [sic].”
49
  So clearly 
does Ross articulate the key tenets of the cautionary interpretation that he deserves to be quoted 
at length:  
As before, Americans were charged with fighting an enemy “now” rather than 
“later,” and the timeworn atrocities of ‘rape and pillage’ made headlines.  
Crushing wartime news censorship by the Pentagon mocked America’s press 
freedoms, and again, big-business communications media enthusiastically 
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followed Washington’s lead.  Propaganda for war in the United States was alive 
and well in the last decade of the twentieth century.
50
    
 
Inspired by the same war as Ross, Boston reporter Larry Tye begins his biography of CPI 
alumnus Edward Bernays by saying, “the selling of the Persian Gulf War on America was a 
public relations triumph.”
51
  Tye continues, “but the whole notion that the United States had been 
rallied to war by a massive hidden PR campaign left many Americans doubting the soundness of 
their own opinions and wondering whether our very thoughts were being tampered with right 
here in the hub of democracy.”
52
   
Less than a decade later, new conflicts would inspire new treatments of the CPI as a 
cautionary tale.  In 2003’s The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I, historian Thomas 
Fleming surpasses Stewart Halsey Ross in his disdain for both Creel and the CPI.  He introduces 
a phrase missing in other accounts of the CPI: “creeling.”  Fleming claims that this was a term in 
use by “many papers” by the summer of 1917 and was “synonymous with government hot air.”
53
  
One specific instance of “creeling” mentioned by Fleming involved the erroneous report, 
presumably by the CPI, that the first American military aircraft were on their way to France.  His 
source for the incident was George Creel’s How We Advertised America, in which Creel 
attempted to defend himself—an attempt that failed to persuade Fleming.
54
  One can only 
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speculate how Fleming’s opinion might have been affected had he consulted Walton Bean’s 
explanation of the “Airplane incident,” an explanation which largely exonerates Creel.
55
  
Fleming’s invective against Creel, as part of his broader attempt to discredit Woodrow 
Wilson, might easily be dismissed except for the fact that his book is the single most-cited source 
in the Wikipedia article on the CPI (it appears in thirteen of the thirty-three footnotes).
56
  It is 
worth noting that, aside from Creel’s own How We Advertised America, not one note in the 
Wikipedia article comes from the standard bibliography of the CPI, a list that would include the 
work of James Mock and Cedric Larson, Stephen Vaughn, and David Kennedy (although 
Vaughn’s Holding Fast the Inner Lines does rate mention in the “Further Reading” section).
57
   
In a 2004 article for Cinema Journal entitled “9/11, the Useful Incident, and the Legacy 
of the Creel Committee,” Christopher Sharrett, a professor of communications at Seton Hall 
University, draws a straight line from the CPI to 9/11 and the Iraq War.  Sharrett describes the 
CPI as “a monstrous specter hanging over U.S. history in its empire-building phase, reminding 
us that media cooperation with the state apparatus is not an occasional aberration but a natural 
function of the press as it aids in the enforcement of ruling-class interests.”
58
  Sharrett invokes 
the cautionary tale by reminding readers that “long before President George H. W. Bush hired a 
                                                 
55. Bean, “George Creel and His Critics,” 165. 
56. “Committee on Public Information,” Wikipedia, last modified March 28, 2014, accessed March 29, 2014. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_on_Public_Information.  While serious scholars naturally question the 
veracity of Wikipedia and reject it as a credible source, this does not change the fact that Wikipedia reaches a far 
broader audience than any work of scholarship.  It matters what Wikipedia says because it is, so often, the first stop 
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War: The Rise of the War Welfare State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) is limited part of one chapter 
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and George Creel’s How We Advertised America. 
58. Christopher Sharrett, “9/11, the Useful Incident, and the Legacy of the Creel Committee,” Cinema Journal 
43, no. 4 (Summer 2004), 127. 
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public relations-instructed Kuwaiti refugee to present bogus tales to Congress of Iraqi atrocities 
as a rationale for Gulf War I, the government created a propaganda apparatus designed to involve 
the United States in one of the worst conflagrations of the twentieth century.”
59
  The final part of 
this statement is remarkable in that it represents one of the most significant distortions of fact 
about the CPI, which is that it predated U.S. entry into World War I.  This is but one of several 
false claims and insinuations that Sharrett makes with regard to the CPI.   
In Sharrett’s view, “perhaps the most important element of the Wilson-Creel years 
relevant to an understanding of the portrayal of 9/11 and the new ‘war on terror’ is the sinking of 
the Lusitania and the release of the Bryce Report.”
60
  He neglects to mention that both of these 
incidents occurred in 1915, a full two years prior to the formation of the CPI.  Why he considers 
this part of the “Wilson-Creel” years is a mystery. Regardless of his reasoning, his facts are 
incorrect. In 1915, George Creel was nowhere near Washington, D.C. and largely unknown to 
Woodrow Wilson.  That year, Creel had divided his time between crusading for causes, such as a 
failed campaign for women’s suffrage in New York, and ghostwriting an autobiography for the 
Heavyweight Champion boxer Jess Willard.
61
  The mistakes of Sharrett’s article may be the 
result of poor research or they may be intentional but they are not uncommon in popular 
retellings of the CPI.   
The dominant narrative often places the CPI within a broader tradition of deception by 
the U.S. government.  From an influence standpoint, this is a tactic known as “framing.”  It can 
be observed in three recent historical works that discuss World War I propaganda and the CPI 
                                                 
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid., 128. 
61. Alan Alexrod, Selling the Great War: The Making of American Propaganda (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 39. 
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within the context (i.e. “frame”) of how America was conditioned to support military operations 
throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.  The use of framing leads the reader to 
a predetermined conclusion about the topic. 
In 2007, Eugene Secunda, a professor of marketing and media studies, and Terrence P. 
Moran, a professor of media ecology, collaborated on Selling War to America: From the Spanish 
American War to the Global War on Terror.  Secunda and Moran waste no time invoking the 
cautionary tradition, stating on the first page:  
We wrote this book because we believe that the U.S. public should better 
comprehend how U.S. presidents and their administrations exploit the media and 
execute marketing strategies to win support for war policies.  With this 
understanding, we believe that the U.S. public will become a more informed and 
empowered electorate.
62
   
 
The authors expound on this theme for several pages before declaring: “Our task is to help 
people to become more careful customers when buying a war.”
63
  Seldom has the cautionary 
tradition been more clearly or thoroughly articulated.   
In surveying propaganda during World War I, Secunda and Moran draw a direct line 
from the CPI, through nearly a century of subsequent propaganda, to the present day, asserting 
that “His (Creel’s) basic strategy has guided American war marketing policy since its entry into 
World War I to today’s War on Terrorism.”
64
  Their attempt to define what exactly that strategy 
was is problematic.  They appear to apply some basic public relations/influence conventions in 
an effort to understand the CPI’s effectiveness.  For example, they note that the CPI succeeded in 
the following ways: analyzing the situation and defining their goals, identifying key target 
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Global War on Terror (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007), 1. 
63. Ibid., 10. 
64. Ibid., 33. 
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audiences and employing effective strategies and tactics to reach these audiences, their creative 
strategies and executions were clear, concise, and reinforced through repetition, and they made 
extensive and adroit use of all available media.
65
  This analysis is problematic because the 
authors do not demonstrate that any of these accomplishments were the result of conscious 
planning.  In fact, they provide little evidence that some of these things occurred at all.  Instead, 
they appear to interpret successful outcomes as evidence that these things must have happened in 
the way that they would in a modern public relations or psychological operations campaign.  
There is little evidence to support this assumption, which makes Secunda and Moran’s analysis 
rather teleological.   
In Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq 
(2009), historian Susan Brewer provides a survey of how Americans were conditioned to support 
military intervention in a series of conflicts spanning from 1898 to 2003.  Starting with President 
William McKinley, she locates the source of this persuasion in the White House.  In her chapter 
on World War I (“Crusade for Democracy”), Brewer provides a decent primer in CPI operations.  
She also specifically notes that the CPI “objected to the extreme nature of hate films To Hell with 
the Kaiser and The Kaiser, Beast of Berlin” but she adds that “the agency itself repeatedly 
promoted the theme of German brutality.”
66
  Brewer notes that Creel claimed that his 
organization had served as a moderating force but, true to the cautionary tradition, she notes that 
the CPI “shifted from its emphasis on education and information to the promotion of 
unquestioning patriotism.”
67
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The final entry into this trilogy of cautionary tales, Selling War in a Media Age: The 
Presidency and Public Opinion in the American Century (2010), contains an essay by historian 
Emily Rosenberg entitled, “War and the Health of the State: The U.S. Government and the 
Communications Revolution during World War I.”  Rosenberg argues that President Woodrow 
Wilson used mass advertising, censorship, and surveillance in a three-pronged strategy to build 
and maintain support for the war and to quell dissent.  Rosenberg also furthers the theme of a 
mid-war transition in the sort of persuasive appeals used by the CPI.  She notes, “By 1918 the 
campaigns became more rousing and graphic, emphasizing German atrocities.  Pictures of large, 
hideous animalistic brutes, representing German soldiers, suggested pillage and the 
endangerment of women and children.”
68
  Rosenberg calls into question the effectiveness of the 
CPI but acknowledges that “most commentators believed that the CPI had exerted a great 
impact, and they either heralded it or blamed it for being able to whip up the spirit of ‘100% 
Americanism’ that pervaded wartime and postwar American culture.”
69
  Rosenberg’s final 
observation indicates a recurring theme of the dominant narrative—the role of the CPI in 
promoting intolerance towards immigrants and opponents of the war in the name of patriotism.   
Errors in Fact and Interpretation 
As evidence of the CPI’s blatant appeals to fear and hate, the dominant narrative often 
presents works of propaganda that were not produced by the CPI.  One of the most common 
examples of the misattribution of wartime propaganda to the CPI is the poster “Destroy This 
Mad Brute” by H.R. Hopps.  This poster has no known connection to the CPI and yet serves as 
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the image associated with the CPI on Wikipedia.  It also appears in the first line of results when 
searching for either the “Committee on Public Information” or “Creel Committee” in Google 
images.  It is referenced in several of the more widely cited books of World War I propaganda, 
including historian Ronald Schaffer’s America in the Great War and Stewart Halsey Ross’s 
Propaganda for War, in which it serves as the frontispiece.
70
 
“Hang the Kaiser” films, the most notable of which was The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin, 
are also misattributed to the CPI with alarming frequency.  Walton Bean noted this error in 1941, 
tracing it to a Time magazine article in October of 1939.
71
  This error caught on quickly and yet 
none of the four books devoted exclusively to film in World War I consulted attribute The 
Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin to the CPI.
72
  The Progressive Silent Film List’s Carl Bennett 
identified the Renowned Pictures Corporation as the production company for The Kaiser: The 
Beast of Berlin and dates the copyright to March 11, 1918.
73
  Rupert Julian, a New Zealand 
native, wrote, directed, and produced the film, in addition to playing the lead role of Kaiser 
Wilhelm II.
74
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In both cases listed above, the error in fact is used to support a specific interpretation of 
the CPI, which is that it grew more extreme in its appeals during the course of the war.  A 
reference book on the 1920s demonstrates this tendency: “At the outset of the publicity 
campaign, the committee made films with innocuous titles such as Our Colored Fighters and 
Pershing’s Crusaders.  By war’s end they had turned to producing movies such as The Kaiser: 
The Beast of Berlin and The Prussian Cur.”
75
  This is incorrect on two accounts.  First, neither of 
the latter two movies mentioned had any connection to the CPI’s Division of Films.  Second, 
Pershing’s Crusaders did not debut until May 1918.
76
  The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin had 
opened two months earlier, on March 9, 1918.  In fact, all four films mentioned appeared in 
1918.  “Destroy This Mad Brute” is dated to either 1916 or 1917.
77
  Regardless of whether or not 
a shift in the tone of CPI propaganda occurred in 1918, no such shift can be ascertained based on 
either “Destroy This Mad Brute” or The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin, as neither of these were CPI 
products. 
Other errors in fact, while not as conspicuous as those listed above, appear regularly in 
accounts of the CPI.  One explanation for this is that, in the dominant narrative, anything that 
indicates the excessive nature of the CPI is admissible as evidence.  For example, in The Nervous 
Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War (1999), Brett Gary, a 
professor of media, culture and communication, writes that “the CPI’s much-celebrated Four-
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Minute Men—of which there were several million—used atrocity stories in their four-minute 
speeches, promoted hate films, [and] urged Americans to keep track of one another and report on 
suspect utterances.”
78
  There were, at their peak, a total of 75,000 Four-Minute Men and not, as 
Gary claims, “several million.”
79
   
Sometimes, the errors in fact could be viewed as inconsequential, and perhaps innocuous, 
if not for the perception of the CPI that they convey.  Take, for example, the following quote 
from cultural historians Robert Rydell and Rob Kroes’s Buffalo Bill in Bologna (2005):  “On 
April 14, 1917, within hours of asking the U.S. Congress to declare war on Germany, Wilson 
moved with lightning speed to issue an Executive Order creating the Committee on Public 
Information.”
80
  The obvious error here is that President Wilson asked Congress to declare war in 
a speech given on April 2, 1917 (and Congress complied on April 6).  The CPI was, in fact 
created, on April 14.  This nearly two-week gap between the two events does not imply 
“lightning speed.”  By portraying the interval between Wilson’s war address and the creation of 
the CPI as “within hours,” Rydell and Kroes give the impression that such a committee was a 
foregone conclusion when, in point of fact, the serious discussions between Wilson and his 
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advisors regarding the formation of what would become the CPI did not take place in earnest 
until after war was declared.
81
 
Casting Aspersions 
In addition to errors in fact, the dominant narrative features attacks on the personality, 
fitness, and character of its director, George Creel.  These are the very sort of ad hominem 
attacks that Walton Bean felt had distracted the generation that immediately followed the war 
from understanding and evaluating the CPI on its own merits.
82
  One frequently quoted criticism 
of Creel appeared in The Nation on November 22, 1917: 
That the President, whom he [Creel] exalted so lustily in print, should have 
wished to give him some notable mark of favor will not seem strange to anyone 
who recognizes the time-honored custom of partisan politics in this country; but 
why he should have chosen a writer of Creel’s touch-and-go sort to head a bureau 
of which the most important duty would be to suppress touch-and-go writing on 
the part of other people, remains to this day as much a mystery as ever.
83
 
 
In referring to Creel’s “touch-and-go” nature, the anonymous critic is questioning Creel’s 
credibility and fitness for his position without addressing any particular deficiency in Creel’s 
work. 
On October 7, 1917, Ryley Grannon of The Washington Post wrote an article about Creel 
and his CPI entitled “Why Pay For Comedy When We Have a Creel Committee.”
84
  In it, 
Grannon highlights Creel’s hypocrisy on issues of censorship, complains about his exorbitant 
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salary (rumored to be $10,000 per year), and mocks Creel’s tendency to emphasize his close 
relationship with President Woodrow Wilson.  Grannon’s complaints about Creel, which are 
accompanied by unflattering characterizations of other CPI officials, are used to discredit the CPI 
without providing evidence of actual malfeasance.   
Some critics of the CPI resorted to the propaganda technique of name-calling to attack 
George Creel.
85
  Writing in the early 1960s, novelist John Dos Passos (a relic of the “Lost 
Generation”) was still able to summon the kind of disdain for Creel that was felt by many of 
Creel’s contemporaries.  In Mr. Wilson’s War, Dos Passos described Creel as “a little shrimp of a 
man with burning dark eyes set in an ugly face under a shock of curly black hair” and labeled 
him as Wilson’s “human megaphone.”
86
  He went on to note, disapprovingly, “In an 
astonishingly short time George Creel had the entire nation—except of course for the 
disreputable minority who insisted on forming their own opinions—repeating every slogan 
which emanated from the President’s desk in the wordy war to ‘make the world safe for 
democracy.’”
87
  Dos Passos’s scathing assessment stands out from others mainly for its 
descriptiveness. Though not flattering of Wilson, he reserved a special vitriol for Creel. 
In Propaganda for War, Steward Halsey Ross continues the tradition of Creel-bashing by 
describing Creel as “Indefatigable, brash, unprincipled, and hypocritical.”
88
  To Ross, American 
wartime propaganda was “a reflection of his [Creel’s] own vigorous personality and strong 
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will—and of his narrow interpretation of patriotism.”
89
  Ross declares Creel a dictator over the 
propaganda effort without explaining how such a leadership style could maintain unity of effort 
among a propaganda corps consisting largely of volunteers, many of whom were leaders in their 
respective fields.  In 2010’s For Home and Country, English professor Celia Malone Kingsbury 
makes only passing mention of the CPI in her analysis of World War I propaganda before 
pronouncing in her conclusion that Creel “must go down as one of history’s villains.”
90
   
Few other CPI members attract much attention from scholars, no doubt due to the 
tendency to consider the “Creel Committee” the work of one man.  The exception to this 
tendency is Edward Bernays, to whom many CPI scholars assign a disproportionately large role 
in the CPI.  This attention is somewhat understandable, given Bernays’s prolific post-war 
writing, his longevity (he died in 1995), and his close association with the emerging field of 
public relations (of which some consider him the father). Within ten years of World War I’s end, 
Bernays had published two popular books that drew, in part at least, from his wartime 
experiences with the CPI.
91
  Nevertheless, Bernays was not a central figure in the CPI.  
Bernays’s biographer Larry Tye admits as much, noting that “Eddie (Bernays) wasn’t part of the 
CPI brain trust.”
92
  Bernays worked for the Export Section of the CPI’s Foreign Bureau, which 
was under the leadership of Ernest Poole.  Later on, he worked at the Foreign Bureau’s Latin 
American desk.  Bernays was also not a personal friend of George Creel and he was pointed in 
his criticisms of what he perceived to be Creel’s failures.   
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Bernays’s arguments for the value of the “public relations counsel” and “propaganda” in 
his postwar writings raised suspicion, albeit after-the-fact, of the CPI and continue to draw 
criticism.  This criticism is compounded by the fact that Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph 
Goebbels boasted of having read all of Bernays’s work.
93
  The correlation with Nazism has 
proven too enticing for many of the CPI’s critics to pass up and has led to the employment of a 
second propaganda device against the CPI: transfer.
94
  Conservative radio and television 
personality Glenn Beck cites the Bernays-Goebbels connection as proof positive of the evilness 
of the CPI.
95
  More sagacious commentators than Beck have noticed the connection, as it adds a 
sinister element to the CPI.  That Bernays was a Jew (and the nephew of Sigmund Freud), and 
was in no way complicit with Goebbels, does not seem to matter.
96
  In addition to being a form 
of transfer, this attack on the CPI is blatantly teleological, as it is based on something that 
occurred well after the CPI was disbanded and does not even directly relate to the CPI. 
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Conclusion: A Dominant Narrative Established  
The narrative of the CPI that has evolved over the past ninety-five years is one that views 
the CPI as a cautionary tale that should place Americans on the alert for government attempts at 
mass persuasion, particularly leading up to and during wartime.  To reinforce this message, the 
dominant narrative utilizes a variety of propaganda techniques.  It frames the CPI within a long 
tradition of government deception.  It uses ad hominem arguments and name-calling to discredit 
the work of the CPI.  It skews facts and misappropriates evidence to prove that the CPI turned 
increasingly to appeals to fear and hate during 1918.  Finally, the dominant narrative treats the 
legacy of the CPI in almost exclusively negative terms.  The CPI is alleged to have fostered an 
intolerant attitude towards immigrants and dissenters that encouraged wartime vigilantism and 
lingered well into the 1920s.  It is also purported to have been too effective in selling Wilson’s 
idealistic war aims and, as a result, it inevitably led to postwar disillusionment.  
It is important to remember that, when discussing narratives of the CPI, “dominant” 
should not be confused with “only.”  Other narratives, such as that proposed by Stephen Vaughn 
in Holding Fast the Inner Lines, continue to be influential.  New accounts that deviate from the 
dominant narrative, such Alan Axelrod’s Selling the Great War, continue to appear.  
Nevertheless, the dominant narrative holds sway.  Stewart Halsey Ross’s jaded version of the 
CPI has influenced most subsequent accounts, including those of Christopher Sharrett, Emily 
Rosenberg and Thomas Fleming.  As easy as it is to discount Fleming’s caustic and cynical 
account of Creel and the CPI, his book is the single most prevalent on the one-stop shop for non-
scholarly research that is Wikipedia. 
Given the pervasiveness of the dominant narrative, it is difficult to imagine that Walton 
Bean ever believed that the CPI could be viewed as a moderating force.  Then again, Bean 
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defended his dissertation in May of 1941—seven months prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor.  In the seventy-three years since, the United States has fought another World War and 
numerous undeclared wars from Korea to Vietnam to Iraq to Afghanistan.  Propaganda has 
played a role in all of these conflicts.  Despite the apparent ineffectiveness of the dominant 
narrative in preventing war, it is invoked with renewed vigor with each successive conflict.  
Having been “fooled” into yet another foreign war, it is all too easy for Americans, including 
scholars, to look into the distant mirror for warning signs and observe the specter of George 
Creel and his committee.  The victims of the most recent hoodwink are determined to render 
future propaganda inert by tearing down this early instance of officially-sanctioned propaganda.  
They thus resort to propaganda against the CPI in the hope that, if Americans only heed its 
lessons, they won’t get fooled again. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Propagating the Dominant Narrative: The Committee on Public 
Information in Instructional and Reference Materials 
Disregarding the grosser charges, we may still have grave doubts whether there were 
beneficial results of the Committee’s activities to any degree commensurate with the 
millions of dollars which it spent.   
David S. Muzzey 
The American Adventure, 1927 
 
 
In high schools and institutions of higher learning around the United States, students 
memorize the name “George Creel” as part of their study of World War I and are taught to 
associate his “Committee on Public Information” (otherwise known as the “Creel Committee” or 
“CPI”) with propaganda during that war.  Some students are shown a few examples of CPI 
propaganda, almost certainly in the form of wartime posters, blissfully unaware that some of 
these posters may not even be the work of the CPI.  They may be introduced to the “Four 
Minute-Men” and told that they were an “army of 75,000 public speakers” who spoke on behalf 
of the war.  Depending on their personal biases and the biases of the sources they use, teachers 
and professors may present America’s propaganda effort during World War I as commendable, 
neutral, or contemptible.  What is lost on students, because it is most likely lost on their 
instructors, are the errors in fact and interpretation that accompany the dominant narrative of the 
CPI that is found in many common United States History textbooks, reference materials, and on 
some of the most readily available online sources.  These errors and biases prevent students from 
developing an accurate understanding of the CPI.  Furthermore, the transmission of these errors 
and biases from teacher and textbook to student ensures the perpetuation of the dominant 
narrative of the CPI to the next generation.   
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The dominant narrative of the CPI is pervasive in the historiography.  Its tone is one of 
caution.  Its goal is to make the American people more aware of the dangers of propaganda in 
hopes of preventing another CPI, another Vietnam, or another Iraq War.  This narrative also 
includes the misattribution of non-CPI propaganda to the CPI, ad hominem attacks on CPI 
Chairman George Creel, and the interpretation of the CPI as an agency of suppression, not 
expression (which George Creel professed to be its aim).  As such, the dominant narrative holds 
that CPI was responsible, perhaps solely, for censorship, anti-immigrant hysteria, and vigilantism 
in America during World War I.  In short, the dominant narrative presents the CPI as something 
exclusively negative and yet it is something that all American students should learn about for the 
expressed purpose of preventing its emulation in future conflicts.   
Determining to what extent the dominant narrative of the CPI is perpetuated in common 
instructional texts and informational websites required several steps.  The first step was an 
examination of how the CPI is addressed in the social studies curricula of selected states.  The 
next step was a survey of forty United States History textbooks to determine the degree to which 
their accounts of the CPI conform to the dominant narrative.  This step included a longitudinal 
evaluation of changes in interpretation over time.  Stanford historian Thomas Bailey’s venerable 
textbook The American Pageant provides the framework for the discussion of the highlights of 
this survey (the full results of the survey are presented in several appendices).  The third step was 
a consultation of four popular U.S. histories that have affected the way teachers understand and 
teach American history.  The fourth step was to canvass informational websites by performing a 
Google search, as would the typical student, for the terms “Committee on Public Information” 
and “Creel Committee” and then an assessment of the information found on each of the top ten 
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search results.  The chapter culminates in an examination of two prominent obstacles to student 
understanding that are found in the available learning materials.   
The results of this study clearly indicate that the dominant narrative of the CPI is strong 
in instructional literature, particularly in its portrayal of the CPI as the work of one man (George 
Creel) and its charge that the CPI promoted intolerance and suppressed dissent.  Beyond this 
narrative are a number of significant factual errors, particularly in online sources.  Due to the 
proliferation of user-edited research sites, these errors are more easily perpetuated than ever.  
While errors in textbooks take years to replicate, and are subject to editorial review, errors online 
can replicate in a matter of seconds with little or no expert oversight.  As a result, an accurate 
narrative of the CPI seems more elusive than ever.   
The CPI in the Social Studies Curriculum 
Twenty state social studies standards, to include those of the five most populous states, 
were surveyed in order to determine the extent to which the CPI is addressed in public school 
curricula.  The results of this survey are presented in Appendix A: Mentions of “Propaganda” 
and “Committee on Public Information” in State History Curricula.  The proposed national 
standards for U.S. History were also consulted.  All totaled, seven of the twenty states surveyed 
specifically require instruction in propaganda as part of a study of World War I. 
The National Center for History in the Schools at the University of California at Los 
Angeles has developed a set of national standards for United States History.  While these 
standards are not binding, they do provide a common reference point for state-level curriculum 
developers.  A survey of twenty states’ curriculum standards for high school-level U.S. History 
demonstrated a significant degree of alignment with the national standards.  It is worth asking, 
then, to what extent these national standards deal with the topic of World War I propaganda. 
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Under the theme “The Emergence of Modern America (1890-1930),” there are three 
standards.  The most applicable of these standards is Standard 2: The changing role of the United 
States in world affairs through World War I.  Under Standard 2, there are two supporting 
objectives that deal with propaganda.
1
  The first is Standard 2B: “The student understands the 
causes of World War I and why the United States intervened.”  For this objective, the curriculum 
specifies that the student will be able to “analyze the impact of American public opinion on the 
Wilson administration’s evolving foreign policy from 1914 to 1917.”  The second supporting 
objective is Standard 2C: “The student understands the impact at home and abroad of the United 
States involvement in World War I.”  For this objective, the student is expected to be able to 
“analyze the impact of public opinion and government policies on constitutional interpretation 
and civil liberties.”  Taking all of this into consideration, there is a clear opening for teaching 
about propaganda and the CPI.   
In California, tenth grade World History students are expected to be able to “Analyze the 
arguments for entering into the war presented by leaders from all sides of the Great War and the 
role of political and economic rivalries, ethnic and ideological conflicts, domestic discontent and 
disorder, and propaganda and nationalism in mobilizing the civilian population in support of 
‘total war.’”
2
  In Florida, students examine the CPI as one of several war measures that the U.S. 
government used to prepare the nation for war (the others being the Selective Service Act, War 
Industries Board, war bonds, Espionage Act, and the Sedition Act).
3
  In New York, it is 
                                                 
1. National Center for History in the Schools, University of California at Los Angeles, “United States History 
Content Standards for Grades 5 -12” accessed February 5, 2014, http://www.nchs.ucla.edu/Standards/us-history-
content-standards/us-era-7#section-1 
2. California Department of Education, History-Social Science Framework for California Public Schools 
CDE.ca.gov, 2005, accessed February 4, 2014, http://www.cde.ca.gov/ci/cr/cf/documents/histsocsciframe.pdf, 137.  
3. State of Florida, “Sunshine State Standards for Social Studies, Grades 9-12: SS.912.A.4.6,” CPALMS.org, 
accessed February 4, 2014, http://www.cpalms.org/Public/PreviewStandard/Preview/3405.  
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recommended that students “analyze World War I posters and identify propaganda techniques 
used.”
4
   
In North Carolina, Goal 7.1 of the U.S. History curriculum states that students will know 
“How the United States government used propaganda to appeal to American patriotism and sell 
the nation’s war efforts (e.g., Committee on Public Information, Four-Minute Men, “Meatless 
Tuesdays”).”
5
  Per Goal 7.3, students are expected to “explain the impact of wars on American 
society and culture since Reconstruction (e.g., relocation of Japanese Americans, American 
propaganda, first and second Red Scare movement, McCarthyism, baby boom, Civil Rights 
Movement, protest movements, ethnic [sic], patriotism, etc.).”
6
  This requires that students be 
able to understand: 
1) How, why and to what extent Americans mobilized and sacrificed on behalf of 
United States military efforts in world wars (e.g., rationing, war bonds, 
“Wheatless Wednesdays”).  
 
2) How, why and to what extent United States participation in world wars 
restricted the civil liberties of various groups of Americans. (e.g., German 
Americans, Japanese Americans, Muslim Americans) 
 
3) How communication technologies and mediums, such as newspapers, 
television, film and radio influenced American patriotism and propaganda 
during warfare.
7
 
 
Each of these “enabling objectives” relates to the activities of the CPI.  What, then, enables 
teachers to effectively explain the CPI to their students?  The three main sources that were 
surveyed for this study are U.S. History textbooks, other commonly-referenced U.S. histories, 
                                                 
4. New York State Department of Education, “Social Studies Core Curriculum,” NYSED.gov, accessed 
February 5, 2014, http://www.p12.nysed.gov/ciai/socst/pub/sscore1.pdf, 75.  
5. North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, “Instructional Support Tools: American History II,” 
accessed February 5, 2014, http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/docs/acre/standards/support-tools/unpacking/social-
studies/american2.pdf, 33.   
6. Ibid.  
7. Ibid.  
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and the websites gleaned from a Google search for “Committee on Public Information” and 
“Creel Committee.” 
The CPI in Selected U.S. History Textbooks 
The CPI has not been neglected in U.S. History textbooks but it bears asking how 
accurately do they portray the CPI and to what extent do they conform to the dominant narrative 
of the CPI?  A gleaning from several textbooks from the past six decades provides some 
indication.  In 1951, A History of the United States highlighted the negative aspects of the CPI’s 
work by saying: “at the same time that Creel’s committee created an atmosphere of 100 per cent 
Americanism, it opened the door to bitter hatreds.  Hatred of Germany and all things German 
became universal and wholly indiscriminate.”
8
  The United States: A History of Democracy 
(1960) picked up on this theme a decade later saying: “There was little tolerance for anyone 
suspected of not supporting the war, and freedom suffered.”
9
  Little had changed by the 1980s, as 
seen in 1984’s America: A Narrative History: “By arousing public opinion to such a pitch of 
excitement, the war effort channeled the crusading zeal of progressivism into grotesque 
campaigns for ‘Americanism’ and witch-hunting.”
10
  The theme of intolerance was proving quite 
durable.  In 2007, The American Journey said of the CPI: “Obsessed with national unity and 
conformity, Creel promoted fear, hatred, and prejudice in the name of a triumphant 
Americanism.”
11
  One of the most recent textbooks surveyed, The Enduring Vision (2008), 
                                                 
8. Cecil Bining and Philip Shriver Klein, A History of the United States: Volume II (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 391. 
9. Henry W. Bragdon and Samuel P. McCutchen, History of a Free People (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1960), 489. 
10. George Brown Tindall, America: A Narrative History (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1984), 964. 
11. David R. Goldfield, et. al, The American Journey: A History of the United States (Upper Saddle River, 
New Jersey: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2007), 677. 
 
50 
 
echoes this recurrent theme: “Responding to wartime propaganda, some Americans became 
almost hysterical in their strident patriotism and their hostility to radicals and dissenters.”
12
  If 
one judged the treatment of the CPI in textbooks based on this sampling alone, it would be 
difficult to deny the presence of a strong anti-CPI bias that is consistent with the dominant 
narrative.  Does this verdict stand up to closer scrutiny? 
Until the 1950s, treatment of the CPI in U.S. History textbooks was sporadic.  By the 
early 1950s, however, the CPI had become a staple of the American historical narrative, as seen 
in the fact that no high school or college textbook surveyed from 1950 onward failed to address 
the CPI (see Appendix B for a master list of textbooks consulted).  During the 1950s and 1960s, 
the dominant narrative of the CPI was still in its formative years.  As a result, characterizations 
of the CPI varied significantly.  Every textbook surveyed after 1950 (The Making of Modern 
America) mentioned George Creel but their descriptions of him ran the gamut from laudable to 
contemptible (see Appendix E).  Various textbooks highlighted various aspects of the CPI’s 
work.  One textbook mentioned only the CPI’s pamphlets.  Another mentioned only the Four-
Minute Men.  Most provided the number of Four-Minute Men (75,000) but otherwise 
generalized about “millions of pamphlets” (see Appendix F).  Anti-CPI bias was not absent, as 
seen in A History of the United States Volume II (1951), but there were also instances of pro-CPI 
bias (1952’s A Short History of the American People Volume II).  The most influential textbook 
to emerge from this period was Stanford historian Thomas Bailey’s The American Pageant. 
First published in 1956, The American Pageant is now in its fifteenth edition.  Over the 
past sixty years, it has become a staple U.S. History text.  In 1956, Bailey’s 316-word treatment 
of the CPI was ahead of its time, in that it captured several key tenets of the dominant narrative.  
                                                 
12. Paul S. Boyer, The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 
679. 
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This makes The American Pageant a fitting point-of-comparison for how other textbooks address 
the CPI.   
How textbooks label the section on the CPI often reflects their bias.  Some choose rather 
neutral verbiage, such as “Selling the War” or “Mobilizing Public Opinion” (See Appendix D for 
a complete list of headings).  Thomas Bailey went in a somewhat different direction by giving 
his section on the CPI the leading heading “Manipulating Minds.”  By the sixth edition of The 
American Pageant (1979) the heading had become even more leading: “Creel Manipulates 
Minds.”
 13
  This change, while subtle, is important.  No longer is the reader, presumably a 
student, required to read on in order to determine who it is who is “manipulating minds.”  The 
student is being told in the heading that it is George Creel who is doing the manipulating.  This 
is, somewhat ironically, manipulating the mind of the reader to arrive at the predetermined 
conclusion. 
Bailey begins by presenting the purpose for the CPI: “Mobilizing the mind for war, both 
in America and abroad, was an urgent task facing the Washington authorities.  For this purpose, 
the Committee on Public Information was created.”
14
  Other textbooks do a better job of defining 
the CPI (see Appendix C for a comparison of definitions).  Bailey then uses an interesting 
combination of positive and negative adjectives to describe George Creel and the task before 
him: “a youngish journalist…who, though outspoken and tactless, was gifted with zeal and 
imagination.  His job was to ‘sell’ America on the war, and the world on Wilsonian war aims.”
15
  
Bailey’s description of Creel is more colorful than what is found in most textbooks, many of 
                                                 
13. Thomas Bailey and David Kennedy, The American Pageant: A History of the Republic, 6th ed. (Lexington, 
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1979), 682.  
14. Thomas Bailey, The American Pageant: A History of the Republic (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 
1956), 735. 
15. Ibid. 
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which identify him simply as a “journalist” or a “newsman,” with some adding adjectives like 
“progressive” or “muckraking” (see Appendix E).   
Bailey next attempts to capture the scope of the CPI by observing: “The Creel 
organization, employing 150,000 workers at home and overseas, proved that words were 
weapons.  It sent out an army of 75,000 ‘Four-Minute Men’ – often longer winded than that – 
who delivered over 7,500,000 speeches containing much ‘patriotic pep.’”
16
  Bailey is no doubt 
citing George Creel’s own numbers (150,000 workers and 7,500,000 speeches) but both numbers 
deserve clarification.  No complete roster of CPI employees exists but there is an abundance of 
evidence that the overwhelming majority of those 150,000 were volunteers (a full one-half of 
them, 75,000, were involved in just one division—the Four-Minute Men).  Committee records 
indicate that there were perhaps a few hundred paid employees.
17
  Most textbooks neglect to 
mention the degree to which the CPI was a volunteer enterprise (see Appendix E).  As for the 
7,500,000 speeches, this is a factual error traceable to George Creel’s postwar account of the CPI 
(How We Advertised America).
18
  Elsewhere, Creel identifies the number of speeches as 755,190.  
Most historians accept this as the more accurate number.  Finally, the claim that the Four-Minute 
Men were “often longer winded than that” appears unsubstantiated.  There is nothing in the two 
full-length studies to indicate that long-windedness was a pervasive problem.  In fact, exceeding 
                                                 
16. Ibid., 736.   
17. Wayne Allen Nicholas, “Crossroads Oratory: A Study of the Four Minute Men of World War I.” (PhD 
diss., Columbia University, 1953). 50.  Nicholas cites a report from Creel to President Wilson dated January 27, 
1918 that indicated that the CPI had 250 paid employees. 
18. George Creel, How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on 
Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (1920; repr., London: 
Forgotten Books, 2012), 85.  Elsewhere in How We Advertised America (p. 94), as well as in his Complete Report 
(p. 22), he lists the figure as 755, 190.  In later editions of The American Pageant, the 7,500,000 number is dropped 
in favor of “countless.”   
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the four minute time limit was one of the surest ways for a Four-Minute Man to lose his 
credentials (the slide which introduced him as an official representative of the U.S. 
government).
19
 
In addition to The American Pageant, many of the textbooks, websites, and other sources 
consulted for this study rely heavily on the weight of numbers to tell the story of the CPI (see 
Appendix F).  The truth is that numbers do not tell the whole story.  The story is just as much in 
the fact that so many people, from all walks of life, donated their time and talent to what they 
perceived to be a worthy cause.  
As part of his discussion of the scope of CPI operations, Bailey makes his most 
significant and enduring error by stating that: “Hang-the-Kaiser ‘movies,’ with such titles as 
‘The Kaiser the Beast of Berlin’ and ‘To Hell with the Kaiser,’ revealed the ‘Hun’ in his 
bloodiest colors.”
20
  These films were not produced by the CPI nor is there any evidence that the 
CPI officially promoted them.  The misattribution of these films (along with The Prussian Cur) 
is the single most common factual error concerning the CPI found in the textbooks surveyed.  It 
is an error that goes back at least as far as 1939, when two reviews of James Mock and Cedric 
Larson’s Words that Won the War indicated that The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin was a CPI film.  
However, Bailey’s mention of these movies is the earliest found among the U.S. History 
textbooks consulted in this study.  This error has only grown more common with time.  Nearly 
half of the textbooks surveyed that were published from 2000 onward contain this particular 
error (see Appendix G).   
                                                 
19. Ibid., 213.  See also: Alfred E. Cornebise, War as Advertised: The Four Minute Men and America’s 
Crusade 1917-1918 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1984), 43-44. 
20. Bailey, The American Pageant, 736. 
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Bailey then attempts to assess the immediate impact of the CPI.  In tribute to Creel’s 
effectiveness, Bailey says, “Creel was unsurpassed as a mobilizer of emotion.  Unlike most 
propagandists, he had to merely tell the truth about America’s tremendous war effort –the truth 
was incredible enough.”
21
  This homage is qualified by what follows: “But he (Creel) rather 
oversold the ideals of Wilson, and led the world to expect too much.  When the President proved 
to be a man and not a god, the resulting disillusionment at home and abroad was disastrous.
22
  
For the third edition (1966), Bailey adds the cautionary epitaph “paper bullets can be 
overdone.”
23
  While many textbooks since have made note of the CPI’s role in promoting 
postwar disillusionment, they more commonly focus on the CPI’s role in promoting intolerance 
towards immigrants (particularly German-Americans) and toward opponents of the war and its 
role in suppressing civil liberties (see Appendix H). 
The earliest editions of The American Pageant include one additional paragraph in which 
Bailey provides a longer-term assessment of the legacy of the CPI.  He observes: “America’s 
most noteworthy contribution to the ‘science’ of warfare was in mobilizing the mind of the 
world.  Regrettably, some of Creel’s techniques were later copied by the master propagandists 
serving Adolf Hitler and other dictators.”
24
  This ominous final paragraph was eliminated at 
some point after Bailey’s death in 1983.  Given the frequency of other aspects of the dominant 
narrative, it is surprising how few textbooks attempt to link the CPI to the rise of the World War 
II-era totalitarians. 
                                                 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid., 736-737.  Later editions substitute the word “mortal” for “god.”  
23. Thomas Bailey, The American Pageant: A History of the Republic, 3rd ed. (Boston: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1966), 737. 
24. Bailey, The American Pageant, 1st ed., 737. 
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What The American Pageant has to say about the CPI is important because it is widely 
used in honors-level and Advanced Placement (AP) U.S. History classes.  Other AP and college-
level texts tend to have similar biases, and to make similar errors.  Such texts are the sort used by 
college-bound students, including future teachers.  Thus, the errors made by Bailey (and other 
textbook authors) tend to become institutionalized—and perpetuated.  However, textbooks are 
not the only source of information on the CPI that students, or their teachers, are likely to 
consult. 
Other Sources 
Lies My Teacher Told Me 
In addition to textbooks, a source frequently consulted by history teachers is sociologist 
and historian James W. Loewen’s Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History 
Textbook Got Wrong (1995).  As the subtitle indicates, Loewen’s book is a study of perceived 
errors in eighteen common U.S. History texts, including several that were surveyed for this 
chapter.  While Loewen devotes considerable space to debunking myths concerning Woodrow 
Wilson’s progressivism and humanity, he fails to provide any context for understanding the CPI 
(which he refers to as the “Creel Committee on Public Information.”)
25
  For Loewen, the CPI is 
simply evidence of Wilson’s nativism and intolerance.  He finds it significant that at least one 
textbook (The American Tradition) acknowledges that Wilson “set up” the CPI but that it, along 
with other textbooks, shields Wilson from the “domestic fallout” that resulted from the CPI’s 
activities (in reference to the wartime surge of nativism).
26
  As an example of these xenophobic 
activities, Loewen provides a full-page copy of the CPI poster “Spies and Lies” with a lengthy 
                                                 
25. James Loewen, Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 31. 
26. Ibid. 
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caption that began: “To oppose America’s participation in World War I, or even to be pessimistic 
about it, was dangerous.”
27
   
A People’s History of the United States 
In a similar vein as Loewen’s work is Howard Zinn’s 1980 tome A People’s History of 
the United States: 1492-Present.  If anything, A People’s History has had an even deeper impact 
on American history teachers than Lies My Teacher Told Me, given that the former predates the 
latter by fifteen years and is commonly required as supplemental reading for prospective history 
teachers.  Zinn devotes a mere paragraph to the CPI, in which he calls it “a massive effort to 
excite a recalcitrant public.”
28
  Zinn contends that the formation of the CPI is evidence of the low 
level of popular support for American involvement in the war.
29
  However, his only specific 
mention of a CPI activity was the Four-Minute Men.  He cites, as most do, the figures of 75,000 
speakers and 750,000 speeches.  While it is fitting that the most participatory of CPI endeavors 
would be the one cited by Zinn in his “people’s history,” the willingness of so many to 
voluntarily join the pro-war propaganda campaign actually would seem to undermine Zinn’s 
broader claim that popular support for the war was lacking.  
Zinn later connects George Creel to the formation of the American Alliance for Labor 
and Democracy, which was headed by noted labor leader Samuel Gompers.  Zinn condemns the 
complicity of labor leaders with the government’s war effort and notes that rank and file union 
members did not embrace the pro-war stance of their leaders as eagerly as Creel and Gompers 
                                                 
27. Ibid., 30.  “Spies and Lies” serves as the smoking gun for those seeking to pin responsibility for wartime 
intolerance and vigilantism on the CPI.  While it undoubtedly originated from the CPI’s Division of Advertising, it 
was but one of 1,438 visual products produced by the Division of Pictorial Publicity.   
28. Howard Zinn,   A People’s History of the United States of America, 1492-2001 (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2003), 364. 
29. Ibid.  
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might have hoped.  In fact, Zinn declares, with apparent delight, that the “Alliance did not 
work.”
30
  A dearth of relevant data makes it impossible to assess the accuracy of Zinn’s claim 
with any degree of precision but his verdict on the wartime struggle for the loyalty of American 
workers should not be accepted as the final word on the matter.  In Words that Won the War, CPI 
historians James Mock and Cedric Larson devote an entire chapter—nearly thirty pages—to the 
topic of labor (entitled “The People’s War: Labor and Capital”).  In it, they present a more 
positive assessment of the CPI’s outreach to labor than that offered by Zinn.  They acknowledge 
that the challenge of keeping labor “in line” was “perhaps the biggest of all the big jobs assigned 
to the CPI.”
31
  They do not overlook the obstacles and setbacks but they provide a much more 
thorough, and nuanced, account of the war for the mind of labor than that provided by Zinn.  
They note that Creel’s own long history of support for labor made him wary of crass attempts to 
manipulate the workingman into giving up legitimate rights in the name of patriotism.
32
  Despite 
their impressive recounting of CPI efforts directed at labor during the war, Mock and Larson fail 
to make a convincing case for effectiveness of these efforts for the same reason that Zinn fails to 
make his case against them: a lack of data.  For the purposes of communal memory, however, it 
is important to note that Zinn’s work is much more widely read and consulted than that of Mock 
and Larson. 
Conservative Voices 
If Loewen and Zinn’s treatment of the CPI is representative of the intellectual left, then it 
bears asking how those on the right perceive it.  One such work, Larry Schweikart and Michael 
                                                 
30. Ibid., 364.   
31. James Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public 
Information, 1917-1919 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), 189. 
32. Ibid., 210-211. 
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Allen’s A Patriot’s History of the United States (2004) devotes only one paragraph to the CPI.  
Before doing so, they note that the government “launched an all-out propaganda offensive” 
during the war that led to “a culture [sic] sanitization” of all things German.
33
  It is curious that, 
unlike so many authors, they do not make any attempt to pin this on the CPI.  They do, however, 
note that the CPI “encouraged citizens to report anyone engaging in antiwar behavior to the 
Justice Department.”
34
  While this is true (as noted by Loewen, among others), it barely scrapes 
the surface of what the CPI did.  There is no mention of the CPI’s prolific production numbers or 
the Four-Minute Men, only a general reference to “posters” and “war literature.”
35
  
In contrast to the relatively moderate tone of A Patriot’s History, conservative British 
historian and journalist Paul Johnson demonstrates thinly-veiled contempt for the CPI in 1997’s 
A History of the American People.  It is apparent that the British author’s conservative bent 
colors his opinion of Woodrow Wilson and thus the CPI—which he considered one of Wilson’s 
“ruthless” war policies.
36
  What is remarkable about Johnson’s account—and what makes it 
worthy of inclusion in this study—is that he seems to so thoroughly misunderstand the CPI.  He 
claims that Creel not only “recruited 75,000 speakers, ‘Four-Minute Men,’ to give short war-
aims talks” but that these speakers were also used to “distribute 100 million pamphlets in various 
languages, to make movies, such as The Kaiser: Beast of Berlin, and to hold expositions of 
‘frightfulness’ by the ‘Barbaric Huns.’”
37
  In point of fact, Creel did not recruit the speakers (a 
                                                 
33. Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen, A Patriot’s History of the United States (New York: Sentinel, 2004) 
accessed online pdf version February 21, 2014, 
http://mhsamericanhistory.wikispaces.com/file/view/A+Patriot's+History+of+the+United+States.pdf.  
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Paul Johnson, A History of the American People (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 645. 
37. Ibid., 646. 
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common mistake) and there is no indication that these speakers were the main distributors of CPI 
pamphlets.  Furthermore, the Four-Minute Men neither made movies nor held war expositions.  
They most certainly had no part in the making of The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin, a film which, 
as noted elsewhere in this study, was not a product of the CPI.  Johnson’s narrative is as tidy as 
that provided by Howard Zinn but even less accurate.   
Online Resources 
When conducting research on the CPI, history teachers and students alike are likely to 
turn to the internet.  After typing “Committee on Public Information” into a search engine such 
as Google, Yahoo, or Bing, they are presented with a list of relevant websites.
38
  The first page of 
search results is often as far as most cursory attempts at research ever get.   
Rank Title Website 
1 The Committee on Public Information wikipedia.com 
2 Images for “Committee on Public Information” google.com 
3 Records of the Committee on Public Information archives.gov 
4 World War I: Committee on Public Information propagandacritic.com 
5 What is the Committee on Public Information? Wisegeek.com 
6 American Experience: Woodrow Wilson Gallery pbs.org 
7 Committee on Public Information? Ask.com 
8 Committee on Public Information in ww1 wiki.answers.com 
9 Definition of Committee on Public Information boundless.com 
10 Committee on Public Information sourcewatch.org 
Table 2.1: Top Google Search Results for “Committee on Public Information” 
Wikipedia 
A favorite online resource for students and teachers alike is the user-edited reference site 
Wikipedia.  The Wikipedia article entitled “Committee on Public Information” is commendable 
for its factual accuracy and relative lack of bias.  This is surprising given that so many other, 
                                                 
38. A search of “CPI” yields a wide variety of results, given that this is a common acronym.  A search of 
“Creel Committee” (as the CPI is often known) yields substantially the same results as those listed in Table 2.1.   
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more credible sources (ranging from scholarly articles to textbooks) inaccurately portray the CPI.  
The Wikipedia entry leans heavily on Thomas Fleming’s The Illusion of Victory (2003)—easily 
one of the most caustic treatments of the CPI—citing it more than any other source.  The article 
is notably lacking in references from the standard historiography of the CPI.
 39
  Despite its 
general accuracy, there are errors in the Wikipedia article.  Of these, none is more glaring than 
the choice of the poster “Destroy This Mad Brute” as the article’s foremost image (this poster 
has no known connection to the CPI).  The article also asserts that the World War II era Office of 
Censorship “did not follow the CPI precedent. It used a system of voluntary cooperation with a 
code of conduct, and did not disseminate government propaganda.”
40
  This demonstrates a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the CPI’s role in censorship.  It was Creel who, in the spring of 
1917, successfully advocated for a policy of “voluntary cooperation” in lieu of a strict censorship 
law.
41
 
National Archives 
The next search result is the National Archives’ Guide to Federal Records.
42
  This site 
provides only the most basic of information about the CPI.  Its primary function is to provide the 
serious researcher with information on the location of the CPI files in the National Archives 
(Record Group 63).  None of these files have as of yet been digitized and an infinitesimally small 
                                                 
39. “Committee on Public Information,” Wikipedia, last modified January 8, 2014, accessed February 17, 
2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_on_Public_Information. Aside from one citation of James Mock’s 
1942 article on the CPI’s activities in Latin America, the article does not cite any of the foremost authorities on the 
CPI (James Mock and Cedric Larson, Stephen Vaughn, David Kennedy and Alan Axelrod). 
40. Ibid. 
41. Mock and Larson, Words that Won the War, 19-20. 
42. “Records of the Committee on Public Information,” archive.gov, accessed February 21, 2014, 
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/063.html.   
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percentage of students or teachers will ever visit the National Archives in person to research the 
CPI.  
Propaganda Critic 
The third Google search result for the CPI is propagandacritic.com.  This website was 
started and maintained, until 2011, by Aaron Delwiche, an assistant professor of communications 
at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas.  The entry that appears on Delwiche’s website under 
the heading “Committee on Public Information” is actually one of four entries that deal with the 
CPI and its role in World War I propaganda.  These four items appear, in the form of an article 
entitled “Of Fraud and Force Fast Woven: Domestic Propaganda during the First World War,” 
on the website firstworldwar.com.
43
  This article also provides background information for an 
online lesson plan on World War I propaganda.
44
  
Delwiche’s article fits well within the dominant narrative of the CPI.  Much of the 
information is factually accurate and yet there is an unmistakable bias.  He misattributes 
propaganda to the CPI, asserting that “movies with titles like The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin, 
Wolves of Kultur, and Pershing’s Crusaders flooded American theatres.”
45
  Of these three films, 
only Pershing’s Crusaders was a product of the CPI.  He goes on to say that “one picture, To 
Hell With The Kaiser, was so popular that Massachusetts riot police were summoned to deal with 
an angry mob that had been denied admission.”
46
  This was also not a CPI product.  
                                                 
43. Aaron Delwiche, “Of Fraud and Force Fast Woven: Domestic Propaganda During The First World War,” 
firstworldwar.com, August 22, 2009, last modified August 22, 2009, accessed February 5, 2014, 
http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/propaganda.htm#The Committee on Public Information 
44. “Use of Propaganda During World War I,” accessed February 17, 2014, 
http://greatwarpropaganda.weebly.com/content-summary.html 
45 Delwiche, “Of Fraud and Force Fast Woven.” 
46. Ibid. 
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Additionally, Delwiche makes the error of presuming that the CPI was guided by an 
expert grasp on human cognition and persuasion, noting that “the CPI blended advertising 
techniques with a sophisticated understanding of human psychology.”
47
  In the section of his 
article labeled “Demons, Atrocities, and Lies,” he makes several references to Harold Lasswell’s 
landmark 1927 study Propaganda in the Great War.  He fails to note, however, that Lasswell 
was analyzing all propaganda during World War I and devoted very little of his time to the CPI.  
In fact, many of the examples that Lasswell used predated American entry into the war and the 
formation of the CPI. 
Delwiche makes other common errors.  He discounts the intention to appeal to reason and 
fact, so important to men like George Creel and Guy Stanton Ford (head of the CPI’s Division of 
Civic and Educational Cooperation), and insists that “CPI propaganda typically appealed to the 
heart, not to the mind.”
48
  He also dismisses Creel’s aversion to censorship by asserting, through 
the use of an unsourced quotation, that “the CPI was not a censor in the strictest sense, but ‘it 
came as close to performing that function as any government agency in the US has ever done.’”
49
  
This claim ignores the role that the U.S. Post Office Department, the Department of Justice, the 
Department of War, and the Department of the Navy all played in wartime censorship. 
Delwiche furthers a critical myth about the CPI, which is that it was used to encourage 
American intervention in the war: “When one considers the horrible legacy of the war, it is 
tempting to pin complete responsibility for American involvement on hate-mongering militarists 
                                                 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid.  
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in the CPI.”
50
  As a student of propaganda, Delwiche must certainly realize the impact of such 
value-laden language as “hate-mongering militarists.”  In fact, he appears to rely on such 
language to frame his argument on the incompatibility of propaganda, as exemplified by the CPI 
(and, it would appear, only the CPI), with democracy.  He ignores the fact, as many 
commentators and historians do, that, during the war, the CPI was charged with what Walton 
Bean terms “treasonable moderation”—which is to say that the CPI did not go far enough in 
condemning all things German.  Such accusations would no doubt have detracted from his 
argument.
51
   
By the end of the article, Delwiche has turned what seems like an informative entry on 
the CPI into a classic application of the cautionary aspect of the dominant narrative, stating that 
“ultimately, their (the CPI’s) guilt is less important than the questions their activities raised about 
the role of propaganda in a democratic society.”  He devotes the final five paragraphs of his 
article to a discussion of the incompatibility of propaganda and democracy.  While he is certainly 
within his right to do so, it is worth noting the impact that such polemical writing must have on 
those seeking to learn about the CPI.   
Wiki Answers 
Sites that allow users to submit and answer questions are potential fountainheads of 
misinformation.  Wiki answers.com is no exception.  The response to the question, “What was 
the goal of the Committee on Public Information,” contains a critical error by asserting that the 
                                                 
50. Ibid.  Delwiche correctly notes the date of the CPI’s formation (April 13, 1917) earlier in his article and yet 
there is no way to “pin” American involvement in the war on the CPI unless the CPI predated that involvement. 
51. Walton Bean, “George Creel and His Critics: A Study of the Attacks on the Committee on Public 
Information, 1917-1919” (PhD diss., University of California, 1941), 197.  Bean’s final chapter (p. 197-265) is 
devoted to addressing the charges of “treasonable moderation,” by the National Security League and other groups, 
against the CPI. 
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purpose of the committee was to “encourage and push them (Americans) into entering the 
war!”
52
  A second inquiry on Wiki Answers (“Committee on Public Information WW1?”) 
provides some accurate information but directly ties CPI propaganda to vigilante violence 
against German-Americans by saying, “It caused people to be so against the Germans that some 
people would go around killing Germans that lived in the U.S.”
53
  This is, at best, an 
unsubstantiated claim.  The answer to a third question (“Committee on Public Information and 
propaganda?”) simply reads, “it tried to convince people of one side of a story by appealing to 
emotions.”
54
  
PublicDiplomacy.wikia 
The search results for “Creel Committee” are substantially the same as those for the 
“Committee on Public Information,” with the notable exception of an article on the website 
publicdiplomacy.wikia.com entitled “Creel Committee.”  Of all of the textbook entries and online 
articles consulted for this study, this short entry is far and away the least accurate.  Among its 
errors, it lists the other members of the CPI (in addition to Creel) as being “Secretary of State, 
William Jennings Bryan; Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison; and Secretary of the Navy, 
Josephus Daniels.”
55
  Of the three, only Daniels was a member of the CPI.  Bryan had resigned 
as Secretary of State in 1915 and was replaced by Robert Lansing.  By 1917, Lindley Garrison 
had been replaced as Secretary of War by Newton Baker.  The entry also says that Walter 
                                                 
52. “What was the goal of the Committee on Public Information,” wiki.answers, accessed February 21, 2014, 
http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_was_the_goal_of_the_committee_on_public_information#slide=1.  
53. “Committee on Public Information WW1,” wiki.answers, accessed February 21, 2014, 
http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Committee_on_public_information_in_ww1?#slide=10.  
54. “Committee on Public Information and propaganda,” wiki.answers, accessed February 21, 2014, 
http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Committee_on_public_information_and_propaganda#slide=2.  
55. “Creel Committee,” publicdiplomacy.wikia.com, accessed February 21, 2014, 
http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/Creel_Committee.  
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Lippmann, along with Edward Bernays, “played key advisory roles to Creel.”
56
  In fact, 
Lippmann was highly critical of the CPI and played no part in it while Bernays’s role in the CPI 
has been overinflated by historians.
57
  Most inexplicably, the entry asserts: “in the months before 
Wilson formally asked Congress to enter the war, the Committee mailed out thousands of 
pamphlets, cartoons, magazines, movies, and prowar paraphernalia warning of the dangers of the 
‘Terrible Hun.’”
58
  What makes it inexplicable is that the article starts out by correctly 
identifying the date of the CPI’s creation as April 13, 1917—eleven days after Woodrow Wilson 
called for a declaration of war against Germany.  It is telling that the sole source cited in the 
entry is an article by communications professor Christopher Sharrett that makes the same 
outlandish accusation.
59
  Sharrett, in turn, relies exclusively on Thomas Fleming’s The Illusion of 
Victory (2003) for his information of the CPI. 
This string of errors, traced only three steps back, provides some insight as to how 
misconceptions of the CPI are perpetuated.  Imagine a teacher, in preparing a lesson on World 
War I, performing a search for the “Creel Committee” and landing on this particular website 
(publicdiplomacy.wikia.com).  Unaware of its errors, this teacher decides to copy and paste the 
text, which seems plausible enough, into a PowerPoint slide and then presents it to one or more 
U.S. History classes.  This “knowledge” becomes what these students will know about the CPI 
from that point onward.  Now imagine that it is a student, in high school or college, who is 
performing the research.  He or she is even less prepared to determine the veracity of the claims 
                                                 
56. Ibid.  This inaccuracy is furthered by conservative radio personality Glenn Beck. 
57. Larry Tye,  The Father of Spin: Edward L. Bernays and the Birth of Public Relations (New York: Random 
House, 1998), 19. 
58. “Creel Committee,” publicdiplomacy.wikia.com. 
59. Christopher Sharrett, “9/11, the Useful Incident, and the Legacy of the Creel Committee,” Cinema Journal 
43, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 127-128.  The major inaccuracies of Sharrett’s article are discussed in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis.   
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made on this website (or others) about the CPI.  In fact, this student may feel well-informed 
enough to get onto a site such as Yahoo Answers or Wiki Answers and unwittingly spread the 
misinformation.  And so it goes.  Errors beget errors.  After nearly a century of errors, it is easy 
to understand why the truth about the CPI is so elusive.   
Obstacles to Understanding 
The suggested activities related to the CPI found in state curricula, history textbook 
inserts and supplemental materials, and online World War I lesson plans indicate two major 
obstacles to understanding the true nature of the CPI.  The first of these is the tendency to rely 
almost exclusively on the visual products of the CPI as primary source evidence.  The second is 
the tendency to focus on George Creel to the exclusion of anyone else.  Both tendencies 
contribute to an inaccurate, or at best highly incomplete, portrait of the CPI. 
The primacy of the visual medium 
The innumerable Four-Minute Men speeches are lost to time.  Pershing’s Crusaders, 
America’s Answer, Under Four Flags and other shorter CPI films are either lost or otherwise 
unavailable to popular audiences.  The “Red, White, and Blue” pamphlets churned out for the 
CPI by America’s leading historians exist mainly in archives.  What remains for students 
studying the CPI are its posters.  Many of these are stunning examples of visual propaganda.  
Even today, they are tailor-made for reproduction.  They can be resized to fit within the pages of 
a textbook (see Appendix I).  Many of them have been digitized, which makes them easy to 
import into documents, PowerPoint presentations, or onto websites.  Posters have, to a large 
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extent, become the solitary evidence of the work of the CPI—and yet they represent but one 
small part of what the CPI was and what it did.
60
 
The posters skew our understanding of the CPI because poster artists relied heavily on 
emotion-laden symbols and slogans.  To some extent this is inherent to the medium.  The logical 
arguments and the appeals to fact that Creel prided himself on were not effectively conveyed in 
the visual medium.  Added to this, many of the artists who volunteered their services to the CPI’s 
Division of Pictorial Publicity (DPP) had been members of a prewar readiness organization 
known as the Vigilantes (to include one of its most famous artists, James Montgomery Flagg).  
As the head of the DPP, Creel selected Charles Dana Gibson—a nationally-known artist, 
president of the Society of Illustrators, and leader of the Vigilantes.
61
  Far from embracing 
Creel’s “faith in fact,” Gibson is quoted as saying: 
One cannot create enthusiasm for war on the basis of practical appeal. The spirit 
that will lead a man to put away the things of his accustomed life and go forth to 
all the hardships of war is not kindled by showing him the facts. We are being 
purged with fire, and the work of the artist will be to catch the new spirit of the 
people, to blow on the new flame.
62
 
 
The fact that the DPP departed from the other divisions’ emphasis on education, and 
Creel’s own “faith in fact,” has led to a distorted view of the CPI’s body of work.  Few teachers 
are likely to know, and their U.S. History textbooks do not tell them, that the DPP was but one 
                                                 
60.  Public Broadcasting’s website (pbs.org), which rated as the sixth highest search result in Google (see 
Table 2.1), contains an exhibit on “Poster Art of World War I” as part of its “American Experience” feature on 
Woodrow Wilson.  This article includes a brief paragraph explaining President Wilson’s motive for forming the 
CPI, one paragraph that discusses Creel and the broad work of the committee, and two paragraphs on the Division of 
Pictorial Publicity (DPP). The photo gallery contains ten of the most iconic posters from the war, most of which 
were products of the DPP. 
61. Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public 
Information (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 149. 
62. Eric Van Schaak, “The Division of Pictorial Publicity in World War I,” Design Issues 22, no. 1 (Winter 
2006): 38. 
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source of wartime posters.
63
  Furthermore, these teachers may not even be aware of the dangers 
of presenting the products of the DPP as the primary work of the CPI, given that this skews the 
student’s understanding of the CPI.  Finally, they are not likely to know that the DPP, first 
created in April 1917, did not become fully operational until November 1917, that its 
headquarters were in New York City (and not in Washington, D.C.) or that George Creel gave 
Gibson a large degree of latitude in managing the Division (as he did to the heads of all CPI 
divisions).
64
   
In short, the work of the DPP is presented to, and studied by, students today as the chief 
tangible documentary evidence of the CPI and yet neither these students, nor their teachers, are 
likely to understand much of anything about the DPP or its relation to the CPI.  All they know is 
that George Creel was the head of the CPI and the CPI produced posters.  This is reflective of 
another obstacle to understanding the CPI, which is the “Great Man Theory” of history.   
George Creel: The Not-So-Great Man 
As seen in textbook headings like “Creel Manipulates Minds,” there is a tendency to 
reduce the CPI to the person of Creel.  Many textbooks do not read “it” (i.e. the CPI) did this or 
that.  Instead, they read that “he” (Creel) did it.  Thus it is Creel who “recruited an army of 
public speakers”—while in reality the Four-Minute Men was not the idea of Creel and the 
speakers were all recruited locally.  Creel is very straightforward about how the Four-Minute 
Men came into being in both the Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public 
                                                 
63. Ibid., 43.  Van Schaak notes that “the Marine Corps Recruiting Bureau, the YMCA, the YWCA, the Red 
Cross, and the U.S. Navy all ran their own (poster) campaigns.” 
64. Ibid., 35-36. 
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Information and How We Advertised America.
65
  The tendency to view the CPI in terms of one 
man began shortly after the committee was formed.
66
   
Creel became a lightning rod for criticism, not only of the CPI but of Wilson.
67
  Ad 
hominem attacks on Creel are as old as the CPI itself.  Such attacks prevent a more thorough 
understanding of the CPI and thoroughly obscure the true nature of the organization.  While 
textbooks present Creel’s leadership of the CPI as singular, this is simply not the case.  Creel 
could not have exercised dictatorial power over the CPI even if he had so desired.  Thousands of 
CPI workers served, the vast majority on a volunteer basis, in twenty different, largely distinct 
divisions across the country and in approximately thirty foreign countries.  If the example of 
Charles Dana Gibson’s Division of Pictorial Publicity proves anything, it is that Creel did not 
exercise dictatorial control over all aspects of the CPI.  It seems more accurate to say that he 
barely controlled some of his subordinates at all—and yet textbooks and reference texts, 
websites, etc. insist on reducing the CPI to Creel.  
As a result, the names of important men such as Gibson, Donald Ryerson, Guy Stanton 
Ford, Edgar Sisson, and Arthur Bullard have been lost to all but the most devoted students of the 
World War I propaganda.  These men were not Creel’s minions.  They were the men, among 
many others, who made the CPI happen.  A Division of Pictorial Publicity without Charles Dana 
Gibson and his existing network of artists (the “Vigilantes”) seems as inconceivable as a 
Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation without Guy Stanton Ford.  It was Ford, a history 
                                                 
65. U.S. Committee on Public Information, Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public 
Information 1917: 1918: 1919 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), 22 (hereinafter Complete 
Report); Creel, How We Advertised America, 84-85. 
66. Ryley Grannon, “Why Pay For Comedy When We Have a Creel Committee,” The Washington Post, 
October 7, 1917. 
67. Bean, “George Creel and His Critics,” 128.   
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professor and Dean of Graduate Studies at the University of Minnesota, who did more than any 
other CPI member to mobilize the historians of America in support of the war effort—therefore 
making him the man most responsible for the oft-cited 75 million pamphlets.  Beyond the 
monumental task of running his own expansive division, Ford also assisted in the preparation of 
the Four-Minute Men’s General Bulletin.
68
  Without Donald Ryerson, there would undoubtedly 
have been no Division of Four-Minute Men at all—as he was the man who conceived of it, tested 
out the idea, pitched it to Creel and led it during its formative period.
 69
  According to at least one 
CPI historian, without Arthur Bullard, there would have been no CPI at all.
70
  After lobbying for 
the creation of the CPI, Bullard, a progressive reporter and novelist, went on to serve for a year 
and a half as the director of the CPI’s “Russian enterprise.”
71
  Edgar Sisson left a lucrative 
position in the employ of William Randolph Hearst as editor of The Cosmopolitan to serve in 
various capacities, to include a stint as the head of the CPI’s Foreign Section.
72
  Reflecting 
specifically on the services rendered to the CPI by Sisson and Bullard (along with Ernest Poole), 
Creel remarked, “when I think of their unselfish drudgeries, their contributions from loyal hearts 
and driving minds, I find fault with every phrase designed to convey appreciation.”
73
   
The contributions of these men, and many others, are far less appreciated by those writing 
history texts.  In fact, this study located only two history books that mentioned any CPI 
                                                 
68. Cornebise, War as Advertised, 8. 
69. The History Committee of the Four Minute Men of Chicago, The Four Minute Men of Chicago (Chicago, 
The History Committee, 1919), Kindle loc 25; Creel, How We Advertised America, 84. 
70. Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines, 7.  Vaughn asserts that Bullard “should receive much of the credit 
for the (Wilson) administration’s decision to establish the Committee on Public Information.” 
71. Complete Report, 212. 
72. Ibid., 108. 
73. Creel, How We Advertised America, 70. 
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personnel aside from George Creel (see Appendix E).  The first was the first edition of George 
Brown Tindall’s college text America: A Narrative History (1984), which mentions Gibson, 
Ford, and the famous artist James Montgomery Flagg (best known for his poster “I Want 
You”).
74
  The other source to mention individuals other than Creel is the online textbook 
provided by US history.org.  It mentions Flagg, to whom it assigns inflated importance, and 
songwriter George M. Cohan, who did not even work for the CPI. 75   
Content on focusing exclusively on Creel, the overwhelming majority of textbooks 
surveyed make no mention of the volunteer nature of the CPI.  By this omission, they miss the 
entire essence of the CPI.  It was a volunteer enterprise made up of men and women, some 
experts in their fields but most anonymous outside of their own communities.  These were, in 
many cases, the true believers in Wilsonian idealism.  They were not, in their own eyes, 
instruments of government repression.  They were contributing, each in his or her own way, to 
President Wilson’s colossal struggle to “make the world safe for democracy.”  It is therefore 
ironic that they have been passed down, in much of the instructional literature, as villains.  Many, 
though certainly not all, of these volunteers would fall under the broad heading of 
“progressives.” 
Conclusion 
A survey of forty U.S. history textbooks, other U.S. history resources, and reference 
websites reveals that the dominant narrative of the CPI remains strong.  The CPI is presented in 
                                                 
74. Tindall, America: A Narrative History, 964.  Tindall had excised these names from his narrative by the 
eighth edition (2010).   
75. UShistory.org, “Over Here,” U.S. History Online Textbook 2014, accessed March 26, 2014, 
http://www.ushistory.org/us/45c.asp.  The text states: “He (Creel) commissioned George M. Cohan to write patriotic 
songs intended to stoke the fires of American nationalism.”  In point of fact, George Cohan was not affiliated with 
the CPI and there is no evidence that Cohan wrote “Over There” or any other patriotic song at the behest of George 
Creel. 
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terms of numbers, in terms of posters, and in terms of one man.  It is associated, often through 
value-laden language, with intolerance, xenophobia, and vigilantism.  It is a symbol of 
something incompatible with democracy and something to be avoided.  George Creel remains, as 
Time magazine observed in 1939, “Horrible Exhibit No. 1 of…anti-war propaganda.”
76
  His deep 
roots in progressivism and his faith in democracy, if acknowledged at all, are presented as ironic 
when juxtaposed against his sinister side as chief censor and master propagandist.  This tendency 
to reducing the CPI to the personage of one man or to the work of one of its component parts 
(e.g. the Four-Minute Men or the Division of Pictorial Publicity) is nothing more than history 
poorly done.  Students deserve better.  They deserve to be presented with a more objective and 
more nuanced narrative of the CPI—not for the CPI’s sake but for the sake of historical 
accuracy. 
                                                 
76. Review of Words that Won the War by James R. Mock and Cedric Larson,  Time 34, no. 16 (October 16, 
1939): 108. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Woodrow Wilson, George Creel, and the Committee on Public 
Information: An Alternative Narrative 
He, with Wilson; Wilson as forger of verbal thunderbolts, Creel as propagandeer of them; 
Wilson as Napoleon of ideas, Creel as Marshal Ney of dissemination – the two would 
conquer the world. 
Mark Sullivan 
Our Times, Vol. 5, 1933 
 
In the 1916 presidential campaign, progressives rallied behind President Woodrow 
Wilson and his policy of neutrality in the “Great War” that raged in Europe.  One of these 
progressives was a muckraking journalist from Denver by the name of George Creel, whose 
foremost contribution to Wilson’s campaign was a book-length defense of the president’s 
policies, including that of neutrality, entitled Wilson and the Issues.  Five months after securing 
his reelection under the banner “He kept us out of war,” Wilson led a reluctant nation into that 
very war.  Knowing that he must mobilize public opinion in support of this fateful decision, 
Wilson issued Executive Order 2594 creating a new executive bureaucracy, the Committee on 
Public Information (CPI), and naming George Creel as its chairman.
1
  In doing so, Wilson made 
Creel one of the first progressives enlisted into the war for the American mind—the war that was 
to “make the world safe for democracy.”  Working through Creel’s CPI, Wilson conducted the 
first executively directed war of ideas in American history, selling the war to the American 
people, and ultimately to the world, as a progressive venture based on American ideals of 
democracy and freedom.   
                                                 
1 Executive Order 2594, April 14, 1917, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur Link, vol. 42, 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 59. Hereinafter Wilson Papers. 
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The dominant narrative of the CPI, as defined in the preceding chapters, makes two 
critical errors with regard to President Wilson’s relation to the CPI.  First, historians cast Wilson 
in the role of the watchmaker who created the CPI and then left it in the hands of its chairman, 
George Creel.  For most historians, George Creel was both mastermind of the CPI and dictator 
over it.  At most, historians acknowledge that Wilson provided many of the messages that the 
CPI broadcast throughout the world.  However, the wartime correspondence between Wilson and 
Creel reveal that Wilson was much more involved in CPI affairs than most accounts of the CPI 
would indicate.  Wilson was by no means the driving force behind the CPI, nor was he involved 
in every aspect.  However, given the vast and varied nature of the tasks facing an American 
President during wartime, Wilson’s level of interest and involvement in the business of the CPI 
was telling.  It revealed the priority that he placed on the CPI’s mission. 
A second error that is characteristic of the dominant narrative of the CPI is the tendency 
of historians to excoriate Creel for a variety of abuses while temporizing on Wilson.  Many 
historians present Creel as the face of wartime intolerance, excessive “patriotism,” vigilantism, 
and censorship.  Wilson, on the other hand, is often presented as a tragic yet sympathetic 
figure—the naïve idealist who promised the world more than he could deliver but who was 
driven by the noblest of intentions.  This can be seen in the recent work of cultural historian 
Jackson Lears.  In Rebirth of a Nation (2008), Lears dismisses Creel’s efforts as “chauvinistic” 
and the “last gasp of a discredited dogma” and yet Lears is much more ambivalent towards 
Creel’s boss.
2
  While critical of Wilson’s decision to participate in the Great War, Lears 
acknowledges Wilson’s sincere (though, to Lears, misguided) intentions: “He (Wilson) would 
fight a war, he finally decided, in the service of all humanity—a war that would lead to the 
                                                 
2. Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920 (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2008), 353. 
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regeneration not merely of the individual and the nation, but of the world.”
3
  Such 
characterizations overlook, intentionally or by accident, the fact that Wilson and Creel were very 
much kindred spirits who shared a progressive interpretation of the war and a progressive view 
of the importance of public opinion. 
Additionally, the dominant narrative overlooks the role of progressivism as the driving 
force behind the government’s propaganda effort.  Many historians note that progressives, as 
individuals, largely supported the war, and that some participated in the CPI, but they seldom 
focus on the impact that progressivism, as an ideology, played in the war for what Wilson 
referred to as the “verdict of mankind.”
4
  The fact is that the progressives’ confidence in the 
efficacy of bureaucracy, their faith in human rationality, and their desire for moral regeneration 
all combined to make the war for the American mind a decidedly progressive venture. 
An examination of ninety-nine wartime correspondences between Woodrow Wilson and 
George Creel, drawn from The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, provides a view of the CPI that does 
not come across in the historiographical literature or in the instructional literature studied in 
previous chapters.  It is an alternate narrative that presents the CPI as a collaborative venture 
between Woodrow Wilson and George Creel; one as idealistic as the other, both driven by 
progressive ideals, and both convinced of the justness of a “war to end war.”  Together they 
formed a partnership that convinced much of the country, and a large part of the world, that 
America’s was a fight for right. 
                                                 
3. Ibid., 328. Other historians, most notably Thomas Fleming (The Illusion of Victory) and Stewart Halsey 
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The CPI’s Progressive Roots 
In his classic 1967 work The Search for Order, political and social historian Robert 
Wiebe makes the case for Woodrow Wilson as the progressives’ beau ideal: the “public man.”  
In defining progressivism, Wiebe argues, “Idealism supplied most of the new theory’s 
superstructure—the philosopher-kings, the rational public, the social consensus.”
5
  Wiebe then 
notes that “bureaucratic thought filled the interior—the beautifully functioning administration, 
the perfect administrative types, the interacting groups, the society in indeterminate process.”
6
  
At the head of this “beautifully functioning administration” Wiebe places “the public man, a 
unique and indispensable leader.”
7
  Woodrow Wilson, as philosopher-king, believed in the 
“rational public” and “the social consensus,” which led him to perceive a war for the American 
mind as both a just and necessary undertaking.  George Creel was an example of Wiebe’s 
“perfect administrative types” and his CPI drew from, and appealed to, the various “interacting 
groups.” 
Other historians of progressivism have built on Wiebe’s construct of progressivism.  
Jackson Lears adds to it the theme of moral regeneration.  For Lears, the entire period from the 
end of Reconstruction through World War I was about a longing for rebirth.  For many 
Americans, Lears argues, progressivism provided an avenue to fulfill that longing.
8
 This helps to 
explain why so many progressives were drawn to the war effort.  On this note, Lears says, 
“Progressive hopes for wartime regeneration went far beyond the managerial vision of efficient 
                                                 
5. Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 162.  Wiebe does 
not specifically address the CPI in this, his seminal work on the Progressive Era. 
6. Ibid., 163. 
7. Ibid., 160. 
8. Lears, Rebirth of a Nation, 310. 
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social engineering.”
9
  This is to say it went beyond Wiebe’s conception of progressivism.  Lears 
continues: “the war, many felt, would be an opportunity for remaking both the polity and the 
self—erasing class differences, elevating women, eliminating selfishness, disciplining indolence 
and pleasure.”
10
  Thus, for Lears, progressives chose to support the war as a way of 
accomplishing goals beyond merely making the world safe for democracy. 
In The Tyranny of Change (2006), military and cultural historian John Whiteclay 
Chambers introduces the idea of the “progressive ethos.” According to Chambers, the 
progressive ethos “combined the nineteenth century sense of Protestant evangelism with the new 
methods of science and large-scale organization.”
11
   This blending of a religious sense of 
mission with the desire for scientifically-enhanced efficiency made progressives, to Chambers, 
“evangelical modernizers (who) worked for specific reforms while seeking to restore a sense of 
community and common purpose to a nation they saw splintering into diverse ethnic and interest 
groups.”
12
  This definition is helpful in determining why progressives rallied not only behind 
President Wilson’s war but also behind his war of ideas.  Of particular interest is the final 
observation from Chambers above, which notes the progressives’ sense that America was being 
pulled apart by centrifugal forces.  This gave rise to the idea among many progressives that unity 
was, in and of itself, a worthy goal.  This was a goal that Wilson and Creel pursued through the 
CPI. 
                                                 
9. Ibid., 341. 
10. Ibid. 
11. John Whiteclay Chambers II, The Tyranny of Change (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
2006), 140. 
12. Ibid. 
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In 1980’s Holding Fast the Inner Lines, CPI historian Stephen Vaughn gives the 
relationship between progressivism and the CPI fuller treatment than any other historian.  He 
observes that “most workers for the CPI were dedicated to the preservation, if necessary the 
revitalization, and indeed the expansion of democratic government.”
 13
  He goes on to note that 
“to mobilize public opinion was their immediate goal.  But there was a forward-looking, 
progressive aspect to the work of the committee that has often been overlooked.
14
  What Vaughn 
does not highlight, however, is the role of President Woodrow Wilson, in collaboration with 
George Creel, in this great progressive struggle.  That is the central theme of this narrative.  
Woodrow Wilson: Propagandist in Chief? 
In Propaganda Technique in World War I, Harold Lasswell labels Woodrow Wilson “the 
great generalissimo on the propaganda front.”
15
  Lasswell is referring specifically to Wilson’s 
role in the eyes of Europeans but it was equally true on the home front.  Jackson Lears notes in 
Rebirth of a Nation (2008) that “from the outset, Wilson knew he would have to mobilize public 
opinion as well as men and guns.”
16
  Historian David Kennedy observes that Wilson “had all of 
his life been a moralizing evangelist who longed with religious fervor to sway the public mind 
with the power of his person and his rhetoric.”
17
  Thus, it is clear that historians have not totally 
divorced Wilson from the propaganda effort.  They acknowledge that Wilson created the CPI 
and that this organization propagated Wilsonian themes and messages.  Beyond this, however, 
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Information (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 236. 
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15. Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in World War I (1927; repr., Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 
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the watchmaker view prevails.  Additionally, the tendency to view the CPI as the work of George 
Creel, has left little room for an examination of the role of Wilson.  Nevertheless, it was Wilson 
who led the national, even worldwide, war of ideas from 1917-1919.   
The story of the Committee on Public Information typically begins with its creation by 
Executive Order on April 14, 1917.  Historians continue to debate about who deserves credit for 
the idea of a “Bureau of Publicity” (Creel’s initial term).  The list of possible candidates, all 
notable progressives, includes Walter Lippmann, David Lawrence, Arthur Bullard, George 
Creel, Secretary of War Newton Baker, and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels.
18
  
Historians omit Wilson from this list, despite his great faith in the power of persuasion and 
advocacy for mobilizing public opinion, for the simple reason that there is no evidence that the 
idea of the CPI originated with him.
19
 This, however, overlooks the seemingly obvious fact that 
it was Wilson who created the CPI with a stroke of his pen.  Who receives credit for the idea is, 
ultimately, trivial when one considers that, had Wilson not embraced the concept, it would have 
remained just an idea.  He was not merely present at the creation of the CPI; he was its creator. 
Josephus Daniels recalled the President’s intent for the CPI:  “The purposes of the 
Committee on Public Information as President Wilson conceived them were two: the 
mobilization of the mind of America, and the fight for the ‘verdict of mankind.’”
20
  Thus it was 
President Wilson who established what might be referred to as the “mission statement” of the 
CPI.  Although he would delegate the day-to-day operations of the CPI to its civilian chairman, it 
                                                 
18. Of all the accounts of the CPI’s creation, Stephen Vaughn devotes the most time to the discussion in 
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19. On this point, there is evidence that Wilson considered a “publicity agency” as early as June 1914 to 
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was clear that the President had a firm vision of what it was to accomplish.  Throughout the war, 
Wilson held the final authority over CPI operations.  Wilson expressed his wish “to keep the 
matter of propaganda entirely in my own hands.”
21
   
Before the CPI was even officially formed, Wilson had no doubt as to whom he wanted 
to lead the CPI on his behalf.  Secretary Daniels, a friend of George Creel, noted in a diary entry 
dated April 9, 1917 that he had met with the President to discuss the censorship issue and that 
Wilson indicated that he would appoint Creel to head some as-yet unformed and undefined 
bureau that would deal with the issues of censorship and publicity.
22
  Two days later, on April 
11, Daniels met with Wilson again to discuss Creel’s appointment and forwarded him Creel’s 
memo proposing a Bureau of Publicity that would allow the government to avoid strict 
censorship.  The following day, April 12, Daniels wrote that he and Secretary of War Newton 
Baker had “sent letter to W.W. as to Committee of Publicity and suggested appointment of 
George Creel.”
23
  Wilson replied that same day: “Do I understand that I now have the authority 
to designate Creel?  If so, I shall be glad to do so.  I like his memorandum very much.”
24
 
The endorsement of Creel as CPI Chairman by Wilson, Baker, and Daniels left a 
reluctant Secretary of State Robert Lansing with no choice but to go along.  Tensions between 
the older, more conservative Lansing and Creel were evident from the very beginning.  In his 
diary, Daniels related how Lansing had insisted that the memo creating the CPI be rewritten on 
                                                 
21. Turner, “Woodrow Wilson and Public Opinion,” 516. 
22. Josephus Daniels diary entry, April 9, 1917, Wilson Papers 42: 23. 
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State Department letterhead and that Lansing’s be the first signature.
25
  These tensions had not 
eased by the end of the war.  As late as December 15,1918, Wilson’s friend and advisor 
“Colonel” Edward House wrote in his diary: “I told him (Wilson) that a ‘head-on collision’ was 
about to occur with Creel on the one side and with Lansing on the other…I told him Lansing’s 
dislike for Creel was only equaled by Creel’s dislike for Lansing.”
26
 
Relations between Creel and the other two committee members were better.  Daniels, a 
newspaperman by trade, was the most involved of the three cabinet members but he deferred to 
Creel, which was not as difficult for him since he considered Creel a personal friend.  However, 
it did not appear to matter very much what any members of the Committee felt, given that Creel 
held the unwavering confidence of the President.  Given Creel’s leadership, the CPI quickly 
came to be known as the “Creel Committee.”   
In appointing George Creel to lead the Committee on Public Information, Wilson enlisted 
the services of both a “prominent muckraker” and a loyal admirer.
27
  Both of these characteristics 
would serve Creel well as CPI chairman.  By 1917, the forty-one year old Creel had experienced 
a lot in his restless life; he had been a newspaper owner/editor, Denver police commissioner, 
muckraker who opposed local political bosses, friend of labor, campaigner for women’s suffrage, 
and political renegade.  Popular historian Alan Axelrod observes that Creel was “always an 
advocate, a crusader for whom journalism was merely a means to an end.
28
   The most significant 
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of the causes embraced by Creel, in terms of its impact on Creel’s life, turned out to be Woodrow 
Wilson’s 1916 reelection campaign. 
Over the course of the 1916 campaign, Wilson developed a fondness for George Creel.  
Journalist Mark Sullivan remarked that Wilson treated Creel “as one of the very small number of 
men whom Wilson enjoyed having near him.”
29
  Sullivan noted that “Creel’s appeal for Wilson 
lay in his robustious [sic] vitality, from which Wilson could absorb some for his own habitually 
depleted stores.”
30
  For his part, Creel was a true believer in Woodrow Wilson.  This 
demonstrated loyalty was what distinguished Creel from some of his would-be competitors for 
the job of CPI chairman and continued to pay dividends for him throughout his tenure in that 
position.  In 1920, Creel wrote to Mrs. Edith Wilson, “Aside from my faith in the President and 
my deep admiration for him, there is a personal devotion to him formed as a result of 
association.”
31
 
Beyond the matter of likability was the equally important issue of like-mindedness.  
Wilson and Creel had much in common.  In addition to a general agreement on political issues, 
both shared the progressive faith in the power of public opinion and believed it to be based in 
human rationality and malleable for political ends.
32
  According to Henry Turner, Wilson’s 
conception of the relationship between public opinion and government predated his entry into the 
world of politics by over two decades and was based on his reading of Edmund Burke and 
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Walter Bagehot.
33
  Wilson himself wrote in Constitutional Government in the United States: “Let 
him (the President) once win the admiration and confidence of the country, and no other single 
force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily overpower him.”
34
  By selecting a 
man he trusted to head the CPI, and by forging a close working relationship with him, Wilson 
was attempting to secure such a level of admiration and confidence from his country. 
Creel was happy to oblige.  The relationship between the President and Creel was in 
many ways symbiotic.  Wilson provided Creel with a cause and Creel, in turn, used that cause to 
the benefit of the President in multiple ways.  Without the war, it seems likely that Creel would 
have continued to bounce between the East Coast and the Midwest, fleeing success in search of 
an elusive sense of fulfillment.
35
  Without Creel, Wilson would have been forced to choose 
between the other progressive journalists (such as Lippmann, Lawrence, and Bullard) who may 
or may not have proven as apt as Creel at running the CPI or as personally loyal to Wilson.  How 
any of these alternatives might have performed is unknowable but it is known that Wilson was 
quite pleased with his choice of Creel.  Secretary Daniels, Creel’s partner on the CPI, 
characterized the President’s opinion of Creel as such: “The President had an affection for Creel, 
who had won his heart, while his brilliancy compelled his admiration. Their common devotion to 
real liberalism cemented the regard.”
36
 
From the very beginning, Wilson served as Creel’s top advocate in the U.S. government.  
In May 1917, one month after forming the CPI, Wilson expressed his concern over the fact that 
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Creel had yet to make provision for his own salary in the CPI budget.  Wilson wrote to Creel: “I 
cannot be content with that arrangement and write to beg that you will do me the favor to provide 
you a proper compensation for your services.”
37
  Creel conceded and granted himself a modest 
annual salary of $8,000.
38
  By comparison, President Wilson’s salary was $75,000 per year.
39
   
Wilson also provided what might be termed “top cover” for Creel by recommending that 
all inquiries about the CPI and its work be directed to him.  In July 1917, Wilson wrote his 
personal secretary, Joseph Tumulty: “I would suggest that Creel say that the Committee on 
Public Information was created by me, that Mr. Creel is my personal representative, and that he 
feels constrained in the circumstances to refer all inquiries about the committee and the work is 
doing to me.”
40
 
Wilson frequently expressed his pleasure with the CPI’s work to Creel and others.  On 
January 14, 1918, Wilson wrote Creel in response to Creel’s report of CPI activities for 1917: “I 
have just finished reading the report of the Committee on Public Information which you were 
kind enough to bring me last week, and I want to say how much it has gratified me and how 
entirely the work of the Committee meets with my approval.”
41
  In a letter to House 
Appropriations Committee Chairman Swager Sherley, dated 11 May 1918, Wilson states: 
May I not say a word of special emphasis with regard to the work which the 
Committee on Public Information is doing?  Mr. Creel in conducting this work is 
in a very special sense my personal representative.  I have kept in close touch with 
the work that he is doing, and it has at all times been based in large part upon my 
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advice.  It has been admirably done and I think it very likely that nobody, not 
even those most intimately connected with the Government, are aware of the 
extent, the variety and the usefulness of that work or of the really unusually 
economical manner in which it has been accomplished, so far as the expenditure 
of money is concerned.  I should feel personally crippled if any obstacle of any 
kind were put in the way of that work.
42
 
From this quote, it is clear that Wilson approved of Creel and his conduct of the 
propaganda war. Unfortunately for both Wilson and Creel, his pleas for additional funding from 
Congress were to no avail, due in part to the hostility Creel was about to generate with a 
particularly ill-advised comment about the U.S. Congress.  
George Creel possessed a seemingly limitless ability to engender controversy.  Journalist 
Mark Sullivan noted that “Creel’s pugnacity, his gift for biting sarcasm, and a talent he had for 
epithets at once caustic and accurate, brought him into row after row with Congress.”
43
  One 
such “row” presented Wilson with the greatest test of his loyalty to Creel.  In May 1918, after 
delivering a speech at the Church of the Ascension in New York, Creel fielded questions for an 
hour. In How We Advertised America, Creel recalled that “when the questions were getting fewer 
and weaker, and when fatigue had robbed me of mental quickness, some fool asked what I 
thought about the ‘heart of Congress.’”
44
 He remembered his “quick and thoughtless answer” as 
being “I had not been slumming for years.”
45
  Creel claimed to have realized his error 
immediately, stating that “the moment the words left my mouth I could have bitten my tongue 
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out.”
46
  He noticed that, on the day following his comment, the morning papers gave full 
attention to his “slumming” remark and its implications that he “had accused Congressmen of 
being ‘poor, dirty, degraded, and often vicious.’”
47
  
Creel’s enemies were quick to seize on the ill-advised comment.  Josephus Daniels noted 
that a “fire of denunciation of Creel” broke out in Congress, accompanied by cries for Creel’s 
head.
48
  George LaBarre, a city commissioner from Trenton, New Jersey, wrote Wilson to 
inquire: “Is George Creel a damn fool or just a plain nut?”
49
  For his part, Wilson publicly rushed 
to Creel’s defense, telling a group of Senators, “Gentlemen, when I think of the manner in which 
Mr. Creel has been maligned and persecuted I think it a very human thing for him to have 
said.”
50
  Privately, however, Wilson expressed doubts.  Colonel House noted in his diary that 
Wilson sought his advice as to what to do with Creel in the wake of the controversy.
51
  Wilson 
feared that retaining Creel would cost the CPI any chance of an appropriation from Congress.  
House suggested sending Creel abroad and replacing him with Frank Cobb.  According to 
House, Wilson was amenable to the idea, but it never happened.  Creel remained at his post and 
Wilson remained by his side.  There is no indication that Wilson ever regretted this decision. 
Creel was hardly more popular with the press than he was with Congress.  In the early 
months of the war, while censorship was still being hotly debated, Wilson wrote to journalist 
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David Lawrence that he believed “continued intercourse with Creel such as the newspaper 
correspondents will have will more and more convince them of his unusual qualities, not only of 
sense but of trustworthiness.”
52
  This turned to be less than prescient.  Journalist Frank Cobb 
reported to House in August 1917: “Creel is hopelessly discredited…the newspaper 
correspondents distrust him.  They have no respect for him.  They are suspicious of everything 
he gives out.”
53
  Throughout the war, Creel struggled to convince the press that his form of 
“voluntary censorship” was the least of evils. 
Given the extent to which the CPI promoted Wilson and his ideas, Wilson’s loyalty to 
Creel, even in the face of opposition from the press and from Congress, was not entirely selfless.  
Wilson had long believed that the presidency deserved to occupy the premiere spot in the 
national government and he used the CPI for this purpose.
54
   Furthermore, one of the 
overarching purposes of the CPI was to spread Wilson’s words and ideas into every crevice of 
the country and to the far corners of the earth.  The CPI’s exaltation of the person of Wilson and 
its amplification of his messages led to accusations of partisanship and, more specifically, of 
Creel’s serving as the President’s press agent.  In his study of select CPI messages, historian 
Elmer Cornwell found that “Creel was the President’s unconscious publicity agent, if not his 
conscious propagandist.”
55
  While historians of the CPI agree that its messages were in harmony 
with Wilson’s ideals, Cornwell goes a step further by demonstrating that many of its messages 
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were explicitly about the President.  Whether this is reflective of Wilson’s direct involvement, or 
merely of Creel and his fellow progressives’ devotion to the President, is unknown.  Regardless, 
no less a personage than Theodore Roosevelt claimed that the CPI was a partisan venture, 
stating: “Mr. Creel’s activities are exercised nominally on behalf of the country, but in reality 
primarily on behalf of the administration.  Mr. Creel announces and publishes himself as the 
special representative of the President, and is permitted by the President to so announce and 
publish himself.”
56
 
In addition to promoting Wilson’s image, Creel served as Wilson’s lightning rod.  The 
critics of Woodrow Wilson and the critics of George Creel were often one in the same.  Criticism 
of Creel was easier and safer than direct criticism of Wilson.  CPI historian Walton Bean 
explains this phenomenon as such: “The opposition…is in war-time under one tactical 
disadvantage of its own; its criticisms of the administration’s conduct of the war cannot be too 
direct, lest they be successfully branded unpatriotic and even treasonable.
57
  Bean then describes 
Creel as a “whipping boy, an exposed flank of the administration which could be attacked with 
relative impunity.”
58
  In a letter to George Creel, Democratic Representative Edward Pou 
explained the situation this way: “The Republicans hate President Wilson as the devil hates holy 
water.  They know he is founding a new dynasty which is going to endure…for years to come.  If 
they can attack him without coming out in the open, they are glad to do so.”
59
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This strategy was certainly on full display in the Sixty-fifth U.S. Congress, which was 
somewhat deferential, out of necessity, to Wilson but treated Creel with thinly-veiled contempt.  
In Historians on the Homefront (1970), historian George Blakey quotes Democratic 
Representative James F. Byrnes as saying that Wilson’s critics in Congress used Creel and the 
CPI as a “goat” in lieu of other avenues for getting their opinions on the record.
60
  Evidence that 
Wilson recognized this form of indirect attack comes from Josephus Daniels’s account of an 
April 12, 1918 cabinet meeting in which Wilson stated that, “in [if] the House cited George Creel 
for contempt he would go up to the House as his attorney & say ‘It’s me you are after.  Here I 
am. Be brave enough to go after me.’”
61
   
A Productive Partnership: Wilson and Creel as Mutual Advisors 
The Wilson-Creel relationship was not merely one of the supporter and the supported.  
They were also collaborators in the great war of ideas.  Josephus Daniels noted that “Wilson took 
the deepest interest in the work of the Committee, making suggestions from time to time.”
62
  One 
such suggestion for which Wilson deserves full credit was the creation of a government daily.  
Wilson had long believed that the nation’s leaders were less effective than the press in shaping 
public opinion because they lacked “a national organ of opinion.”
63
  On May 10, 1917, the first 
edition of the Official Bulletin was published.  Historian Stewart Halsey Ross refers to the 
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Official Bulletin as Wilson’s own “propaganda sheet, a medium through which he could present 
information in the form he wished, without the press interposing its editorial interpretations.”
64
  
Wilson made other suggestions and offered advice to Creel on a variety of issues.  In 
September 1917, Wilson wrote Creel granting his authorization to the formation of a Speaking 
Division and approving the appointment of Arthur Bestor, one of the nation’s foremost orators, 
as its chief.
65
  In early October 1917, Creel sought input from Wilson concerning a shift in the 
loyalties of the Yiddish-language newspaper Volwarts.
66
  Wilson wrote back two days later to 
assure Creel that Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson was on the case and that Wilson 
believed that “the thing is being worked out with some degree of equity and success.”
67
  In 
December 1917, Creel informed Wilson of a controversy regarding the use of the words “Our 
Allies” in a Food Administration poster.
68
  In May 1918, Wilson wrote Creel waiving rights to 
his History of the American People so that it could be freely distributed by the Italian-American 
Union.
69
  In late June 1918, Wilson and Creel exchanged letters making arrangements for the 
President’s Fourth of July speech to a gathering of twenty-three different ethnic groups at Mount 
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Vernon.
70
  In September 1918, Wilson proposed to Creel the “immediate publicity task” relating 
to the efficacy of the government’s food program in regulating the price of food staples.
71
   
George Creel ensured that the President was involved in the domestic work of the CPI by 
sustaining the morale of the CPI’s vast network of volunteers.  In November 1917, he drafted a 
letter on behalf of Wilson commending the work of the 15,000 Four-Minute Men.
72
  Wilson 
signed the letter, which was distributed to each member of the all-volunteer organization.  
Wilson issued a second letter of commendation a year later, on November 29, 1918, that 
summarized the impact of the speakers’ collective efforts: “Each member of your 
organization…may justly feel a glow of proper pride in the part that he has played in holding fast 
the inner lines.”
73
 
Sometimes, Creel made suggestions that Wilson felt compelled to decline.  For example, 
Wilson rejected Creel’s proposal of August 10, 1917 that Wilson be filmed signing a critical 
piece of legislation.  Wilson protested, “I am the worst possible subject for moving pictures and I 
hope you will let me off from having my picture taken when signing the Food Bill.”
74
  In August 
of 1918, he declined Creel’s suggestion that Mrs. Edith Wilson make a public statement in favor 
of the War Savings Stamp drive, citing the First Lady’s desire to stay out of the limelight.
75
  
Perhaps most significantly, Wilson rejected Creel’s suggestion that he meet with African-
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American newspaper editors.  Creel noted that “the colored population of the country, from a 
variety of causes, has been torn by rumor and ugly whisperings ever since we entered the war” 
and that “their leaders have been working with the Administration splendidly in combatting this 
dangerous unrest.”
76
  Wilson declined Creel’s invitation to speak at the gathering, noting, “I have 
received several delegations of negroes and am under the impression that they have gone away 
dissatisfied.”
77
   
There were other matters on which Creel failed to convince Wilson.  One example of this 
came from a letter dated February 26, 1918 in which Creel asked Wilson to intervene on behalf 
of a group of Swedish-American men who had been imprisoned by a Federal judge, Kennesaw 
Mountain Landis, for failure to register for the draft.  Creel vouched for the loyalty of the 
Swedish-American community and said that the release of the resisters would have a positive 
effect on their attitude towards the war.
78
  Wilson seemed inclined to go along until he received a 
report from Attorney General Thomas Gregory in late March that indicated the Swedish draft 
resisters were in fact socialists with connections to the International Workers of the World.
79
  
Upon being informed of Wilson’s agreement with Gregory’s report, Creel replied “it was not 
justice I asked (for)…but clemency.”
80
  While this example alone does not exonerate the CPI of 
all charges of promoting intolerance, it does reveal a side of George Creel that seldom comes 
across in textbooks or in histories of the CPI.  It is the story of a man with a heart who, true to his 
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muckraking past, attempted to stand up for the “little man” and to give voice to those groups, 
such as African-Americans or immigrant communities, who may not otherwise be heard. 
One group that Creel found in particular need of an advocate was the Non-Partisan 
League (NPL), which David Kennedy describes as “a militant farmers’ organization in the upper 
Midwest” that had its roots in the “Populist debacle of the 1890s.”
81
  The Minnesota Historical 
Society adds that the NPL was “decried as socialist from its inception” and, once the war began, 
that “Leaguers were ruthlessly attacked as disloyal pacifists.”
82
  These attacks were sanctioned 
by the Minnesota Commission on Public Safety, which was intent on destroying the League.
83
  
At a meeting in October 1917, the Commission appointed an agent for the purpose of 
investigating the NPL and its founder/leader, Arthur Townley, citing allegations “that said 
organization is disloyal and guilty of disseminating sedition and disloyal propaganda.”
84
  Creel 
took up the cause of the beleaguered Non-Partisan League (NPL) by inviting Townley to the 
White House to meet with Wilson in November 1917.
85
     
President Wilson, unconvinced of the NPL’s loyalty, shared the report of the Minnesota 
Commission of Public Safety with Creel in February 1918.
 86
  Creel immediately rushed to the 
NPL’s defense. Wilson and Creel exchanged several letters on the matter in the early months of 
1918 and, at one point, Wilson told Creel that “I think it will be your judgment, as it is mine, that 
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we had better pull away from them [the NPL].”
87
  Creel was undeterred.  He assured Wilson that 
the League “has been loyal absolutely, and is loyal now, and the Safety Commission is willing to 
drive it into disloyalty in order to further its own mean political end.”
88
  To strengthen his case, 
Creel had a CPI speaker by the name of Dixon Williams, who had spoken on behalf of the NPL 
in Minnesota, write to Wilson vouching for the League’s loyalty.
89
  Wilson was finally 
convinced.  He wrote to his personal secretary Joseph Tumulty on April 5, 1918 “this is politics, 
pure and simple, or rather impure and simple.”
90
  In September 1918, Creel twice wrote Wilson 
to endorse Charles Lindbergh, Sr.’s appointment to the War Industries Board, which had been 
blocked because of his affiliation with the NPL.
91
  It is difficult to explain Creel’s tenacity on 
this issue beyond his own belief that the NPL was being unfairly persecuted for political reasons 
by an overly “patriotic” organization.
92
  Once again, Creel stood up for the little man.
93
 
                                                 
87. Wilson to Creel, April 1, 1918, Wilson Papers 47: 215-216. 
88. Creel to Wilson, April 2, 1918, Wilson Papers 47: 226. 
89. Dixon Williams to Wilson, April 3, 1918, Wilson Papers 47: 235-237. 
90. Wilson to Tumulty, April 5, 1918, Wilson Papers 47: 260. 
91. Creel to Wilson, September 12, 1918, Wilson Papers 49: 536; Creel to Wilson, September 18, 1918, 51: 
64-65. 
92.  Minnesota History Center, “Commission of Public Safety,” accessed March 19, 2014, 
http://libguides.mnhs.org/publicsafety.  The overview of the Commission of Public Safety found on this site helps to 
explain the wartime mentality that drove the Commission: “Who were the enemies among us? Not only the 
Germans, but all immigrants, those who spoke a foreign language, those who belonged to unions and supported 
strikes and those who belonged to suspect organizations such as the Nonpartisan League or the Industrial Workers of 
the World (IWW). ‘Patriotism’ became a powerful political weapon, legitimized by the creation by the Minnesota 
Legislature of the Commission of Public Safety, whose excessive jurisdictional latitude allowed for unbounded 
control and trampling of civil rights…Foreign language instruction was discontinued in many schools. Foreign 
language speakers were disparaged as unpatriotic. It was a dark chapter in the history of Minnesota, a state usually 
thought of as progressive.” 
93. Creel also used his position to advance the cause of women’s suffrage.  On September 25, 1918, Creel 
wrote to Wilson to encourage him to make a personal plea to the U.S. Senate in favor of the women’s suffrage 
amendment.  In this instance, Creel appealed to Wilson’s pragmatism on this particular matter saying, “I feel deeply 
that the passage of this amendment is a war necessity” (Creel to Wilson, September 25, 1918, Wilson Papers 51: 
117). 
 
95 
 
Such stories are noteworthy because so many historians have labeled the CPI as a 
promoter of intolerance and a violator of civil liberties.  Despite such characterizations, the 
correspondence of Wilson and Creel reveal their sensitivity to these issues.  The first matter 
before the CPI, in fact the very reason for its creation, was how to handle what Creel later 
referred to as the “censorship bugbear.”
94
  Creel was adamant from the start, despite the 
objections of Secretary of State Lansing and other high-ranking government officials, that the 
U.S. avoid strict censorship.  In May 1917, Creel had solicited input from Wilson on his proposal 
for voluntary censorship of the press, entitled the “Preliminary Statement to the Press of the 
United States.”  After suggesting a few changes, Wilson remarked that it otherwise “seems to be 
excellent.”
95
  Wilson then defended the proposal to journalist David Lawrence saying, “I fear 
that it would not be wise for me to pursue the course you suggest… because…it might look as if 
I were trying to correct mistakes which Creel is thought to have made when I do not in my heart 
believe that he has made any.”
96
 
While some in the press regarded Creel and the CPI with contempt, not all felt this way.  
Thomas Logan, correspondent for the Philadelphia Inquirer, wrote Wilson on April 13, 1918—
the one year anniversary of the CPI’s formation—to express gratitude for Creel’s work saying, “I 
have had the occasion to observe very closely the splendid work done by Creel” and calling his 
work “one of the most helpful influences in the war.”  Logan also attempted to explain the 
criticisms of Creel coming from the press: “the attacks that are made on him now are so 
unjust…that I felt constrained to give expression of my own knowledge that these criticisms are 
unjust and unfounded and that they do not represent the view of the country or of the men who 
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have the opportunity and take the time to study conditions in Washington.”
 97
  Logan closed by 
assuring Wilson that those criticizing Creel were not the majority.  
Wilson and Creel also discussed the banning of the German language in American 
schools and elsewhere.  On February 26, 1918, Creel sent Wilson a letter soliciting his opinion 
on the matter.
98
  Wilson responded two days later, telling Creel that “the opposition to teaching 
German in our schools is childish.”
99
  When the topic came up again in the summer of 1918, 
Creel’s opinion was somewhat more opaque.  In a letter to Wilson dated August 6, 1918, Creel 
stated that he opposed the practice of banning all foreign languages, noting that it hampered CPI 
operations among immigrant communities, but he left the door open for the banning of German.  
However, Creel indicated that he considered this a matter best decided by Congress.
100
 
Wilson took particular interest in the CPI’s foreign activities, most notably in Russia.  In 
fact, a full twenty per cent of the wartime correspondence between Wilson and Creel addressed 
some aspect of the Russian situation.  In spring 1917, in the wake of the Russian Revolution, 
Wilson assembled a mission, under the leadership of former Secretary of State (and retired U.S. 
Senator) Elihu Root, to investigate the situation in Russia and to establish relations with Russia’s 
Provisional Government.
101
  Creel suggested to Wilson that Arthur Bullard, a CPI deputy and a 
progressive writer of known socialist leanings, accompany the Root Mission as the CPI’s 
representative.  Wilson endorsed Creel’s appointment of Bullard in a letter to Secretary of State 
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Lansing.
102
  However, Lansing rejected Bullard’s appointment on the grounds that Root’s 
mission already contained a journalist.
103
  The Root Mission sailed for Russia in May 1917 
without a CPI representative. 
The Root Mission returned home in July 1917.  It reported on the need for a “wide-
ranging publicity campaign” that could bolster the flagging morale of Russia’s soldiers, as well 
as its war-weary civilian population.
104
  Wilson viewed this as a task for the CPI and forwarded 
the Root Mission’s report to Creel, to which Creel responded with a list of recommendations.
105
  
The following month, Wilson wrote Creel to suggest a meeting with Basil Miles, who had been 
the secretary of the Root Mission, saying that Miles “would be a capital man to use in making 
our plans for the enlightenment of Russia.”
106
  In October 1917, Wilson and Creel discussed the 
work of William Thompson, the head of the American Red Cross Mission to Russia, who had 
made a donation in the amount of one million dollars that was earmarked specifically for use in 
Russia.  Bothered by the decentralized and ad hoc nature of the publicity work in Russia, by 
Thompson’s group and by others, Wilson decided to place Creel in charge of all publicity work 
in Russia.
107
  Creel, in turn, decided that one of his top deputies, Edgar Sisson, would be the best 
man for the job.  
                                                 
102. Wilson to Lansing, May 14, 1917, Wilson Papers 42: 289.  
103. Gregg Wolper, “The Origins of Public Diplomacy: Woodrow Wilson, George Creel, and the Committee 
on Public Information” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1991), 170-171.  Wolper notes that Bullard’s socialist 
leanings may also have impacted Lansing’s decision.  Bullard ultimately sailed for Russia in November 1917 to 
assist the CPI’s Edgar Sisson and, upon Sisson’s return home, Bullard assumed the role of the CPI’s Russian chief—
a post which he would hold for the duration of the war. 
104. Ibid., 171-172.  
105. Creel to Wilson, August 20, 1917, Wilson Papers 43: 526-527. 
106. Wilson to Creel, September 4, 1917, Wilson Papers 44: 142. 
107. Mock and Larson, Words that Won the War, 303. 
 
98 
 
Acting on the recommendation of Creel, Wilson approved Sisson, formerly the editor of 
Collier’s and The Cosmopolitan, as CPI agent to Russia in October 1917.  In fact, Sisson was the 
first CPI “agent” sent overseas, thus marking the start of the CPI’s experiment in what would 
later be termed “public diplomacy.”
108
  Creel assured Wilson that Sisson was the right man for 
the job saying: “He is a twenty thousand dollar-a-year executive; he gave up everything to serve 
his country. He is an organizing genius, a man of the highest ideals, and has more real moral 
courage than almost anyone I know. It means double work for me to let him go, but he is the 
only one in whom I have absolute trust.”
109
  Creel also drafted a letter to Sisson for Wilson’s 
signature.  It included the following admonition: “Guard particularly against any effect of 
officious intrusion or meddling, and try to express the disinterested friendship that is our sole 
impulse.”
110
  This advice would prove ironic in the wake of the controversy that was to come. 
Before Sisson reached Russia, the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government of 
Alexander Kerensky.
111
  Within a month of setting foot in Russia, Sisson reported to Creel 
“Russia is out of the war.”
112
  In May 1918, Sisson sent Wilson what were to become known as 
the “Sisson Documents.”  These documents had been passed to Sisson while he was on station in 
Russia and purported that “the present Bolshevik government is not a Russian government at all 
but a German government acting solely in the interests of Germany and betraying the Russian 
people.”
113
  The documents were released by the CPI to the press in September 1918 despite 
                                                 
108. Gregg Wolper, “Wilsonian Public Diplomacy: The Committee on Public Information in Spain,” 
Diplomatic History 17, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 18. 
109. Creel to Wilson, October 24, 1917, Wilson Papers 44: 434-435. 
110. Wilson to Edgar Sisson, October 24, 1917, Wilson Papers 44: 435. 
111. Mock and Larson, Words that Won the War, 303. 
112. Sisson to Creel, December 5, 1917, Wilson Papers 45:216.  
113. Mock and Larson, Words that Won the War, 314. 
 
99 
 
questions as to their authenticity.  In October 1918, the CPI published a thirty-page pamphlet 
entitled “The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy” that was based on the Sisson Documents.  Colonel 
House wrote in his diary that both he and Wilson doubted authenticity of the Sisson Documents 
and recognized that publication amounted to “a virtual declaration of war upon the Bolsheviki 
[sic] Government.”
114
  Nevertheless, House lamented that Creel had persuaded Wilson to publish 
these documents without State Department approval.
115
  Postwar studies would all but confirm 
that the Sisson Documents were forgeries, thus casting a cloud of doubt over CPI’s credibility.
116
   
Aside from Russia, Wilson and Creel corresponded about a number of other foreign 
issues, often exchanging advice and sharing ideas.  Creel and Wilson discussed the CPI’s work 
in Scandinavia, Lithuania, Mexico, Italy and Great Britain.  Eager to have his words transmitted 
to as broad an audience as possible, Wilson readily agreed to Creel’s suggestion that Wilson 
provide him with advance copies of presidential addresses so that they could be translated and 
disseminated in a timelier manner.
117
  Creel shared news from his far-flung network of 
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representatives with Wilson.  In October 1918, Creel forwarded Wilson news from the head of 
the CPI’s new bureau in Rome, Italy regarding the Vatican’s official appraisal of the situation 
and of the willingness of the Austrians to conclude a separate peace based on Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points.
118
  Such news gave evidence that the CPI’s commitment to promoting Wilson’s peace 
program was having the desired effect. 
As the war drew to a close, George Creel accompanied the delegation to the Paris Peace 
Conference, not as an official delegate but as a member of Wilson’s personal party.  Creel was 
grateful to Wilson for including him but chafed at his lack of a meaningful role to play.
119
  In 
fact, his presence generated suspicion, as his name had come to be associated with propaganda 
and censorship.  In order to avoid the distraction, Wilson dispatched Creel on a tour of Europe to 
inspect the CPI’s various foreign offices. 
On March 1, 1919, George Creel wrote Woodrow Wilson to announce his resignation 
from his position as CPI Chairman and noting that “all domestic work of the Committee on 
Public Information has been closed up.  All the foreign work has been discontinued save the 
news distribution machinery with offices in New York, Paris, and London.”
 120
  Creel added, “I 
have dismissed myself from the payroll today.”
121
  Creel closed his letter, “Let me thank you for 
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your support that has always been generous and an association that has been inspiring.  Please 
count always upon my devotion.”
122
 
In his reply, dated March 20, 1919, Wilson expressed his deep appreciation for Creel’s 
work: “The work has been well done, admirably well done, and your inspiration and guidance 
have been the chief motive power in it all…I want you to know how truly grateful I am.”
123
  
Wilson closed his letter by saying, “It is with real emotion, therefore, that I sign myself, Your 
sincere friend, Woodrow Wilson.”
124
  It was the only time in the forty-nine letters from Wilson 
to Creel consulted for this study that Wilson had used this particular closing sentiment.   
In the year that followed, Creel all but disappeared from Wilson’s correspondence.  On 
June 5, 1920, he wrote his former boss to report, with some bitterness, on the liquidation of the 
CPI by order of the Republican-controlled Congress.
125
  In August of that year, Creel signed on 
as Wilson’s literary agent.
126
  By that point in time, Creel was busy writing about his wartime 
experiences, as well as those of Wilson.  He would publish two of his best-known works in that 
year: How We Advertised America and The War, the World and Wilson.  In the latter work, Creel 
touted “the projectile force of the President’s idealism” as a major reason for the Allied victory 
in the Great War.
127
  Creel continued to defend Wilson long after the latter’s passing, authoring 
an article for The Saturday Evening Post in 1931 that recounted “Woodrow Wilson’s Last 
Years.”  In it, he reaffirmed his late hero’s belief in public opinion and the power of fact.  Creel 
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writes, “It was all very simple as he saw it, and he kindled to evangelical fervor as he talked of 
the people—the people he loved and in whom he believed with all the passion of his soul.  Give 
them the facts and victory was assured.”
128
  This was a fitting way for Creel to eulogize Wilson 
since it was this very confidence in the power of fact to steer public opinion, which both Wilson 
and Creel shared, that guided the activities of the Committee on Public Information. 
Conclusion 
Woodrow Wilson, not George Creel, led the nation to war in 1917 to make the world safe 
for democracy.  The correspondence between the two men indicates that Wilson was neither a 
watchmaker who, after creating the CPI and appointing Creel as its chairman, walked away; nor 
was Wilson merely an interested observer.  He was an active participant.  It was his fight for the 
“verdict of mankind” even more than it was Creel’s.  The question is not so much whether or not 
this fight was won but at what cost.  In The Tyranny of Change, John Whiteclay Chambers 
concluded that it was the very ambitiousness of this cause that ensured its ultimate defeat.  
Chambers asserts, “Wilson justified American entry into the war in terms of idealism and 
mission, rather than mundane self-interest.  He thereby established war objectives that were so 
unrealistic that virtually no future peace conference could attain them.”
129
  Nevertheless, few 
Americans believed in Wilson’s lofty ideals more than George Creel.   
Given the failure of Wilson’s most soaring war aims, it seems only fitting that the legacy 
of the CPI has failed to be appreciated for its high-minded ideals.  The slogans “the war to end 
all wars” and “a war to make the world safe for democracy” have become sadly ironic punch 
lines in the history of American involvement in World War I—but this was unknown to anyone 
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in 1919.  For the moment, Wilson and Creel shared credit for America’s great victory.  Their war 
of ideas had been won.  They could not have known at the time that it would be lost in the 
retelling. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Learning All Over Again: A Psychological Operations Perspective on 
the Committee on Public Information 
I rode with Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan and Sun Tsu. 
I saw action in both World Wars and in Korea and Vietnam.  
I helped bring a speedy victory in Just Cause and Desert Storm.  
I brought the hope of peace to Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan 
I was and I am…PSYOP. 
 
From the “PSYOP Creed”  
 
The “PSYOP Creed” traces the legacy of Psychological Operations from the Trojan War 
to the current conflict in Afghanistan.  Along the way, it invokes Hannibal’s elephants, Gideon’s 
trumpets, Patrick Henry’s words of defiance, and the Texans’ cry of revenge.
 1
 The omission of 
any mention of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) is fitting, as it reflects a greater 
neglect on the part of the PSYOP community to explore the lessons of what is widely considered 
America’s first propaganda ministry.  The price of overlooking such an expansive enterprise in 
influence is high.  PSYOP methodology can be used to better understand the CPI and, in turn, the 
CPI holds lessons for modern practitioners of PSYOP.
2
  The difficulties that historians face in 
assessing the effectiveness of the CPI are not unlike the difficulties facing today’s PSYOP 
community.  The improvised process that emerged in one section of the CPI, the Division of 
Four-Minute Men, bears a remarkable similarity to the seven-step process used in modern 
                                                 
1. Ed Rouse, “PSYOP Creed,” Psywarrior, accessed January 24, 2014, http://www.psywarrior.com/creed.html. 
2. First conducted under the label of propaganda (or “public information”) during World War I, influence 
operations were rechristened “Psychological Warfare” (Psywar) during World War Two.  During the Vietnam War, 
Psywar became “Psychological Operations” (PSYOP).  This label was retained until 2010, when the term “Military 
Information Supports Operations” (MISO) was adopted for active-duty Army PSYOP (under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Special Operations Command).  The Army Reserve PSYOP components, under the U.S. Army Civil 
Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), have retained the term “PSYOP.”  The U.S. Air 
Force prefers the label of “Influence Operations.”  In this paper, Psywar, PSYOP, MISO, and Influence Ops all refer 
to the selective use of information to influence the attitudes, opinions, and behaviors of foreign Target Audiences.  
The term “PSYOP” will be used throughout for purposes of consistency. 
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PSYOP.  Finally, the CPI’s efforts to persuade foreign target audiences invites comparisons to 
the modern PSYOP mission of Defense Support to Public Diplomacy.  In each of these areas, 
examining the CPI through the lens of PSYOP yields a better understanding of the effectiveness 
and limitations of the CPI while providing a useful point of comparison for modern PSYOP.   
A survey of the historiography of PSYOP might lead one to conclude that the CPI is 
barely worth mentioning, let alone studying.  In his history of PSYOP, Major Ed Rouse (US 
Army, Retired) mentions Alexander the Great, Sun-Tzu, and Genghis Khan before skipping 
ahead to World War II.
3
  In “A History of Modern-Day Psychological Warfare and Operations,” 
Joshua Beninga leaps from Sun-Tzu directly to World War II.
4
   In a lengthy article entitled 
“Allied PSYOP of World War I,” Sergeant Major Herb Friedman (US Army, Retired) devotes a 
few sparse paragraphs to George Creel and the CPI.  In fact, of the dozens of articles on the 
history of PSYOP found on the website psywar.com, only three deal with World War I.  Of these 
three, all are by Friedman and only the one cited even mentions the CPI.  The CPI is similarly 
neglected in Colonel Frank Goldstein (USAF) and Colonel Benjamin Findlay’s (USAFR) edited 
volume Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies.  Only one of the twenty-four 
essays in that volume even mentions the CPI, and that is a passing reference in an endnote.
5
  A 
detailed discussion of the CPI is similarly missing from Major Brett Bemis’s 2011 thesis 
                                                 
3. Herb Friedman, “Allied PSYOP of World War I,” Psywarrior, accessed January 9, 2014, 
http://www.psywarrior.com/psyhist.html.   
4. Josh Beninga, “A History of Modern-Day Psychological Warfare and Operations,” Psywarrior, accessed 
January 9, 2014, http://www.psywarrior.com/ModernDayPSYOPBeniga.html. 
5. Frank Goldstein and Benjamin Findlay, editors, Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), 145.  The note reads, “Relatively little has been 
written in recent years about the so-called Creel Committee, the Committee on Public Information, created by 
United States President Woodrow Wilson after the United States entered World War I.”  Thus, the only 
acknowledgement of the CPI is to say that it is no longer being studied to any significant degree.  While true, this is 
hardly instructive.   
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“Cooking Up Psychological Operations: The Ingredients of Successful PSYOP.”
6
  Military and 
diplomatic historians have demonstrated a preference for case studies of PSYOP (e.g. 
“Psychological Warfare in Vietnam”).
7
  While the CPI, as a whole and in its component parts, 
could provide a variety of interesting and informative case studies for PSYOP, the existing 
PSYOP literature does little to arouse the curiosity of would-be researchers. 
Perhaps the most basic reason for this omission is that the CPI was not a military 
undertaking.  It was conducted by civilians and, despite its unprecedented and expansive Foreign 
Section, it is best remembered for its efforts on the domestic front.  Present-day PSYOP is 
strictly forbidden from targeting domestic audiences.  This prohibition was codified into law by 
the United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948 (better known as the Smith-
Mundt Act) and subsequent policy directives.
8
  The result is that the CPI seems, to many in the 
PSYOP community, to be an incongruent, apples-to-oranges comparison, as if there is a 
substantial difference between the sort of persuasion attempted on domestic audiences by the 
CPI and the sort attempted on foreign audiences by military PSYOP.   
                                                 
6. Brett Bemis, “Cooking Up Psychological Operations: The Ingredients of Successful PSYOP,” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), Kindle Loc. 285-290; Bemis notes that the CPI (along with the Army’s 
“Propaganda Section”) were disbanded after the war and that “almost all of the experiences and lessons learned 
during the war were lost over the next twenty years.” 
7. See James O. Whittaker’s “Psychological Warfare in Vietnam” Political Psychology 18, no. 1 (March 
1997): 165-179;  S.R. Joey Long’s “Winning Hearts and Minds: U.S. Psychological Warfare Operations in 
Singapore, 1955-1961”  Diplomatic History 32, no. 5 (November 2008): 899-930; Brett Bemis’s thesis also uses 
several specific case studies from the Korean War. 
8. The Smith-Mundt Act was effectively repealed by an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act 
of 2013 (Emily Metzgar “Smith-Mundt Reform: In with a whimper?” Columbia Journalism Review, cjr, January 21, 
2013, accessed January 26, 2014, http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/smith-
mundt_modernization_pass.php?page=all).   The Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 (aka H.R. 5736 or 
“Smith-Thornberry”) authorized “the domestic dissemination of information and material about the United States 
intended primarily for foreign audiences, and for other purposes” (Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012, H. Res. 
5736, 112th Cong., 1st sess. Library of Congress THOMAS, accessed January 26, 2014 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c112:H.R.5736). 
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Another explanation for the neglect of the CPI is that it is tarred with the brush of 
propaganda, which is a taboo term even in PSYOP circles.  The United States Department of 
Defense (DoD) currently reserves the term “propaganda” exclusively for enemy communications 
efforts.  To the DoD, propaganda is “any form of adversary communication, especially of a 
biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior 
of any group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly.”
9
  For nearly a century, 
historians have made the CPI synonymous with propaganda.  This leads to the fear that by 
studying the CPI, PSYOP personnel are somehow indicating a desire to replicate it.
10
   
At best, the PSYOP community studies the surviving products of the CPI in search of 
lessons in content analysis (e.g. persuasive appeals, symbolism, etc.).  Such analysis is based 
almost exclusively on the many surviving visual products of the CPI’s Department of Pictorial 
Publicity.  This would include posters with titles such as “Halt the Hun,” “The Greatest Mother 
in the World,” and “I Want You!”  These posters have become, to many observers, the primary 
substance of the CPI.  This sort of content analysis, while not without value, neglects the lessons 
the CPI holds for the PSYOP community in the areas of measuring effectiveness, the origins of a 
process for conducting influence operations, and the earliest instances of Defense Support to 
Public Diplomacy.  Such lessons are the focus of this chapter. 
                                                 
9.  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-53: Military Information Support Operations 
(January 2013), Glossary-10. 
10. The United States Department of Defense does not conduct any form of propaganda or influence operations 
aimed at U.S. citizens.  It does, however, conduct such operations directed at foreign audiences at the discretion of 
the President of the United States or his designee.  Due in part to the negative connotation of the word “propaganda” 
that emerged from World War I, the U.S. Government defines propaganda as an exclusively foreign enterprise 
intended to mislead. 
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Obstacles to Measuring the Effectiveness of the CPI 
The first aspect of the CPI to be taken into consideration from a PSYOP perspective is 
that of measurement.  Many historians assume that the CPI was effective, often citing Creel’s 
professed goal of raising the level of public opinion to a “white hot mass” as if this statement 
itself somehow represented proof of the CPI’s effectiveness.
 11
  In fact, the dominant narrative of 
the CPI presumes its effectiveness.  This narrative holds that the CPI did its job too well, as 
evidenced by the widespread intolerance of all things foreign, the suppression of any form of 
dissent, and the pervasiveness of postwar disillusionment.  These assumptions of effectiveness 
are not, however, based on any sound empirical evidence.   
In order to assign causation for increased wartime intolerance to the CPI, its critics utilize 
a form of cum hoc, ergo prompter hoc fallacy.
12
  While it is true that certain CPI propaganda 
products emphasized the negative qualities of the German enemy and attempted to increase 
awareness of German espionage and propaganda, this alone cannot be taken as proof of 
causation—let alone sole causation—for anti-immigrant sentiment or violence simply because 
this propaganda was being disseminated at the same time that such sentiments were becoming 
more prevalent.  In order to make such a determination, one must know who was exposed to, 
comprehended, internalized, and acted specifically on CPI propaganda.  Similarly, those blaming 
the CPI for postwar disillusionment, xenophobia, and incidents such as the “Red Scare” are 
demonstrating a form of post hoc, ergo prompter hoc fallacy by assigning causation to the CPI 
                                                 
11. George Creel, How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on 
Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (1920; repr., London: 
Forgotten Books, 2012), 5. 
12. “Cum Hoc, Ergo Prompter Hoc,” fallacyfiles, accessed March 28, 2014, 
http://www.fallacyfiles.org/cumhocfa.html.  “Cum Hoc is the fallacy committed when one jumps to 
a conclusion about causation based on a correlation between two events, or types of event, which occur 
simultaneously.” 
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for developments that have many causes.  The CPI can only be counted among these causes if it 
can be established that postwar sentiment and actions were directly and decisively influenced by 
CPI propaganda.
13
   
In addition to fallacious assumptions of causation, scholars appear to be overwhelmed by 
the sheer size and scope of the CPI.  They often quote George Creel’s estimate that 150,000 
Americans were involved in the work of the CPI.
14
  They reference the 75,000 Four-Minute Men 
with their 755,000 speeches, the CPI’s 6,000 news releases, and its 75 million pamphlets.  The 
assumption is that, given the volume of propaganda churned out by the CPI, it must have 
worked.  From a PSYOP perspective, this is not a safe assumption.   
There is much less agreement on the need for the CPI in the first place.  Some historians 
hold that, by the time of the official declaration of war on April 6, 1917, public opinion had 
largely shifted in favor of U.S. intervention in the war.  Others maintain that resistance remained 
high well after America entered the war.  The inability to quantify the actual level of support for 
the war, at any given point from April 1917 through November 1918, dooms any effort to assess 
the overall effectiveness of the CPI.  The inability to assess the CPI’s effectiveness, in turn, 
undermines feasibility of the dominant narrative. 
                                                 
13. “Post Hoc,” fallacyfiles, accessed March 28, 2014, http://www.fallacyfiles.org/posthocf.html.  “The Post 
Hoc Fallacy is committed whenever one reasons to a causal conclusion based solely on the supposed cause 
preceding its ‘effect.’  Of course, it is a necessary condition of causation that the cause precede[s] the effect, but it is 
not a sufficient condition. Thus, post hoc evidence may suggest the hypothesis of a causal relationship, which then 
requires further testing, but it is never sufficient evidence on its own.” 
14. If there is any truth to this claim, it is only in the broadest sense.  The vast majority of the work of the CPI 
was performed by volunteers.  For example, all 74,500 Four-Minute Men were volunteers and yet they are almost 
certainly counted in Creel’s total.  As of January 27, 1918, Creel reported to Wilson that the CPI had 250 paid 
employees, as compared to 5,000 volunteer artists and writers and 289 volunteer translators and 20,000 volunteer 
speakers (Wayne Alfred Nicholas, “Crossroads Oratory: A Study of the Four Minute Men of World War I” [PhD 
diss., Columbia University, 1953], 50). 
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An Absence of Data 
The problem in determining the actual level of public support for the war results from an 
absence of the sort of data required to make such assessments.  While some Americans were 
awakening to the importance of public opinion in the second decade of the twentieth century, the 
field of public opinion research would not take shape for another twenty years.
15
  The absence of 
polling data does more than simply prevent an accurate determination of support for the war.  It 
also makes it virtually impossible to assess the effectiveness of the CPI.  If the primary goal of 
the CPI was to build support for the war, then the level of support for the war at its outset is one 
of the most important pieces of information.  If it existed, it would provide the baseline against 
which the effectiveness of the CPI could be judged.  It does not. 
In PSYOP, baseline data is relative to the target audience’s desired behavior.  For 
example, if the goal of an operation is to increase the number of tips reported to the Host Nation 
authorities, the baseline is the number of tips per unit of time prior to the start of the operation.  
Behavioral change cannot be tracked in the absence of such data.  Thus, the degree to which the 
CPI moved public opinion towards support for the war cannot be assessed if it is not known how 
many Americans supported the war before the CPI began its operation.  
The absence of data by which effectiveness can be determined has led historians to rely 
on what the PSYOP community refers to as “measures of performance” (MOP).  It is important 
to distinguish between MOP and “measures of effectiveness” (MOE) because the two are often 
confused and conflated.  The former (MOP) is defined in Department of Defense doctrine as “a 
                                                 
15. George Gallup formed the American Institute of Public Opinion, forerunner of the Gallup Organization, in 
1935 (“George Gallup,” gallup.com, accessed January 27, 2014, http://www.gallup.com/corporate/21364/george-
gallup-19011984.aspx); Public Opinion Quarterly began publication two years later in 1937. 
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criterion used to assess friendly actions that [are] tied to measuring task accomplishment.”
16
  The 
latter (MOE) is defined as “a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or 
operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end-state, achievement of 
an objective, or creation of an effect.”
17
   The difference is critical.  Measures of effectiveness 
directly correlate to mission accomplishment (which, in PSYOP parlance, means SPO 
accomplishment), whereas MOP indicate the existence of conditions that enhance the likelihood 
of effectiveness.  Such indicators include: evidence that the message is reaching the desired 
audience (and to what degree), evidence of how the audience is reacting to the message, or 
evidence of the theoretical reach or saturation of a message (based on production numbers).  
There is an abundance of MOP to indicate that the American population was exposed to CPI 
messages (75 million pamphlets, 750,000 four-minute speeches, 6,000 news releases, etc.) but 
this data alone does not indicate effectiveness, merely exposure to the message.  Historians tend 
to mistakenly assume that exposure to a message (which may be termed “opportunities to view”) 
correlates to message reception, internalization and ultimately to behavioral change. 
The absence of reliable effectiveness data also leads to an overreliance on anecdotal 
evidence of effectiveness.  The CPI’s effectiveness has often been judged, by supporters and 
detractors alike, based on such evidence.  Perhaps the most noteworthy example of this was the 
public lynching of German-American Robert Prager in St. Louis in April 1918.
18
  Such acts of 
                                                 
16. U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms (November 8, 2010), 230. 
17. Ibid.   
18. David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), 68.  In Rebel at Large, Creel blames “chauvinistic” state councils of defense and non-governmental 
organizations such as the National Security League and the American Defense Society for the “hymns of hate” that 
led to the Praeger incident.  He credits his own outrage over that incident, which drew a “public denunciation” from 
President Wilson, for slowing the momentum of what he calls the “superpatriots” (George Creel, Rebel at Large: 
Recollections on Fifty Crowded Years [New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1947], 197-199). 
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vigilantism have been used to blame the CPI for promoting a climate of violent xenophobia.  
Some historians also point to riots that broke out at the playing of films such as To Hell with the 
Kaiser and The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin (films that did not originate from the CPI) as 
evidence of the CPI’s effectiveness in promoting vigilantism and intolerance.
19
  Such evidence 
seldom provides an accurate gauge of effectiveness, given that it is not representative in nature.  
In fact, much of what is presented as anecdotal evidence of effectiveness stands out because it is 
exceptional and not representative of broader trends.
20
   
Lack of Measurable Objectives 
A second problem that complicates any attempt to measure the effectiveness of the CPI 
was that its vague mandate, coupled with its ad hoc nature, prevented the establishment of clear 
and measurable objectives.  Executive Order 2594, the founding document of the CPI, included 
no statement of the committee’s purpose.
21
  The improvised nature of the CPI prevented the 
development of concrete objectives beyond the overarching goals of increasing public support 
for the war effort at home and building support for President Wilson’s peace proposal abroad—a 
goal which took shape later in the war.   
                                                 
19. Carlos A. Schwantes, “Making the World Unsafe for Democracy: Vigilantes, Grangers, and the Walla 
Walla ‘Outrage’ of June 1918,” Montana: The Magazine of Western History 31, no. 1 (Winter 1981): 25, 29.  See 
also: H. Bruce Franklin “From Realism to Virtual Reality: Images of America’s Wars,” The Georgia Review 81, no. 
1 (Spring 1994): 47-64. 
20. Anecdotal evidence is compiled, sometimes supported by measures of performance, to create the 
impression of a preponderance of evidence of effectiveness.  This is an example of a propaganda technique known 
as “card stacking” (see Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee, The Fine Art of Propaganda (1939; repr., 
San Francisco: International Society of General Semantics, 1979), 24. 
21. The text of E.O. 2594 reads: “I hereby create a Committee on Public Information, to be composed of the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and a civilian who shall be charged with the 
executive direction of the Committee.  As Civilian Chairman of this Committee, I appoint Mr. George Creel. The 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy are authorized each to detail an officer or 
officers to the work of the Committee” (Executive Order 2594, April 14, 1917, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
ed. Arthur Link, vol. 42, [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966], 59;  hereinafter Wilson Papers). 
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In modern military PSYOP, such broad objectives are known as PSYOP Objectives (PO).  
Under each PO are two or more specific objectives, known as Supporting PSYOP Objectives 
(SPO), that are supposed to be aligned with the changes in attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors 
required to accomplish the PO.  Any given military operation may have, as part of its Operations 
Order, an Information Operations Annex.  This annex, in turn, includes a PSYOP Tab that 
specifies the objectives and supporting objectives (POs and SPOs), along with potential target 
audiences (TA) and a list of themes to stress and themes to avoid.  The CPI lacked anything that 
could be considered analogous to a PSYOP Tab with its POs and SPOs. 
U.S. Army Major Greg Seese, a PSYOP officer, psychologist, and PSYOP doctrine-
writer, emphasized the importance of Supporting PSYOP Objectives in his 2009 essay 
“Measuring Psychological Operations: It’s all about the SPO.”
22
  He argues that the absence of a 
doctrinally-sound, behaviorally-focused SPO handicaps efforts to measure the effectiveness of 
PSYOP.  This approach cannot be applied to the CPI without acknowledging one important 
difference between the mission of the CPI and that of modern PSYOP.  Modern PSYOP is 
founded on the ultimate goal of behavioral change, whereas the ultimate goal of the CPI was an 
attitudinal change.  Even with the aid of modern opinion polling, attitudinal changes are far less 
observable than behavioral change.  Nevertheless, it remains theoretically possible that the 
desired attitude sought by the CPI (perhaps best expressed as “support for the war effort”) could 
be measured based on how it manifested itself in the form of actions: registering for the selective 
service, purchasing war bonds, donating blood, etc.  Such an approach might make at least 
certain aspects of the CPI measureable.   
                                                 
22. Greg Seese, “Measuring Psychological Operations: It’s All about the SPO,” Special Warfare 22, no. 5 
(September-October 2009): 10-11. 
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A PSYOP series, the most basic doctrinal exercise of PSYOP, consists of efforts toward 
the accomplishment of one SPO that are directed at one target audience.  The most basic level of 
measurement for PSYOP, per doctrine, is the evaluation of a PSYOP series.  If specific 
behaviorally-focused campaigns of the CPI (ex: “Third Liberty Loan”) are taken as series, then 
they might be measured with some accuracy.  This has been attempted, to a limited extent, to 
assess the effectiveness of the Division of Four-Minute Men.  Unfortunately, it is confounded by 
the greatest obstacle to measuring the effectiveness of the CPI, which is the cluttered nature of 
the wartime information environment.  
A Cluttered Information Environment 
Even if reliable data regarding public opinion and a list of measurable objectives for the 
CPI existed, it would remain virtually impossible to determine the degree to which the CPI was 
responsible for any change in public opinion for or against the war.  This is due to the difficulties 
in determining causation for the shifts (or lack thereof) in public opinion in America from 1917 
to 1919.  Noting that a change in attitude, opinion, or behavior took place is much more 
straightforward than determining why that change took place.  While the intricacies of 
determining causation is beyond the scope of this study, it is necessary to note that the problem 
of determining causation becomes exponentially more complex and tedious the more variables 
that are introduced into the equation.  If the CPI had been the sole source of propaganda in 
America during World War I, it would still be difficult to determine whether or not it was 
responsible for shaping public opinion.  In reality, it was far from the only source of propaganda, 
a fact that is overlooked by many historians.  The truth is that, during World War I, the 
information environment in America was quite cluttered.  There were simply too many other 
actors at play on the propaganda front to determine the CPI’s effectiveness.  Some of these actors 
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worked towards positive ends by promoting the virtues of patriotism and America’s mission to 
“make the world safe for democracy.”  Others engaged in the decidedly more negative ends by 
stifling any form of dissent through censorship, intimidation, and even violence. 
In the years preceding America’s entry into the war, the belligerent nations on both sides 
were actively courting American support.  In this war for America’s allegiance, most historians 
judge the British to have been most successful.  In addition to foreign propaganda, domestic 
agitators, both for and against intervention, sought to sway public opinion.  A list of these actors 
would include various “preparedness” organizations and the press (particularly newspapers 
within immigrant communities). 
Preparedness forces and pro-intervention agitation began to emerge within a year of the 
onset of hostilities in Europe.  The foremost of these was the National Security League (NSL), 
which predated the CPI by nearly two years. In Over Here (1980), historian David Kennedy 
judges the NSL to have been the “best-heeled and most formidable of the preparedness groups” 
and one that was “as intimately tied to conservative interests as the peace groups were to 
progressive elements.”
23
   Historian George Blakey notes in Historians on the Homefront (1970) 
that once the war started the NSL “transitioned to loyalty crusades and Americanization 
programs.”
24
  In contrasting the NSL to the CPI, Blakey observes that the former “did not 
quibble” and that its president Stanwood Menken “instructed his scholars to rouse and shock the 
American public into patriotic action.”
25
  The NSL produced a large quantity of pamphlets, some 
with circulations rivaling the most popular CPI publications, and organized its own network of 
                                                 
23. Kennedy, Over Here, 31. 
24. George T. Blakey, Historians on the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War (Lexington, 
Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press, 1970), 28. 
25. Ibid., 32. 
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over 500 public speakers.
26
   It was the NSL, and not the CPI, that led the fight against the 
teaching of the German language and against the German-American press.
27
  There is evidence 
that both Wilson and Creel were concerned about the activities of such “patriotic” organizations 
that acted outside of government control.
28
  
Another organization emerged in April 1917 that sought to mobilize academia in support 
of the war effort.  This was the National Board for Historical Service (NBHS).  Its founders 
included eminent historians James Shotwell of Columbia University and Frederick Jackson 
Turner of the University of Wisconsin.
29
  Historian J. Franklin Jameson of Johns Hopkins 
University gave the NBHS free publicity in the American Historical Review, of which he was the 
managing editor.
30
  While technically independent of the CPI, it often cooperated with the CPI’s 
Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation, under the leadership of the University of 
Minnesota historian Guy Stanton Ford.  Although the NBHS was not generally considered as 
inflammatory or xenophobic as the NSL, George Blakey concludes that its historians 
nevertheless bent the standards of historical scholarship in their zeal to promote the war.
31
   
Scholars were not alone in contributing their services to promote the war effort.  The 
Vigilantes were a group of pro-war authors and artists led by James Montgomery Flagg and 
                                                 
26. Ibid., 62.  While this number pales in comparison to the 75,000 Four-Minute Men, it is worth noting that 
many of the NSL speakers were prominent historians and members of society, while the vast majority of Four-
Minute Men were known only within their own communities. 
27. Ibid., 85-86. 
28. Woodrow Wilson to George Creel, September 30, 1918, Wilson Papers 51: 162. Wilson wrote Creel to 
make sure that “none of the stuff of this so-called American Defense Society gets out of the country.” Creel replied 
the following day by saying “like the National Security League, this organization is one of our most difficult 
problems, and I think it is being solved very rapidly by my constant refusal to recognize either of them in any way” 
(Creel to Wilson, October 1, 1917, Wilson Papers 51: 175). 
29. Blakey, Historians on the Homefront, 16-17. 
30. Ibid., 19. 
31. Ibid., 148-150.  
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Mark Sullivan.
32
  Some of the Vigilantes, such as Flagg, eventually offered their services to the 
CPI via Charles Dana Gibson’s Division of Pictorial Publicity.  In this semi-official capacity, 
Flagg produced perhaps the single best known work of propaganda of the entire war: an 
enlistment poster of Uncle Sam with the caption “I Want You!”  This cooperation with the CPI 
should not be taken as evidence that the Vigilantes worked exclusively through the CPI or that 
all of their work was even acceptable to the CPI.  Artists belonging to the Vigilantes were known 
to favor appeals to emotion over the appeals to reason favored by George Creel and Guy Stanton 
Ford.
33
  If the CPI failed to accept their illustrations, other groups and media outlets almost 
certainly would. 
Such was the boundless and unrestrained nature of the propaganda war, that nothing 
prevented journalists, artists, filmmakers, or speakers from developing and disseminating their 
own propaganda.  One of the best examples of this was a film by Rupert Julian, an actor and 
recent immigrant from New Zealand who is said to have born a striking resemblance to Kaiser 
Wilhelm II.
34
  Julian’s film The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin came to be erroneously and 
inextricably linked to the CPI.   H.R. Hopps’s famous poster “Destroy This Mad Brute” was also, 
almost certainly, an example of freelance propaganda.  Even within the federal government, the 
CPI was not the sole source of propaganda.  Other U.S. government bureaus conducted their own 
publicity efforts.  The Treasury Department, for example, conducted its own campaign in support 
                                                 
32. Kennedy, Over Here, 41. 
33. Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public 
Information (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 149-150. 
34. “Rupert Julian Biography,” IMBD, accessed March 26, 2014, 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0432216/bio?ref_=nm_ov_bio_sm.  
 
118 
 
of war bond drives.
35
  With so many sources of propaganda, it is impossible to determine the 
degree to which any one source, including the CPI, contributed to shifts in public opinion or to 
any other theoretically measurable objective. 
Further obstructing any attempt to measure the effectiveness of the CPI is the fact that the 
“war for the American mind” was not merely a propaganda war.  It involved both legal and 
extra-legal suppression of dissent.  The suppression of the free-flow of information and ideas 
was just as much a form of influence as more traditional propaganda. The best known example 
of wartime suppression came in the form of censorship. 
From his earliest days as CPI chief, George Creel advocated “expression” over 
“suppression.”
 36
  His objection to strict censorship is well-documented.  He steadfastly 
maintained throughout his life that the CPI was not a censorship organization and that he had no 
authority as a censor.
37
  Despite Creel’s stringent and frequent protestations on charges of 
censorship, most historians dismiss these claims as inaccurate and disingenuous, arguing that 
Creel and the CPI were engaged in wartime censorship.
38
  Regardless, it is clear that the CPI was 
nowhere near the foremost threat to civil liberties during the war.  There were much more 
aggressive forces of suppression at play. 
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The U.S. Post Office Department, under the leadership of Albert Sydney Burleson, was 
an active and enthusiastic agency of censorship and suppression during the war.  David Kennedy 
considers Burleson to have been “the foremost official enemy of dissidents” during the war 
years.
39
  The Department of Justice, under the leadership of Attorney General Thomas Gregory, 
also aggressively enforced the Espionage and Trading with the Enemy Acts.
40
  Creel’s relations 
with both Burleson and Gregory were strained and he opposed their anti-liberal tendencies.
41
   
The most often cited evidence that the CPI encouraged suppression comes in the form of 
CPI propaganda products (posters, pamphlets, and speeches) that encouraged Americans to 
report on the suspicious and disloyal activities of their fellow citizens.  Such charges are seldom 
accompanied by an explanation that the CPI lacked the ability to enforce loyalty or that it took a 
more moderate stance on “100 percent Americanism,” and suppression in general, than many 
other “patriotic” organizations.  In fact, Walton Bean points out that groups such as the NSL 
routinely criticized the CPI during the war for weakness on the loyalty issue that bordered on 
treason.
 42
  While historians have been eager to blame the CPI, the war to enforce loyalty was 
actually fought largely by vigilante groups such as the American Protective League (APL), 
which enlisted as many as 250,000 volunteers by war’s end, and by state councils of defense.
43
  
The APL was a group of self-appointed domestic spies that operated with the sanction of the 
Department of Justice. David Kennedy states that the APL “bugged, burglarized, slandered, and 
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illegally arrested other Americans.”
 44
  This is the sort of behavior that many have come to 
associate with the CPI, although it seems safe to assert that, in the field of “enforced loyalty,” the 
CPI has been unfairly accused.  This is not to say, however, that the willingness of a large 
number of Americans to spy on their fellow citizens (or to do worse) is not evidence of 
successful propaganda but rather that such propaganda originated from a wide variety of sources 
and therefore cannot be solely attributed to the CPI. 
The combined efforts of the Council of National Defense and its many subsidiary state 
and local councils in propaganda, censorship, and the suppression of dissent must also be taken 
into consideration when attempting to measure the effectiveness of the CPI.  In Uncle Sam at 
Home (1984), historian William Breen calculates that, by the end of the war, there were 184,000 
county, municipal, and community councils in existence.
45
  It is difficult to make generalizations 
about the impact of the state and local councils because there were so many of them and they 
were largely unregulated.  In fact, Breen asserts that diversity emerged as the “dominant motif” 
in his study of the council of defense system.
46
  For example, historian Gerald Senn argues that 
the Arkansas State Council of Defense was an organization that left “few aspects of civilian life 
untouched.”
47
  This may be true of Arkansas but is not helpful in determining the degree of 
influence of state and local councils in other states.  More specifically, this inability to generalize 
extends to cooperation between the CPI and the various councils of defense.  While William 
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Breen characterizes the relationship between the CPI and the State Councils Section as 
“harmonious” and “fruitful,” this does not mean that the state and local councils were mere foot 
soldiers of the CPI.
48
  In fact, George Creel appeared to consider demobilization of these 
councils to be a high priority as the war drew to a close.  Creel recommended to Wilson that even 
the officially-sanctioned Council of National Defense be demobilized “so that the Chauvinistic, 
reactionary state organizations may be put out of business.”
49
 
It is clear from the wide variety of both official and unofficial sources of propaganda and 
the equally varied forces of suppression that the CPI was but one participant, albeit a major one, 
in the war for the American mind.  The CPI’s contribution to this war was primarily positive, in 
that it focused on actively persuading Americans to support the war.  That Creel has been passed 
down to history as the great censor of World War I is sadly ironic, given his limited involvement 
in censorship, his objection to the methods of more aggressive censors such as Postmaster 
General Burleson and Attorney General Gregory, and his abiding belief that the less censorship, 
the better.   For the purposes of assessing the effectiveness of the CPI, it is essential to 
understand that the committee had relatively little role in the official suppression of information 
or of civil liberties relative to other government agencies, state and local councils of defense, and 
the army of self-appointed loyalty police. 
If studied, the many obstacles to measuring the CPI’s effectiveness would undoubtedly 
resonate with the PSYOP community in light of ongoing and recently-concluded conflicts in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.  In the case of the Iraq War (a.k.a. “Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM” or “OIF”), the data available was often insufficient to provide a suitable baseline 
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for measurement or to track changes in the attitudes, opinions, and behaviors of discrete target 
audiences.
50
  Just as was the case with the CPI, the absence of sufficient effectiveness data led to 
the highlighting of measures of performance (MOP) and an overreliance on anecdotal 
evidence.
51
  Additionally, while there was an approved list of PSYOP objectives (POs and SPOs) 
for OIF, these were not always clearly focused on measurable behaviors.  Finally, the most 
instructive parallel between the CPI and modern PSYOP is the problem of a cluttered 
information environment.  Iraqi audiences were bombarded by messages from regional and 
strategic level PSYOP, operational-level PSYOP, tactical PSYOP, non-PSYOP Department of 
Defense influence capabilities (such as the Information Operations Task Force), Department of 
State Public Diplomacy efforts (assisted by military PSYOP), other U.S. Government agencies, 
non-governmental organizations, other foreign nations (such as Iran and Saudi Arabia), domestic 
insurgent and terrorist groups (such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Islamic State 
of Iraq), foreign terrorist groups (such as Al Qaida), the pan-Arab media (influenced by any 
number of unseen and unknown actors) and the Iraqis’ own newly-constituted government.  
Determining which of these entities, or which combination of entities, were successfully 
affecting a given audience’s attitudes or behavior was essentially impossible.  The task of 
measuring the effectiveness of influence operations in Iraq must have seemed, to PSYOP 
personnel in Iraq, every bit as hopeless as that of a historian attempting to measure the 
effectiveness of the CPI. 
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The Four-Minute Men: Evidence of a Process 
Just as there was no PSYOP Tab in which the CPI’s objectives were listed, there was no 
established doctrine for propaganda operations during World War I.  George Creel has been 
given much credit, as much by his detractors as by his supporters, for masterminding an 
elaborate propaganda bureau.  To the extent that this is true, he was making it up as he went.  
The CPI was an exercise in improvisation.
52
  In fact, one of the greatest myths about the CPI was 
that it provided a blueprint for conducting propaganda.  Creel, in his postwar writings, boasted 
about how the CPI had accomplished its mission, but he spoke only of its organizational 
structure.  His expansive postwar writings are devoid of anything that could even loosely be 
considered a doctrine for propaganda. This absence helps to explain why Creel and the CPI are 
of relatively little interest to students and historians of PSYOP.  It was not until the aftermath of 
World War II that wartime propagandists and theoreticians, starting in 1948 with Paul M.A. 
Linebarger, began to lay the foundations for what was to become PSYOP doctrine. That being 
said, there is evidence that a process for conducting influence operations was taking shape, 
perhaps unwittingly, under the auspices of the CPI in at least one of its many divisions: the Four-
Minute Men.   
Background 
The idea of the Four-Minute Men did not originate from within the CPI but rather from a 
group of pro-war Chicago businessmen led by Donald Ryerson.  The Four-Minute Men were 
officially recognized by Creel on June 16, 1917.
 53
  Upon being subsumed by the CPI, Ryerson 
                                                 
52. Mock and Larson, Words that Won the War, 48.  Mock and Larson say of the CPI: “It was developed 
according to no plan.  It was improvised on the job, and the job was never completed.” 
53. Alfred E. Cornebise, War as Advertised: The Four-Minute Men and America’s Crusade 1917-1918 
(Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1984), 6. 
 
124 
 
was appointed by Creel to be the head of the Division of Four-Minute Men.  In the summer of 
1917, Ryerson left to join the Navy and was succeeded by William McCormick Blair.   Blair led 
the Division of Four-Minute Men until the summer of 1918, at which time he enlisted in the 
Army and was replaced by William Ingersoll, who led the division for the remainder of the 
war.
54
   
The general concept for the Four-Minute Men was for the speakers to deliver short 
speeches promoting pro-war attitudes and behaviors to captive audiences and nowhere provided 
a more captive audience for the speakers than movie theaters.  With the approval of theater 
management, the Four-Minute Men delivered their speeches during the intermission.  The exact 
length of four minutes was set after determining how long it took the projectionists to change 
reels.  During the four-minute intermission, the projectionist would present a slide that 
announced his purpose to the audience (see Image 3.1). 
 
Image 3.1: Slide used by projectionists to introduce Four-Minute Men55 
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The Division of Four-Minute Men was a volunteer enterprise from the bottom up, to 
include the Division’s director.
56
  In select cases, they were even asked to contribute to the 
operating expenses of their local chapter.
57
  Nevertheless, it was a sought-after job.  While no 
training in public speaking, advertising, or marketing was required, speakers were expected to be 
able to develop their own speeches and to keep the attention of the audience.  Given the specific 
skill-set required, speakers tended to come from the professional middle class.  However, there 
was a specific warning issued against “well-known speakers” who “are too accustomed to longer 
speeches.”
58
  Instead, the “General Instructions” for the Four-Minute Men recommended 
recruiting “young lawyers and business men who will present messages within the four-minute 
limit forcefully rather than originate speeches.”
59
 
 
Figure 3.1: Growth of Four-Minute Men 1917-1918
60
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The Process 
The process used by the Division of Four-Minute Men, though improvised at the time, 
has not been substantially improved upon by influence specialists for nearly a century. This point 
is best illustrated by comparing the operations of the Division of Four-Minute Men with the 
current seven-step process for conducting PSYOP.  There is little, if any, indication in the 
available histories of PSYOP that subsequent doctrine was based explicitly on the example of the 
Four-Minute Men.  However, the establishment of such a functional and efficient process for 
such a large undertaking (there were 74,500 Four-Minute Men by war’s end) stands as a 
testament to the genius of the CPI personnel who were directly involved with the Four-Minute 
men.  It also helps the current practitioner of PSYOP to see the basic process that is used today in 
practice nearly one hundred years ago.  
The first step of the PSYOP process is to establish overarching objectives and supporting 
objectives.
61
  While no such objectives existed for the CPI as a whole, the Four-Minute Men did 
establish objectives for their speaking campaigns.  Each of the thirty-nine campaigns of the Four-
Minute Men were coordinated centrally through the publication of the Four-Minute Men News, 
edited by Professor Guy Stanton Ford, head of the Division Civic and Educational 
Cooperation.
62
  Furthermore, PSYOP doctrine stresses that supporting objectives be behaviorally 
focused.  In the case of the Four-Minute Men, this criterion was generally met.  Examples of this 
were the liberty bond and draft registration campaigns. In both cases, the audience was being 
asked to take a specific action.  On the whole, there is sufficient evidence of planning and 
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coordination to say that the Four-Minute Men at least partially fulfilled the doctrinal 
requirements of Step One of the PSYOP process. 
Step Two of the PSYOP process is to conduct target audience analysis in order to 
develop themes, messages, and persuasive appeals. In the case of the Four-Minute Men 
campaigns, systematic target audience analysis was unnecessary because the speakers were 
drawn from the local population.  Hence, the speakers were members of the target audience or, at 
the very least, lived among the broader audience and were thus familiar with its customs, 
traditions, and other factors affecting persuasion.  Their major task was to relate the approved 
themes from CPI leaders to audiences throughout the nation.  The Four-Minute Men News 
provided the conduit for conveying approved themes and messages from the CPI to the ever-
expanding network of speakers. 
Step Three is to plan (i.e. “stage”) dissemination of messages for the optimal effect.  This 
was also managed centrally and related via the Four-Minute Men News.  An example of staging 
comes from the Second Liberty Loan drive.  Speakers were instructed to spend the first ten days 
of the drive to “arouse enthusiasm; plant the thought; explain the facts” and the final ten days of 
the drive encouraging action (in this case actually subscribing to the loan).
63
   
The fourth step of the PSYOP process is the development of the actual influence products 
which, in this case, were the four-minute speeches.  This was the first step of the process that 
was performed locally by the Four-Minute Men.  Each speaker, following the guidelines set forth 
in General Bulletin 7A and in the Four-Minute Men News, developed his own speech.  Historian 
Alfred Cornebise explains the relationship between the guidelines in the bulletin and the actual 
speeches by saying that “Individual speakers were to deliver original and spontaneous talks but 
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each speaker was to emphasize the lines of argument and general information contained in each 
specific bulletin.”
64
  The following is an “Illustrative Four-Minute Speech” provided by the CPI: 
While we are sitting here tonight enjoying a picture show, do you 
realize that thousands and thousands of Belgians, people just like 
ourselves, are languishing in slavery under Prussian masters? 
 
Driven into slavery, after they were lured back home by Prussian 
promises—Prussian scraps of paper. 
 
Read the stories of deliberate governmentally ordered brutalities as 
told in the book, German War Practices, recently published by the 
Government’s Committee on Public Information. 
 
Read how the Prussian war lords robbed Belgium, pilfered and 
stole. How they extorted fines of millions of francs for trivial 
reasons—e.g. 5,000 francs [5,000,000?]) ($1,000,000) in Brussels 
because of an attack by a policeman; 200,000 marks at Tournai for 
refusal to send a list of citizens. Taxes went to 50,000 francs a 
month and more in Belgium. 
 
Prussian “Schrecklichkeit” (the deliberate policy of terrorism) 
leads to almost unbelievable besotten brutality. The German 
soldiers—their letters are reprinted—were often forced against 
their wills, they themselves weeping, to carry out unspeakable 
orders against defenseless old men, women, and children, so that 
“respect” might grow for German “efficiency.” For instance, at 
Dinant the wives and children of 40 men were forced to witness 
the execution of their husbands and fathers. 
 
Now, then, do you want to take the slightest chance of meeting 
Prussianism here in America? 
 
If not, then you’ll have to help in summoning all the resources of 
this country for the giant struggle. For resources will win the war.  
 
Here’s the way you can help save our resources. Instead of 
throwing money away on unnecessary things, buy Thrift Stamps, 
25 cents, and War-Savings-Stamps, $4.12, worth $5 in five years, 
4 per cent compound interest. They’re good as government money; 
like a mortgage on the U.S.A. Here’s one of theWar-Savings 
Certificates, and here’s a Thrift Card. Ask at any post office, any 
bank, or store wherever you see a W.S.S. sign. 
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It is up to us. We, the people, must win the war.
65
 
 
The fifth step in the process is the approval of products.  Although there was no official 
process for approval, local Four-Minute Men chairmen were responsible for performing quality 
control of their speakers.  The chairman had the power to remove speakers for exceeding the 
Four-Minute time limit, for straying too far from the assigned topic, for injecting political 
opinions, or even for being too boring.
66
  This step in the process bears the least resemblance to 
the intricate approval process used today and yet there is still evidence that oversight and 
accountability mechanisms were in place for the Four-Minute Men. 
Step Six is the distribution and dissemination of messages.  This was done according to 
the plan established in Step Three and typically lasted from two to four weeks.
67
  Given that no 
specific technology was involved in dissemination, the only logistical considerations were 
obtaining the approval of theater owners (by far the most common venue for Four-Minute Man 
speeches) and the presence of the actual speaker. While it was not unheard of for speakers to be 
heckled or to have their audiences walk out, such behavior seldom prevented speakers from 
performing their mission.
68
 
The seventh and final step in the modern PSYOP process is measurement and evaluation.  
While there is some evidence that the Division of Four-Minute Men attempted to measure their 
effectiveness during the war, the most enduring attempts at measurement occurred immediately 
after the war, when Creel and his colleagues took stock of what the CPI had accomplished.  
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Creel provided a wealth of data that attested to the reach of the Four-Minute Men’s messages.  
This data falls mostly in the category of measures of performance.  Creel’s own estimate of the 
activities of the Four-Minute Men projected that they had delivered a total of 755,190 speeches 
to an audience of 314,454,514 Americans.
69
  By this calculation, every single American was 
exposed to approximately three speeches each.  Of course not all Americans attended the movies 
and not all moviegoers were exposed to speeches but the very attempt at quantification reflects a 
progressive inclination for efficiency. This tendency is clearer when Creel presents the Four-
Minute Men in terms of a cost-benefit analysis.  After calculating the $101,550.10 spent on the 
salaries, printing, slides, travel, and general expenses of the division, he exclaims, “what a 
showing!”
70
  He concludes that it was his “proud claim that no other war organization, with the 
exception of the Food Commission, paid such large returns on such small investment as the 
Committee on Public Information.”
71
 
Measures of effectiveness for the Four-Minute Men are more difficult to come by, 
although many Four-Minute Men campaigns were measurable because those directing the 
division tied the objectives to actions (as seen in Step One).  For example, the effectiveness of 
the Liberty Loan campaigns could be measured by the subscriptions to the loan.  Draft 
registration drives were equally measurable.  In his 1953 Ph.D. dissertation, “Crossroads 
Oratory: A Study of the Four Minute Men of World War I,” Wayne Allen Nicholas attempted to 
measure the effectiveness of the Four-Minute Men using available data.  While he found some 
empirical evidence of success, he admitted to the difficulty of assessing their overall 
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effectiveness by saying, “The contribution of the Four-Minute Men was made principally in the 
area of morale, and is difficult to appraise for this reason.”
72
  
There is another, less scientific form of measurement that can be seen in the example of 
the Four-Minute Men.  This is anecdotal evidence, which often comes in the form of 
testimonials.  In the case of the Four-Minute Men, President Wilson testified to the success of his 
army of speakers. In his letter of November 9, 1917, Wilson praises them by saying: 
Upon you Four-Minute Men, who are charged with a special duty 
and enjoy a special privilege in the command of your audiences, 
will rest in a considerable degree, the task of arousing and 
informing the great body of our people so that when the record of 
these days is complete we shall read page for page with the deeds 
of the army and navy the story of the unity, the spirit of sacrifice, 
the unceasing labors, the high courage of the men and women at 
home who held unbroken the inner lines.
73
  
A year later, as the war drew to a close, Wilson penned another letter of thanks to his army of 
public speakers.  While Wilson’s assessment is not backed by any empirical evidence, it does 
carry the credibility of the messenger.  As previously noted, such anecdotal proof of 
effectiveness has the power to transcend more empirical evidence—or the lack thereof.   
The CPI as an Experiment in Public Diplomacy 
Public diplomacy was a term that did not exist during World War I.  It was not coined 
until 1966 when former diplomat and Dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts University Edmund 
Gullion defined it as “the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence 
the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise 
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influence on their foreign policy decisions.”
74
  By 2010, the definition had come to be defined by 
the Department of Defense as “those overt international public information activities of the 
United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by 
seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by 
broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts 
abroad.”
75
  Department of Defense PSYOP personnel currently support Department of State 
public diplomacy efforts through what is known as “Defense Support to Public Diplomacy” 
(DSPD)—which falls under the PSYOP mission of Intergovernmental/Interagency Support 
(IIS).
76
   During World War I, however, public diplomacy was not conducted by the Department 
of State.  It was conducted by the CPI.
77
 
Under the DSPD mission, PSYOP personnel are deployed to U.S. Embassies, at the 
request of the Department of State, to assist in the respective Country Team’s public diplomacy 
efforts.  This practice finds its roots in World War I, when the U.S. military (Departments of War 
and Navy) supported the CPI in the first large-scale experiment in public diplomacy in American 
history.  In fact, this cooperation was one of the few things that President Wilson specifically 
stipulated in the Executive Order that created the CPI.  In that order, Wilson authorized the 
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Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Secretary of the Navy to “detail an officer or officers to 
the work of the committee.”
78
 
The Foreign Section of the CPI conducted influence operations in approximately thirty 
nations.  It is given credit by many historians for increasing support for Woodrow Wilson’s 
peace program (the Fourteen Points) and, consequently, is blamed for the high degree of post-
Versailles disillusionment.  In Buffalo Bill in Bologna (2005), historians Robert Rydell and Rob 
Kroes extrapolate the CPI’s importance beyond the war, arguing that the CPI “globalized 
American culture.”
79
  Rydell and Kroes do not provide enough evidence to support such a bold 
claim but they are correct in presenting the CPI as a significant experiment in using American 
culture as a vehicle for American policy.  Military personnel were critical to this effort. 
Perhaps the single best example of “Defense Support to Public Diplomacy” during World 
War I is that of Lieutenant F.E. Ackerman (U.S. Navy) who was, according to National Archives 
historian James Mock, “the individual who did the most in shaping and organizing the work of 
the Creel Committee in South America.”
80
  Lt. Ackerman sought to employ Americans already 
“in country,” preferably newspapermen.  When no qualified candidates were available, 
Ackerman turned to his fellow service members.  This was the case in Brazil, where Lieutenant 
William Y. Boyd, assistant naval attaché at the American Embassy in Brazil, was selected to 
perform “most of the work desired” (by the CPI).
81
 
                                                 
78. Executive Order 2594, April 14, 1917, Wilson Papers 42: 59. 
79. Robert Rydell and Rob Kroes, Buffalo Bill in Bologna: The Americanization of the World, 1869-1920 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 134. 
80. James Mock, “The Creel Committee in Latin America,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 22, no. 
2 (May 1942): 266. 
81. Ibid., 266. 
 
134 
 
Captain Charles Merriam (U.S. Army Signal Corps), erstwhile professor of political 
science at the University of Chicago, served for a period of six months as the CPI’s chief in Italy.  
He was on loan to the CPI from Colonel Marlborough Churchill’s Military Intelligence Branch.  
Assisting Merriam in Italy were fellow officers Lieutenant Walter Wanger and future New York 
City mayor Captain Fiorello La Guardia.
82
  The CPI’s work in Italy, chronicled by Italian 
historian Daniela Rossini in Woodrow Wilson and the American Myth in Italy (2008), was quite 
effective in elevating Woodrow Wilson to hero status among the Italian populace.
83
  However, 
Merriam’s work demonstrated the difficulties in what would over time become known as 
“interagency cooperation.”  Rossini observes that “the CPI commissioner’s (Merriam) work ran 
on a collision course with the work of the American embassy.”
84
  This collision was not, in 
Rossini’s view, the result of “any arrogance or misguided intentions of the CPI overseas staff; 
rather, the problem lay in an objective overlapping of responsibilities created by the way that 
Wilson organized his diplomatic services.”
85
  Regardless of intentions, Creel cited Merriam’s 
disputes with Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page and Major General Treat (chief of the American 
military mission in Italy) for his recall from Italy in October 1918.
86
 
Overlapping jurisdictions between the CPI and State Department also threatened to derail 
the CPI’s mission in neutral Spain.  In November, 1917, Creel appointed Frank Marion, a film 
                                                 
82. Creel, How We Advertised America, 299-300. 
83. Daniella Rossini, Woodrow Wilson and the American Myth in Italy: Culture, Diplomacy, and War 
Propaganda (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 133. 
84. Ibid., 115. 
85. Ibid.  
86. Mock and Larson, Words that Won the War, 290. 
 
135 
 
executive, to head the CPI mission in Madrid.
87
  From the outset, Marion did not get along with 
Ambassador Joseph E. Willard, who balked at the CPI’s plan for a coordinated film campaign in 
Spain and Italy.  Willard was also frustrated by Marion’s lack of knowledge of Spain, as well as 
Marion’s misreading of the political situation in Spain.  Specifically, Willard judged, correctly, 
that Marion grossly underestimated the level of residual anti-American sentiment among the 
Spaniards resulting from the Spanish-American War.
88
  In February 1918, President Wilson was 
forced to settle the dispute between the CPI and the State Department, siding, as was his 
tendency, with the CPI.
89
   
War Department personnel provided invaluable support to Marion’s mission in Spain.  
Marion appointed assistant naval attaché Lieutenant George A. Dorsey, a personal friend of 
Creel, to act in his absence.
90
  Based on his assessment of the Spanish target audience, Lt. 
Dorsey proposed that American propaganda should use a bandwagon appeal to highlight the 
inevitability of an Allied victory over Germany.
91
  Ambassador Willard ultimately approved 
Dorsey’s plan over the one proposed by military attaché Major John Lang.
92
    
                                                 
87. Gregg Wolper, “Wilsonian Public Diplomacy: The Committee on Public Information in Spain,” 
Diplomatic History 17, no. 1 (January 1993): 18-19. 
88.  Ibid., 22.  
89.  Ibid., 24.  Wolper explains Wilson’s decision as follows: “The president had little trouble making up his 
mind. He had never been fond of diplomats or traditional diplomacy, and he often bypassed normal channels and 
appointed special agents to conduct important diplomatic missions. He also possessed, in the words of John Milton 
Cooper, Jr., ‘a near mystical faith in the efficacy of informed public opinion.’ Thus, he placed a high priority on 
educating the general public abroad, a task that American diplomats were neither willing nor able to undertake. In 
addition, Wilson had established close ties with Creel and worked well with him, while his relations with Secretary 
of State Lansing were frosty at best. Therefore, in the Madrid case, as in nearly every other dispute between the CPI 
and the diplomatic corps, Wilson sided with the CPI.” 
90.  Ibid., 25. 
91.  Ibid., 26.  
92.  Ibid.  By May  1918, Major Lang had become the primary obstacle to CPI efforts in Spain.  Creel 
eventually intervened and convinced Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, chief of the  U.S. Army’s Military 
Intelligence Branch, to replace Lang with the more amenable Lt. Col. Thomas Van Natta.  
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Further evidence of DSPD comes in the form of a series of “Psychological Estimates” for 
various countries that were produced by the U.S. Army’s Military Intelligence Branch.  While 
overlooked by most PSYOP historians, these estimates were the product of Captain Heber 
Blankenhorn’s G-2-D “Psychologic Subsection” (aka “Propaganda Subsection”).
 93
  
Blankenhorn’s section, which also conducted tactical propaganda operations on the Western 
Front from August through November 1918, could be judged to have been the first PSYOP Task 
Force (POTF) in American military history.
94
 
George Creel singled out Captain Blankenhorn’s boss, Brigadier General Dennis Nolan, 
(AEF General Headquarters G2) and Brigadier General Edgar E. Russel (Chief of the Signal 
Corps) for praise, saying that these two members of General Pershing’s staff provided invaluable 
support to the CPI’s efforts in France.
95
  Such support may not have been reciprocated.  PSYOP 
historian Paul M.A. Linebarger asserts that claims by members of the CPI to have assisted the 
American tactical propaganda campaign are largely unsubstantiated.
96
  Nevertheless, the 
contributions made by those in uniform to the CPI should not be overlooked. 
To avoid the obvious anachronism, the support provided by officers such as Lieutenants 
Ackerman and Boyd could more precisely be labeled “Defense Support to the CPI.”  Regardless, 
it is fair to consider the efforts of the CPI’s Foreign Section to be “proto-public diplomacy” and, 
                                                 
93. For more on Captain Blankenhorn’s wartime propaganda mission, see Clayton Laurie’s “The Chanting of 
Crusaders: Captain Blankenhorn and AEF Combat Propaganda in World War I” in The Journal of Military History 
39, no. 3 (July 1995): 457-481. 
94. In this context, the term “POTF” is used in a general sense (in that the AEF GHQ G-2-D Section was a unit 
that conducted PSYOP).  However, in PSYOP doctrine, a POTF is a specific type of PSYOP mission.  It is not my 
contention that the G-2-D Section fit the criteria for a POTF better than the other possible labels (e.g. PSYOP 
Support Element, PSYOP Development Center, Tactical PSYOP Development Detachment, etc.).  I am arguing 
that, labels aside, CPT Blankenhorn’s section was a proto-PSYOP mission that has gone largely unappreciated by 
PSYOP historians. 
95. Creel, How We Advertised America, 293. 
96. Paul M.A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (1948; repr., Landisville, Pennsylvania: Coachwhip 
Publications, 2010), 101. 
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by extension, the involvement of US military personnel to have been “proto-DSPD.”  While each 
case listed above is different, and many other cases existed, each holds its own lessons for the 
PSYOP community.  The most basic of which is to acknowledge that this sort of work was being 
done during the First World War.  
Conclusion 
In his 1959 study The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare, 
Operations Research Office analyst Murray Dyer acknowledged the peril of neglecting to study 
the CPI, noting that, as a result of this neglect, “we went into World War II…faced with learning 
all over again.”
97
  The reasons that the CPI continues to be neglected by the military PSYOP 
community are not that difficult to understand and will not be restated here.  Whatever the 
reason, the fact remains that the CPI, as America’s first government-led experiment in mass 
persuasion, holds valuable lessons for today’s PSYOP community.  The difficulties in measuring 
the CPI’s effectiveness mirror those faced by those attempting to assess contemporary influence 
operations. The process used by the Four-Minute Men, while not an exact fit, presaged the 
development of a doctrinal process for conducting PSYOP.  Finally, the assistance provided by 
U.S. military personnel to the CPI’s foreign operations foreshadowed the advent, in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, of the PSYOP mission known as “Defense Support to Public 
Diplomacy.”  
As important as what the PSYOP community can learn from the CPI is what can be 
learned about the CPI by viewing it through the lens of PSYOP.  Chief among these lessons is 
that the CPI’s effectiveness cannot be measured with any precision due to a lack of relevant data, 
                                                 
97. Murray Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
Press, 1959), 98. 
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a lack of measurable objectives, and a highly cluttered information environment.  Interpretations 
of the CPI that are based on its presumed effectiveness, for good or for ill, are therefore invalid. 
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CONCLUSION 
I think that as time goes on and as the history of this committee’s work is written and its 
accomplishments are better understood, the executive order of April 14 [creating the CPI] 
will be seen as one of the most perspicacious things that was done in preparation for the 
struggle. 
 
Guy Stanton Ford 
January 20, 1919 
Late in the summer of 2013, President Barack Obama took the case for limited military 
intervention in Syria to the American people.  Following in the footsteps of George W. Bush’s 
critics a decade earlier, and those of Bush’s father a decade before that, President Obama’s 
critics, on both ends of the political-ideological spectrum, raised the century-old specter of the 
Committee on Public Information.  Stephen Lendman, host of the Progressive Radio News Hour, 
drew a direct line from the CPI to the “drumbeat for war on Syria.”
1
  Two weeks later, he 
blogged: “Obama wants war.  One way or another he intends to launch it.  False flags are 
pretexts to do so.  They’re a longstanding US tradition.”
2
  Also actively blogging against U.S. 
military action in Syria was James Tracy, a professor of Media Studies, who a year earlier had 
traced “‘Progressive’ Journalism’s Legacy of Deceit” all the way back to the CPI.
3
  Thus it can 
be seen that, while this study of the interpretations of the CPI was in its infant stage, the 
cautionary component of the dominant narrative of the CPI was on full display. 
                                                 
1 Stephen Lendman, “Drumbeat for War on Syria,” August 24, 2013, accessed March 20, 2014, 
http://sjlendman.blogspot.com/2013/08/drumbeat-for-war-on-syria.html.  In the latter article, Lendman stated: “Big 
Lies launch wars. They’re weapons of mass deception. They work when repeated ad nauseam. It’s the same every 
time. They facilitate America's permanent war agenda. They advance imperial lawlessness.” 
2 Stephen Lendman, “AIPAC Lobbies for War on Syria,” September 9, 2013, accessed March 21, 2014, 
http://sjlendman.blogspot.com/2013/09/aipac-lobbies-for-war-on-syria.html. 
3 James F. Tracy, “‘Progressive’ Journalism’s Legacy of Deceit,” global research, July 20, 2012, accessed 
March 20, 2014, http://www.globalresearch.ca/progressive-journalism-s-legacy-of-deceit/31996. There is another 
video from Tracy dated September 24, 2013 entitled “Endless War, Public Opinion and the Pictures in Our Heads” 
that revisits the topic of military intervention in Syria.  In this video, he mentions Walter Lippmann and Edward 
Bernays but does not tie them directly to the CPI (as he does in his earlier article).  
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Those invoking the CPI in the case of Syria overlooked one glaring discrepancy: the CPI 
was not used to promote American intervention in World War I.  The analogy between the CPI 
and Obama’s case for military intervention in Syria, or Bush’s case for an invasion of Iraq, 
breaks down from the beginning because the CPI was formed after the United States Congress 
had declared war on Germany.  While it is true that the CPI presented the war as a just war that 
had been forced on America, these were ex post facto justifications.  The most important 
decision—the one to declare war—had been made a week prior to the CPI’s formation.  The 
main domestic task of the CPI was to build support for the war effort by encouraging draft 
registration, food conservation, blood donation, the purchase of war savings stamps and liberty 
bonds and a variety of other behaviors that were deemed desirable by the U.S. government.  In 
the case of Iraq (in either 1991 or 2003), no such full-scale mobilization was needed, nor would 
it have been needed to sustain the sort of military action that President Obama supported against 
Syria in 2013.  A serious, scholarly comparison of the use of propaganda to increase support for 
military operations in Iraq or Syria with the use of propaganda by the CPI during World War I 
would inevitably yield many more differences than similarities.  Nevertheless, very few 
Americans, even among those considered educated, were in a position to understand this due to 
the general acceptance of the dominant narrative of the CPI.  
The cautionary aspect was certainly not the only theme of the dominant narrative that 
appeared in the writings of the anti-interventionists in 2013.  Lendman focused almost 
exclusively on the role of Edward Bernays in the CPI without bothering to mention that 
Bernays’s role in the CPI was relatively minor and limited primarily to CPI operations in Latin 
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America.
4
  Tracy made the same error by stating of the CPI: “New Republic editor Walter 
Lippmann and ‘father of public relations’ Edward Bernays were also brought on board the 
elaborate domestic and international campaign to “advertise America.’”
5
  They were, perhaps 
unwittingly, following the lead of conservative commentator Glenn Beck, who had pronounced 
in 2010 that Bernays, along with Walter Lippmann (who had no role in the CPI), were “close 
advisors” to Wilson and Creel.
6
   
It bears asking what these observers made of Walton Bean’s argument that “historians 
should reject the idea that the Committee on Public Information (CPI) was largely responsible 
for the war-time excesses of patriotic emotion” and that “relative to general public opinion, it 
was actually a moderating influence.”
7
  It seems doubtful that they were even aware of it but, if 
they were, they clearly rejected it.   
Given the immeasurable nature of wartime propaganda in America, there is no way of 
proving that the CPI was in fact a “moderating influence.”  However, Bean’s argument is 
important because it provides a carefully-reasoned and well-documented corrective to the 
dominant narrative which, as noted in chapter one, began to take shape in the 1920s.  If Bean’s 
treatment of Creel seems hagiographic, then it is because so much of what has been written about 
                                                 
4 After the war, Bernays articulated his ideas on “engineering consent” and “regimenting the public mind” in 
two influential: Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923) and Propaganda (1928); both are addressed in chapter one of 
this study.  
5 Tracy, “‘Progressive’ Journalism’s Legacy of Deceit.” 
6 Glenn Beck, “Progressives’ Fight for American Hearts and Minds,” foxnews.com, May 27, 2010, accessed 
March 21, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2010/05/27/glenn-beck-progressives-fight-for-american-hearts-and-
minds/.  Judging from the information available in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson and the letters provided online 
through the Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Lippmann’s involvement with the CPI and Creel could best be 
described as that of an unimpressed observer—and at some point even a critic. 
7. Walton Bean, “George Creel and His Critics: A Study of the Attacks on the Committee on Public 
Information, 1917-1919,” abstract, (PhD diss., University of California, 1941). 
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Creel since World War I has conditioned the reader to think negatively about the CPI and its 
chairman.  Such is the pervasiveness of the dominant narrative.   
It is fair to say that this thesis has been guided by the spirit of Walton Bean, not with the 
intention to offer an apologia for the CPI but rather a corrective.  There is something revealing in 
the fact that full-length works on the CPI, whether published or unpublished, tend to paint a more 
favorable view of the CPI than do those works that devote a lesser amount of space to the 
subject.  Of the six secondary works exclusively on the CPI consulted for this study (three books 
and three dissertations), none conforms strictly to the dominant narrative of the CPI.
8
  While this 
might be explained away as evidence of bias, it should also be taken as evidence that the better 
one understands what the CPI actually did, the more one recognizes that the dominant narrative 
is poor history.   
The CPI was but one of many organizations disseminating propaganda during the period 
1917-1918 and, as demonstrated in the work of Bean and George Blakey (Historians on the 
Homefront), CPI propagandists were relatively restrained when compared to those working for 
other wartime organizations (such as the National Security League and the various state councils 
of defense).  Furthermore, the correspondence between Woodrow Wilson and George Creel 
demonstrates that they were aware, and did not approve, of the activities of what Creel termed 
“chauvinistic” and “reactionary” organizations.
9
  Thus, while the CPI cannot be entirely 
exonerated from charges of promoting intolerance and the suppressing of civil liberties, there is 
                                                 
8 Books: Words that Won the War (Mock and Larson, 1939), Holding Fast the Inner Lines (Vaughn, 1980), 
and Selling the Great War (Axelrod, 2009); dissertations: “George Creel and His Critics” (Bean, 1941), “Crusading 
Oratory” (Nicholas, 1953), and “The Origins of Public Diplomacy” (Wolper, 1991). 
9 George Creel to Woodrow Wilson, November 8, 1918, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur Link, 
vol. 51, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 646; see also: Wilson to Creel, September 30, 1918, 
Wilson Papers 51: 162 and Creel to Wilson, October 1, 1917, Wilson Papers 51: 175 (regarding American Defense 
Society and National Security League). 
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ample evidence that its leaders were at least sensitive to the issues.  On the issue of censorship, 
Creel and the CPI may have been more involved than Creel (or Walton Bean) would have cared 
to remember but they were not, as David Kennedy points out, the worst offenders on this front.   
Attacks against the CPI that highlight Adolf Hitler’s praise of CPI propaganda and his 
propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels’s possession of Edward Bernays’s postwar writings are 
blatantly teleological.  Ad hominem attacks on the character, qualifications, personality, political 
beliefs, and management style of its chairman, George Creel, should be likewise rejected. 
Pronouncing Creel a dictator, as evil, or as a villain does nothing to further an understanding of 
the CPI and should studiously be avoided.  An in-depth study of the relationship between 
Woodrow Wilson and George Creel, and between Creel and his CPI subordinates, reveals that 
the CPI was not a one-man show with Creel as its dictator.   
Those attempting to use the CPI to make a point about contemporary political issues 
undoubtedly find such a nuanced interpretation of the CPI inconvenient.  Likewise, those 
needing to condense the CPI into a two or three hundred word textbook or encyclopedia entry 
face a similar problem, although for different reasons.  Nuance and brevity are often at odds.  
Many historians find that the dominant narrative solves this problem by offering a highly concise 
(even if incomplete and inaccurate) description of the CPI that comes complete with clear-cut 
conclusions about the CPI’s effectiveness and legacy.   
More accurate portrayals of the CPI are available, to include James Mock and Cedric 
Larson’s Words that Won the War and Stephen Vaughn’s Holding Fast the Inner Lines.  
However, these sources are not widely read or cited.  More commonly read are the textbooks, 
popular histories, and websites that conform, to varying degrees, to the dominant narrative of the 
CPI.  This thesis argued against such a narrative and in favor of a more balanced narrative of the 
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CPI that avoids value judgments, factual errors, ad hominem attacks and the seductive tendencies 
of presentism.  It presented an alternate narrative of the CPI that presents Woodrow Wilson as 
both a supporter of, and advisor to, George Creel.  The evidence dispels the notion that Wilson 
was not actively involved in the work of the CPI and dispenses with the myth of Creel as a one-
man show.  Finally, this thesis examined the CPI through the lens of PSYOP and proved, using 
current Department of Defense doctrine for assessing influence operations, that the effectiveness 
of the CPI’s propaganda cannot be determined with any degree of precision.   
Scholars accept that a period of disillusionment and intolerance followed World War I.  
According to the dominant narrative, George Creel and the CPI did much to create this postwar 
climate.  In order to make such a determination, one must be able to measure levels of 
disillusionment and intolerance before, during, and after the war.  No such measurements exist.  
Furthermore, it is impossible to isolate the effect of CPI’s propaganda from that of all other 
sources of propaganda, just as it is impossible to isolate the impact of CPI propaganda from that 
of all other factors—such as the loss or maiming of loved ones in the war or other life-altering 
wartime sacrifices that might lead to disillusionment.  Based on the lack of evidence required to 
determine the impact of the CPI, it should be acquitted of the charges that it was the cause of 
intolerance, suppression, and disillusionment.   
This thesis stands not as an endorsement of the CPI or of propaganda but as a repudiation 
of the dominant narrative of the CPI and an admonition to those who knowingly propagate it.  
The dominant narrative, like all propaganda, encourages specific attitudinal or behavioral 
outcomes.  Just as the CPI used propaganda to promote support for the war effort during World 
War I, the dominant narrative uses propaganda to promote a greater awareness of the dangers of 
propaganda.  This thesis makes no attempt to assess the worthiness or justness of this goal.  
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However, those making the case against propaganda in general, or the CPI specifically, should 
not rely on factual errors, fallacious assumptions, transfer, oversimplification, name-calling, 
card-stacking or any other tricks of the propagandist’s trade.  Proponents of the dominant 
narrative should instead heed the words of George Creel: “we had such confidence in our case as 
to feel that no other argument was needed than the simple, straightforward presentation of 
facts.”
10
  If facts alone are not enough to make the case, then one must reconsider whether the 
case truly needs making.
                                                 
10. George Creel, How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on 
Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (1920; repr., London: 
Forgotten Books, 2012), 4-5. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Mentions of “Propaganda” and “CPI” in State History Curricula 
State Reference to Propaganda Reference to CPI 
Alabama  No No 
Alaska  No No 
Arkansas  No Yes 
Arizona No No 
California  Yes No 
Colorado  No No 
Connecticut  No No 
Delaware No No 
Florida No Yes 
Georgia No No 
Hawaii Yes No 
Idaho No No 
Illinois No No 
Massachusetts No No 
Michigan No No 
New York Yes No 
North Carolina  Yes Yes 
Ohio No No 
Tennessee Yes No 
Texas  Eliminated in 2010 No 
Virginia  No No 
National Standards No No 
 
  
 
147 
 
Appendix B Master List of U.S. History Textbooks and Other Reference Books 
Textbook Title Author(s) Publication Date 
The American Adventure David Saville Muzzey 1927 
The Making of Modern America  Leon H. Canford and Howard B. Wilder 1950 
A History of the United States, 
Volume 2  
Cecil Bining and Philip Shriver Klein 1951 
A Short History of the American 
People, Volume ,  1865-1952 2
nd
 ed.  
Frank L. Owsley, Oliver Perry Chitwood, and H.C. 
Nixon 
1952 
The American Pageant 1
st
 ed.  Thomas Bailey 1956 
A History of the United States Since 
1865  
Harry T. Williams, Richard Current, and Frank 
Freidel 
1959 
History of a Free People  Henry W. Bragdon and Samuel P. McCutchen 1960 
The United States: A History of a 
Democracy 2
nd
 ed.  
Wesley M. Gewehr, et. al. 1960 
The Adventure of the American 
People   
Henry F. Graff and John A. Krout 1960 
The American Pageant 2
nd
 ed. Thomas Bailey 1961 
The American People A History Vol. 
II Since 1865 3
rd
 ed. 
Oliver Perry Chitwood, Rembert W. Patrick, and 
Robert E. Corlew 
1962 
The American Pageant 3
rd
 ed. Thomas Bailey 1966 
A History of the United States Since 
1865  
Oscar T. Barck, Jr. and Hugh Talmage Lefler 1968 
A History of the American People  Norman Graebner, Gilbert C. Fite, and Philip L. 
White 
1970 
The American Nation John A. Garraty 1971 
The American Pageant 5
th
 ed. Thomas Bailey 1975 
The American Pageant 6
th
 ed. Thomas Bailey and David Kennedy 1979 
American History, A Survey 6
th
 ed. Richard Current and Alan Brinkley 1983 
America: A Narrative History  George Brown Tindall 1984 
The American Past: A Survey of 
American History  
Joseph R. Conlin 1987 
The American Pageant 11
th
 ed. Thomas Bailey, David Kennedy, and Lizabeth 
Cohen 
1998 
Pacemaker United States History 3
rd
 
ed. 
Globe Fearon Educational Publishers 2001 
Holt American Nation Paul Boyer 2003 
United States History Wayne E. King and John L. Napp 2005 
The American Pageant 13
th
 ed. (AP). David Kennedy, Lizabeth Cohen, and Thomas 
Bailey 
2006 
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American History, A Survey 12
th
 ed.  Alan Brinkley 2007 
The American Journey  David R. Goldfield et. al. 2007 
America Past and Present 8
th
 ed. Robert A. Divine et. al.  2007 
The American Promise: A Compact 
History 
James L. Roark, et.al.  2007 
America’s History 6
th
 ed. James Henretta, David Brody, and Lynn Dumenil 2008 
Creation and Development of North 
Carolina in United States History 
William Deverell and Deborah G. White 2008 
The Americans Gerald A. Danzer et. al. 2008 
American Anthem Edward L. Ayers 2008 
The American Journey  Joyce Oldham Appleby, Alan Brinkley, and James 
M. McPherson 
2008 
Liberty, Equality, Power  John M. Murrin et. al 2008 
The Enduring Vision AP ed. Paul S. Boyer 2008 
The American Vision  Joyce Oldham Appleby et. al. 2008 
Prentice Hall United States History 
NC ed. 
Emma Lapsansky-Werner 2009 
United States History: 
Reconstruction to the Present TN ed. 
Emma Lapsansky-Werner 2009 
America: A Narrative History 8
th
 ed. Gerald Brown Tindall and David Shi 2010 
U.S. History Online Textbook ushistory.org  2014 
Book Title Author Publication Date 
A People’s History of the United 
States 
Howard Zinn 1980 
Lies My Teacher Told Me James W. Loewen 1996 
A History of the American People Paul Johnson 1997 
A Patriot’s History of the United 
States 
Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen 2004 
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Appendix C: Definitions of the CPI in Selected Textbooks and Websites 
Textbook Defining the CPI 
The Making of Modern America 
(1950) 
 “A Committee of Public Information was therefore appointed for the purpose 
of keeping the morale of the people high.”  (669) 
A History of the United States, 
Volume 2 (1951) 
CPI’s purpose: “to keep the public informed about the purposes and the 
progress of the war.”  (390) 
Holt American Nation (2003) “Agency created in 1917 to increase public support for World War I” (R21) 
American History, A Survey 
12
th
 ed. (2007) 
 “The most conspicuous government effort to rally public support was a vast 
propaganda campaign orchestrated by the new Committee on Public 
Information.”  (625) 
The American Journey (2007)  “Government agency during World War I that sought to shape public opinion in 
support of the war effort through newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, films, and 
other media.”  (G-3) 
America Past and Present 8
th
 
ed. (2007) 
“Created in 1917 by President Wilson and headed by progressive journalist 
George Creel, this organization rallied support for American involvement in 
World War I through art, advertising, and film.  Creel worked out a system of 
voluntary censorship with the press and distributed colorful posters and 
pamphlets.  The CPI’s Division of Industrial Relations rallied labor to help the 
war effort.”  (G-3) 
The Americans (2008) CPI’s purpose: “To popularize the war, the government set up the nation’s first 
propaganda agency, the (CPI)”  (596) 
American Anthem (2008) “Created by President Wilson, this committee’s objective was to maximize 
national loyalty and support for World War I.”  (R93) 
The American Journey (2008) “The mission of the committee was to persuade Americans that the war 
represented a battle for democracy and freedom.” (685) 
Liberty, Equality, Power (2008) “U.S. government agency established in 1917 to arouse support for the war and, 
later, to generate suspicion of war dissenters.”  (G-3) 
The American Vision (2008)  “President Wilson created the [CPI] to ‘sell’ the war to the American people.”  
(558) 
United States History: Recon- 
struction. to the Present (2009) 
“Government agency created during World War I to encourage Americans to 
support the war.” (861) 
Wikipedia.com “The Committee on Public Information, also known as the CPI or the Creel 
Committee, was an independent agency of the government of the United 
States created to influence U.S. public opinion regarding American 
participation in World War I.” 
Wisegeek.com “The Committee on Public Information (CPI) was a government agency 
established in the United States during World War I with the aim of supporting 
the war effort.” 
Ask.com “The Committee on Public Information was also called the CPI or the Creel 
Committee. It was an independent agency of the United States government. The 
committee was formed to influence the U.S. public opinion on the participation 
of World War I.” 
Sourcewatch.org “The Committee on Public Information, also known as the Creel Committee, 
organized publicity on behalf of U.S. objectives during World War I.” 
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Appendix D: Headings and Subheadings for CPI Sections 
Textbook Heading/Subheading 
The Making of Modern America  (1950) “Public Opinion is Mobilized” 
A History of the United States, Volume 2  (1951) “Mobilization of Public Opinion” 
A Short History of the American People, Volume 
2 (1865-1952)  (1952) 
“Creating and Regulating Public Sentiment” 
The American Pageant 1
st
 ed. (1956) “Manipulating Minds” 
A History of the United States Since 1865 (1959) “Molding Minds Toward War and Peace” 
History of a Free People  (1960) “Control of Opinion” 
The Adventure of the American People  (1960) “Mobilizing on the Home Front” and “The Creel Committee” 
The United States: A History of a Democracy (2
nd
 
ed.)  (1960) 
“Victory and Peace Terms” 
The American People A History Vol. II Since 
1865 3
rd
 ed. (1962) 
“Creating and Regulating Public Sentiment” 
A History of the United States Since 1865  (1968) “Problems of the Home Front” 
A History of the American People (1970) “The Quest for National Unity” 
The American Pageant 6
th
 ed. -onward (1979 -) “Creel Manipulates Minds” 
America: A Narrative History (1984) “Mobilizing a Nation” 
The American Past: A Survey of American 
History  (1987) 
“Manipulating Public Opinion” and “Crushing Kultur” 
Holt American Nation (2003) “Influencing Attitudes” 
American History, A Survey 12
th
 ed. (2007) “Selling the War and Suppressing Dissent” 
The American Journey  (2007) “Conquering Minds” 
America Past and Present 8
th
 ed.  (2007) “The Conquest of Convictions” 
The American Promise (2007) “Rally around the Flag, or Else” 
America’s History 6
th
 ed. (2008) “Promoting National Unity” and “George Creel and Wartime 
Propaganda” 
The Americans  (2008) “Selling the War” 
American Anthem  (2008) “Influencing Public Opinion” and “Winning American 
Support” 
The American Journey   (2008) “Mobilizing Support” and “Controlling Public Opinion” 
Liberty, Equality, Power  (2008) “Arousing Patriotic Ardor” and “Wartime Repression” 
The Enduring Vision  (2008) “Promoting the War and Suppressing Dissent” and 
“Advertising the War” 
The American Vision  (2008) “Shaping Public Opinion” and “Selling the War” 
United States History: Reconstruction to the 
Present  (2009) 
“Shaping Public Opinion” 
USHistory.org (2014) “Rallying the Country” 
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Appendix E: George Creel as the “Great Man” 
Textbook Descriptions of Creel 
Mention of 
Other CPI 
Personnel 
Mention 
Role of 
Volunteers 
Mention of 
Progressives 
in CPI 
The Making of Modern 
America (1950) 
No mention of Creel None No Not surveyed 
A History of the 
United States, Volume 
2 (1951) 
“Combining a prodigious vitality, a 
soaring imagination, and an 
uncanny ingenuity in devising ways 
and means, Creel launched a 
program of words and ideas that 
imposed a rigid conformity of 
thought on Americans”  (309) 
None Yes Not surveyed 
A Short History of the 
American People, 
Volume 2 (1952) 
“energetic and enthusiastic 
journalist” (505) 
None No Not surveyed 
The American Pageant 
1
st
 ed. (1956) 
“a youngish journalist…who, 
though outspoken and tactless, was 
gifted with zeal and imagination” 
(735) 
None No No 
A History of the 
United States Since 
1865 (1959)  
“A progressive newspaperman who 
had worked in the 1916 presidential 
campaign”  (395) 
None Yes Not surveyed 
History of a Free 
People (1960) 
No description None No Not surveyed 
The Adventure of the 
American People 
(1960)   
Creel “so dominated it (the CPI) 
that it came to be known popularly 
as the Creel committee.”  (533) 
None No Not surveyed 
The United States: A 
History of a 
Democracy 2
nd
 ed. 
(1960)   
“ex-Socialist journalist” (489) None No Not surveyed 
The American People 
A History Vol. II Since 
1865 3
rd
 ed. (1962)  
“energetic and enthusiastic 
journalist” with “active imagination 
which served him in good stead” 
(339) 
None No Not surveyed 
A History of the 
United States Since 
1865  (1968)  
No description None No Not surveyed 
A History of the 
American People 
(1970)  
“vigorous and thoroughly 
dedicated” (943) 
None No Not surveyed 
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America: A Narrative 
History (1984)   
“Denver newsman” (964) Charles Dana 
Gibson, James 
Montgomery 
Flagg, Guy 
Stanton Ford 
No Not surveyed 
The American Past: A 
Survey of American 
History (1987) 
“a progressive newspaperman 
who had devoted his career to 
fighting the very intolerance and 
social injustice he now 
encouraged” (671) 
None No Not surveyed 
Holt American Nation 
(2003) 
No description None No No 
American History, A 
Survey 12
th
 ed. (2007) 
“Denver journalist” (625) None No  No 
The American Journey 
(2007) 
“journalist” (677) None No No 
American Past and 
Present 8
th
 ed. (2007) 
“an outspoken progressive 
journalist” (706) 
None No Ida Tarbell, 
Ray Stannard 
Baker 
The American Promise 
(2007) 
No description None Four-Minute 
Men
1
 
No 
America’s History 6
th
 ed. 
(2008) 
“journalist” (693) None Four-Minute 
Men 
Tarbell and 
Baker 
The Americans (2008) “a former muckraking journalist” 
(569) 
None Implied No 
American Anthem (2008) “newspaper reporter and political 
reformer” (603) 
Flagg No No 
Liberty, Equality, Power 
(2008) 
“a Midwestern progressive and a 
muckraker” (701) 
None No Yes  (No 
names given) 
The Enduring Vision 
(2008) 
“journalist” (678) Samuel 
Gompers
2
 
Four-Minute 
Men 
Herbert Croly, 
Walter 
Lippmann, 
John Dewey 
United States History: 
Reconstruction to the 
Present (2009) 
“former journalist and passionate 
admirer of American institutions” 
(294) 
None No No 
America: A Narrative 
History 8
th
 ed. (2010)   
“Denver newsman” None No Yes 
Ushistory.org (1984) No description of Creel Flagg, George 
Cohan
3
 
No No 
                                                 
1. Most textbooks mention the Four-Minute Men but not all specify that these speakers were volunteers. 
2. Gompers headed the “Alliance for Labor and Democracy,” which this textbook alleges was funded by the 
CPI (678). 
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Appendix F: The CPI “By the Numbers” 
Textbook Numbers Provided 
The Making of Modern America (1950) Pamphlets were “distributed by the millions”  (669) 
A History of the United States, Volume 2 
(1951) 
75,000 Four-Minute Men, “millions of articles and pamphlets,” (390)  
A Short History of the American People, 
Volume 2 (1865-1952) (1952) 
Millions of pamphlets, 75,000 speakers 
The American Pageant 1
st
 ed. (1956) 150,000 workers, “an army of 75,000 ‘four-minute men’…who 
delivered over 7,500,000 speeches,” “millions of leaflets and 
pamphlets.” (735-736) 
A History of the United States Since 
1865 (1959)  
150,000 writers, lecturers, actors, and artists; 75 million pieces of 
printed matter  (397) 
History of a Free People (1960) “millions of pamphlets” (527) 
The Adventure of the American People 
(1960)   
“An army of 75,000 volunteers,”  (533)  
The American People A History Vol. II 
Since 1865 3
rd
 ed. (1962).  
Millions of pamphlets, 75,000 speakers (“Creel Organized”) (339) 
A History of the American People (1970)  “Creel unleashed on the country thousands of public speakers”  (944) 
America: A Narrative History (1984)   75,000 Four-Minute Men (964) 
The American Past: A Survey of 
American History (1987) 
75,000 Four-Minute Men (672) 
Holt American Nation (2003) No numbers provided 
The American Pageant 13
th
 ed. (2006) 150,000 workers, “an army of 75,000 ‘four-minute men,’” “millions of 
leaflets and pamphlets” (707-708) 
American History, A Survey 12
th
 ed. 
(2007) 
“75 million pieces of printed material in all” (625) Primary source: 
poster “Keep these off the USA: Buy more liberty bonds”  
The American Journey (2007) “75,000 speakers, who delivered a million speeches to 400 million 
listeners”  (677) 
America Past and Present 8
th
 ed. (2007) “more than 75 million pamphlets,” “Creel also enlisted 75,000 ‘four-
minute men”  (706) 
The American Promise (2007) Four-Minute Men “a squad of 75,000 volunteers” (574) 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3. The text states: “He (Creel) commissioned George M. Cohan to write patriotic songs intended to stoke the 
fires of American nationalism.”  In point of fact, George Cohan was not affiliated with the CPI and there is no 
evidence that Cohan wrote “Over There” or any other patriotic song at the behest of George Creel. 
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America’s History 6
th
 ed. (2008) “The CPI touched the lives of practically every American.  It 
distributed seventy-five million pieces of patriotic literature and, by 
enlisting thousands of volunteers—‘four-minute men’—to deliver 
short pro-war speeches at local movie theaters, reached a huge 
audience.”  (693) 
The Americans (2008) “thousands of paintings, posters, cartoons, and sculptures,”  “He 
(Creel) recruited some 75,000 men to serve as ‘Four-Minute Men,’ “he 
(Creel) ordered a printing of almost 25 million copies of “How War 
Came to America,” “He distributed some 75 million pamphlets, 
booklets, and leaflets.”  (596) 
American Anthem (2008) None given (no mention of Four-Minute Men) 
The American Journey (2008) “millions of pro-war pamphlets, posters, articles, and books” (685)  “It 
was the greatest propaganda campaign the nation had ever seen.”   
Liberty, Equality, Power (2008) “75 million copies of pamphlets,” “it (CPI) trained a force of 75,000 
‘Four-Minute Men,’”  thousands of press releases,” (701)  
The Enduring Vision (2008) 75,000 Four-Minute Men (678) 
The American Vision (2008) “The CPI distributed pamphlets and arranged for thousands of short 
patriotic talks,” “some 75,000 speakers, known as Four-Minute men” 
(558)  Primary sources: Pershing’s Crusaders poster, War Saving 
Stamps poster, Red Cross poster, excerpt from a CPI pamphlet from 
Feb. 1918, newspaper column on German atrocities from May 1915 
United States History: Reconstruction to 
the Present (2009) 
75,000 million pamphlets, 6,000 press releases, an “army of 75,000 
speakers,” “millions of posters” (294) 
America: A Narrative History 8
th
 ed. 
(2010)   
75,000 Four-Minute Men (1001) 
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Appendix G: Evidence of Misattribution, Factual Errors and Anti-CPI Bias 
Textbook Errors and Misattributions Other Evidence of Anti-CPI bias 
A History of the United 
States, Volume 2 (1951) 
Blames the CPI for banning of German 
language, music, etc. (391) 
“Creel launched a program of words and 
ideas that imposed a rigid conformity of 
thought on Americans” (390). 
The American Pageant 
(1956-2012) 
The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin and To 
Hell with the Kaiser 
None 
The United States: A 
History of a Democracy 
2
nd
 ed.  (1960) 
None “George Creel saw to it that American’s 
were well instructed in the purposes of the 
war, the wickedness of the enemy, and the 
need to buy war bonds” (489).   
A History of the United 
States Since 1865  
(1968)  
None “In thus stirring the public and silencing 
critics, Creel and his agents were most 
effective, though much of this propaganda 
made strange reading after the war was 
over.”  (270) 
America: A Narrative 
History (1984)   
The Kaiser, Beast of Berlin (starring “as 
the spike-helmeted embodiment of 
Prussian villainy, Erich von Stroheim”) 
(964) 
“Hardly any public group escaped 
harangue by one of the 75,000 Four-
Minute Men.”  (964) 
The American Past: A 
Survey of American 
History  (1987) 
“Film stars such as Douglas Fairbanks, 
Charlie Chaplin, and Mary Pickford 
(“America’s Sweetheart”) appeared at 
Liberty Bond rallies and spoke anti-
German lines written by the CPI.”
 4
  (672)  
“Second (to censoring the news), and far 
more ominously, the CPI took up the task 
of molding public opinion so that slight 
deviations from full support of the war 
were considered disloyal.”  (671) 
Holt American Nation 
(2003) 
Tacit attribution of The Claws of the Hun 
and The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin (645) 
“The CPI initially put out fact-based 
material that presented an upbeat picture of 
the war.  Soon, however, the CPI began 
creating propaganda that pictured the 
Germans as evil monsters.”  (645) 
American History, A 
Survey 12
th
 ed. (2007) 
The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin and The 
Prussian Cur 
“Government-promoted posters and films, 
at first relatively mild in tone, were by 
1918 becoming lurid portrayals  of the 
savagery of the Germans, bearing such 
titles as The Prussian Cur and The 
Kaiser: Beast of Berlin, encouraging 
Americans to think of the German people 
as something close to savages” (625).  
“Many believed that a crucial prerequisite 
for victory was an energetic, even coercive, 
effort to unite public opinion behind the 
military effort.” (625)   
“The CPI attempted at first to distribute 
only the ‘facts,’ believing that the truth 
would speak for itself.  As the war 
continued, however, their tactics became 
increasingly crude.”  (625) 
                                                 
4. The same review in Time (see note 4 above) states “Few have forgotten the CPI's war expositions, its 
traveling French officers, such stunts as Theda Bara in her Liberty Bond booth before the New York Public Library 
(receipts: $300,000 in one day).”  Creel’s writings provides no evidence that he “hired” any of the movies stars who 
participated in Liberty Bond rallies or that the CPI provided them with “anti-German lines.”  In Words that Won the 
War, James Mock and Cedric Larson connect movies stars such as Theda Bara, Douglas Fairbanks, and Mary 
Pickford to the Liberty Bond drives but credit this to the Department of Treasury.   
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The American Journey 
(2007) 
None “Despite its title, the CPI sought to 
manipulate, not inform, public opinion.” 
(677) 
America Past and 
Present 8
th
 ed. (2007) 
“Exploiting a new medium, the CPI 
promoted films such as The Prussian Cur 
and The Kaiser, The Beast of Berlin” 
(706) 
“At first they (Four-Minute Men) were 
instructed to stress facts and stay away 
from emotions, particularly hatred, but by 
the beginning of 1918, the instructions 
shifted; the Germans were to be depicted 
as bloodthirsty Huns bent on world 
conquest.”  (706) 
The American Promise 
(2007) 
Indirect connection to The Kaiser: The 
Beast of Berlin (which is described as a 
musical that opened on Broadway in 
1918).  (574) 
None 
The Americans (2008) “He (Creel) ordered a printing of almost 
25 million copies of “How War Came to 
America,” (596) 
None 
American Anthem (2008) “Creel hired popular movie starts such as 
Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks to 
speak on behalf of the war effort.” (603) 
None 
Liberty, Equality, Power 
(2008) 
“Destroy This Mad Brute” and The 
Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin and The 
Prussian Cur   
Caption to image of the poster “Destroy 
this Mad Brute”: “The Campaign of 
Fear—By 1918, the government’s appeal 
to Americans’ best aspirations—to spread 
liberty and democracy—had been replaced 
by a determination to arouse fear of 
subversion and conquest.  Here the 
German enemy is depicted as a terrifying 
brute who violates Lady Liberty and uses 
his kultur club to destroy civilization” 
(703) 
The Enduring Vision 
(2008) 
The Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin “While claiming merely to combat rumors 
with facts, the Creel committee in reality 
publicized the government’s version of 
events and discredited all who questioned 
that version.”  (678)   
America: A Narrative 
History 8
th
 ed. (2010)   
The Kaiser, Beast of Berlin (including 
still photo) (1001) 
None 
UShistory.org “He (Creel) commissioned George M. 
Cohan to write patriotic songs intended to 
stoke the fires of American nationalism.” 
None 
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Appendix H: References to the CPI’s Role in Promoting Intolerance and 
Censorship 
Textbook CPI and Intolerance CPI and Censorship 
A History of the 
United States, 
Volume 2 (1951) 
 “But at the same time that Creel’s committee 
created an atmosphere of 100 per cent 
Americanism, it opened the door to bitter 
hatreds.  Hatred of Germany and all things 
German became universal and wholly 
indiscriminate.” (391) 
Yes.  “It (CPI) was not intended to be 
a censorship agency, although some 
aspects of censorship necessarily 
followed the selection or omission of 
material offered for public 
consumption.” (390) 
A Short History of the 
American People, 
1865-1952 2
nd
 ed.  
(1952) 
No Explains voluntary censorship.  
“There was no censorship…except the 
withholding by the military authorities 
of information such information as 
might aid the enemy.” (339) 
A History of the 
United States Since 
1865  (1959) 
No Explains voluntary censorship (same 
as in A Short History above).  
History of a Free 
People (1960) 
CPI “promoted the very intolerance which 
Wilson dreaded.” (527)  
No 
The United States: A 
History of a 
Democracy (1960) 
“There was little tolerance for anyone suspected 
of not supporting the war, and freedom 
suffered.”  (489)   
No 
The American People 
A History Vol. II 
Since 1865 3
rd
 ed. 
(1962)  
No Explains voluntary censorship 
A History of the 
United States Since 
1865  (1968)  
No “Through the daily Official Bulletin, it 
published those ‘facts’ about the war 
that government officials believed 
should be released” (270) 
America: A Narrative 
History (1984)   
“The ultimate irony in Creel’s ‘expression, not 
repression,’ however, was that one led to the 
other.  By arousing public opinion to such a 
pitch of excitement, the war effort channeled the 
crusading zeal of progressivism into grotesque 
campaigns for ‘Americanism’ and witch-
hunting.”  (964) 
Yes.  Explains Creel’s concept of 
“expression, not repression” but notes 
that this failed (964) 
The American Past: A 
Survey of American 
History (1987) 
“The CPI could and did launch a massive 
propaganda campaign that depicted German 
Kultur as intrinsically vile.”  (671) 
Yes.  CPI censored news from Europe 
to shield the American public from 
any news that would be demoralizing 
(671) 
Holt American Nation 
(2003) 
“The groups (including the CPI) were 
particularly hard on German-Americans, many 
of whom had lost their jobs.”  (645) 
No 
American History, A 
Survey 12
th
 ed. (2007) 
No Reference to “self-censorship” and the 
“veiled threats” that accompanied it 
(625) 
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The American 
Journey (2007) 
“Obsessed with national unity and conformity, 
Creel promoted fear, hatred, and prejudice in the 
name of a triumphant Americanism.” (677) 
“This emphasis on unreasoning conformity 
helped prompt hysterical attacks on German-
Americans, radicals, and pacifists.” (677) 
No 
America Past and 
Present 8
th
 ed. (2007) 
No Voluntary censorship (706) 
The American 
Promise (2007) 
“A firestorm of anti-German passion erupted.  
Across the nation, “100% American” campaigns 
enlisted ordinary people to sniff out disloyalty.”  
(757) 
No 
American Journey 
(2008) 
“During the war, the Committee on Public 
Information began trying to silence dissent and 
portrayed people who were against the war as 
unpatriotic.” (686) 
No 
The Americans 
(2008) 
“Creel’s propaganda campaign was highly 
effective.  However, while the campaign 
promoted patriotism, it also inflamed hatred and 
violations of the civil liberties of certain ethnic 
groups and opponents of the war.”  (597) 
No 
American Anthem 
(2008) 
“As many Americans became more patriotic and 
supportive of the war, some began to distrust all 
things German as well.”  (603) 
No 
America’s History 6
th
 
ed. (2008) 
Links CPI to Americanization campaign 
(banishing of German music, language; 
renaming sauerkraut and hamburgers) (693)   
No 
Liberty, Equality, 
Power (2008) 
“By 1918, the CPI’s campaign had developed a 
darker and more coercive side.  Inflammatory 
advertisements called on patriots to report on 
neighbors, coworkers,  and ethnics whom they 
suspected of subverting the war effort”…The 
CPI aroused hostility towards Germans by 
spreading lurid tales of German atrocities and 
encouraging the public to see movies such as 
The Prussian Cur and The Beast of Berlin. (702)   
No 
The Enduring Vision 
(2008) 
“Responding to wartime propaganda, some 
Americans became almost hysterical in their 
strident patriotism and their hostility to radicals 
and dissenters.” (679) 
“Propaganda releases…appeared in 
the press as ‘news’ with no indication 
of their source” (678) 
United States 
History: 
Reconstruction to the 
Present (2009) 
“The CPI also stressed the cruelty and 
wickedness of the enemy, particularly Germany, 
which in some cases aggravated resentment 
towards German-Americans.” (294) 
No 
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Appendix I: Examples of CPI Products Found in Textbooks 
Textbook Posters Other Examples 
A History of the United States, Volume 
2  (1951) 
“I Want YOU!” (389)  
History of a Free People (1960) “That Liberty Shall not Perish from 
the Earth” (for war bonds drive) 
 
A History of the United States Since 
1865  (1968) 
“I Want YOU!” (271)  
The American Nation 2
nd
 ed. (1971) “Remember the Flag of Liberty and 
Support It” (for Third Liberty Loan)  
(287) 
 
The American Pageant 6
th
 ed. (1979) “Destroy This Mad Brute” (668)  
The American Past: A Survey of 
American History (1987) 
“Halt the Hun” (657) 
“We will never be sunk!” (671) 
“Will you have a part in victory” 
(666) 
Excerpt from Four-Minute 
Man speech captioned: “The 
Four-Minute Men were as 
melodramatic as the films they 
interrupted.” (673) 
The American Pageant 11
th
 ed. (1998) “Halt the Hun!” “Over There” 
Pacemaker United States History 3
rd
 
ed. (2001) 
“The Navy Needs You!”
5
  
Holt American Nation (2003) “Can Vegetables and Fruit AND the 
Kaiser too” and “Over the Top for 
You” (Third Liberty Loan) (645) 
 
The American Pageant 13
th
 ed. (2006) “Remember Belgium” (Fourth Liberty 
Loan) (698) 
“Enlist: On Which Side of the 
Window are You?” (700) 
 
American History, A Survey 12
th
 ed. 
(2007) 
“I Want You!” (612) 
“Keep these off the U.S.A.” (Liberty 
Bonds) (625) 
 
The American Journey (2007) “Beat Back the Hun” (678)  
America Past and Present 8
th
 ed. 
(2007) 
“Food Will Win the War” (709)  
America’s History 6
th
 ed. (2008) “Your Duty—Buy United States 
Government Bonds” (683) 
“Halt the Hun!” (in “Documents to 
Accompany, p. 199) 
George Creel’s account of the 
Four-Minute Men (in 
“Documents to Accompany”) 
                                                 
5. This textbook’s treatment of the CPI comes in the form of an activity (“Connecting History and Language: 
Propaganda”).  After explaining how the CPI used a combination of facts and opinions in its propaganda, the 
exercise asks “Sometimes propaganda includes statements that are not true.  Do you think it is right to use false 
statements to help a good cause?” (318) The answer (from the Teacher’s edition) is: “Using false statements is 
unnecessary; often fails.  Using false statements is morally wrong”  (318). 
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The Americans (2008) “Food is Ammunition – Don’t Waste 
It.” 
 
American Anthem (2008) “I Want You!”  
“Over the Top for You” 
 
The American Journey (2008) “Food is Ammunition – Don’t Waste 
it” and “Spirit of 1917” (687) 
“You’re a Grand Old Flag” 
Liberty, Equality, Power (2008) “Destroy This Mad Brute”  
The Enduring Vision (2008) None “Over There” 
The American Vision (2008) “Help Stop This” (War Savings 
Stamps) (562) 
Poster for Pershing’s Crusaders 
“Civilization vs. Barbarism” (Red 
Cross) (563) 
Newspaper column from New 
York Times on German 
Atrocities (563) 
Prentice Hall United States History, 
North Carolina ed. (2009) 
“Over the Top for You” (Third 
Liberty Loan) (499) 
Postcard (with flags of allies) 
“To make the World Safe for 
Democracy” (498) 
America: A Narrative History 8
th
 ed.  
(2010) 
None Still photo from The Kaiser: 
The Beast of Berlin (1001) 
USHistory.org (2014) “I Want You!” 
“Beat Back the Hun with Liberty 
Bonds” 
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